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The Human Right of Property 
JOSÉ E. ALVAREZ * 
Despite the absence of a comprehensive global pact on the 
subject, the human right to property protection—a right of 
property but only rarely to specific property—exists and is 
recognized in 21 human rights instruments, including some 
of the most widely ratified multilateral treaties ever adopted.  
The Cold War’s omission of property rights in the two prin-
cipal treaties on human rights, namely the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, has 
been overtaken by events. But that reality continues to be re-
sisted by legal scholars, including human rights advocates, 
as well as by many across the political spectrum from many 
on the left (who associate property rights with misguided 
“Western” models for economic development) to some on 
the right (who see it as yet another intrusion on sovereign 
discretion sought by global elites). It is also resisted by U.S. 
courts which continue to assert that international law regu-
lates the treatment of foreign property but not of “domestic 
takings” involving actions directed at a state’s own citizens.  
This Article surveys the reality of internationalized prop-
erty rights protections outside the usual context in which it 
                                                                                                             
 *  Herbert and Rose Rubin Professor of International Law, New York Uni-
versity School of Law. This is an extended version of the Fifth Annual Louis 
Henkin Lecture on Human Rights: “The Human Right to Property,” presented at 
the University of Miami School of Law on March 2, 2017. The author is grateful 
for comments received on that occasion and at subsequent presentations at Queen 
Mary University of London and the Graduate Institute of International Studies in 
Geneva, and also for the able research assistance of Melina E. De Bona, Johann 
Justus Vasel, and Nahuel Maisley 
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is addressed, namely to protect the property of foreign in-
vestors in the host states in which they operate. It canvasses 
the policy and jurisprudential objections to the idea of a 
treaty-based human right of property, addresses how the 
U.S. has contributed to the internationalization of this hu-
man right, and contrasts the property caselaw of the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights with the ways U.S. courts 
have largely resisted the idea that the international human 
right of property exists. It addresses how human rights trea-
ties respond to objections to property rights writ large and 
uses, inter alia, the property rulings of the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights to advance a non-instrumentalist de-
fense of the human right to property protection based on 
“moral intuitions” of what human dignity requires. Finally, 
the Article defends the fragmented nature of the distinct in-
ternational regimes that protect property from those who 
would seek to harmonize its contours either through a global 
agreement or by recognizing its status as customary law.  
 
INTRODUCTION ..................................................................... 582 
I. THE RIGHT TO PROPERTY PROTECTION AND ITS 
DISCONTENTS ................................................................. 588 
II.  INTERNATIONAL PROPERTY PROTECTION AS AN 
“AMERICAN” IDEA ......................................................... 597 
III.  CASE STUDY OF THE PROPERTY JURISPRUDENCE OF THE 
INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS ............... 606 
A. Recognizing the Communal Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples ..................................................................... 607 
1. SECURING COMMUNAL PROPERTY ...................... 607 
2. DETERMINING WHETHER A GROUP ENJOYS SUCH 
RIGHTS ................................................................ 609 
3.  STATE OBLIGATIONS WHERE COMMUNAL RIGHTS 
ARE ESTABLISHED ............................................... 612 
B. Claims Involving Private Property .......................... 615 
1. DEFINING PROTECTED PROPERTY ........................ 615 
2.  DEFINING DEPRIVATIONS OF PROPERTY .............. 620 
a. Expropriations ............................................... 620 
b.  Civil Forfeiture .............................................. 623 
c. Damage to Property in the Course of Law 
582 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:580 
 
Enforcement .................................................. 628 
d. Cases of “Special Gravity” ............................ 630 
IV. U.S. COURTS’ DIFFICULTIES WITH THE HUMAN                     
RIGHT OF PROPERTY ...................................................... 634 
V.  WHAT THE HUMAN RIGHT OF PROPERTY IS (AND ISN’T) 644 
VI.  NORMATIVE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE HUMAN                 
RIGHT OF PROPERTY ...................................................... 666 
CONCLUSION ......................................................................... 683 
INTRODUCTION 
Although states today do not routinely expropriate private prop-
erty without compensation, they continue to abuse their power over 
property. Consider two, not atypical, cases. 
In 2011, Nelson Mezerhane, a successful Venezuelan entrepre-
neur who owned a leading bank, the newspaper Diario El Globo, 
and the television channel Globovisión, filed a seventeen-count 
complaint against Venezuela in a federal district court in the United 
States.1 He alleged that, beginning in 2004, during Hugo Chavez’s 
term as President, the Venezuelan government targeted his enter-
prises because of their editorial independence.2 Eventually, through 
what he asserted were “illegitimate judicial proceedings,” the 
Chavez regime expropriated all of Mr. Mezerhane’s and his family’s 
assets, stripped him of his Venezuelan citizenship, and revoked his 
rights to travel or earn a livelihood, and to acquire, sell, or convey 
any property.3 Mr. Mezerhane asserted that, as a result of these ac-
tions, he was rendered stateless.4 At the time of filing his claims, he 
was seeking asylum in the United States.5 Comparable expropriating 
actions to silence political dissent continue to occur in places like 
Vladimir Putin’s Russia and Xi Jinping’s China.6 
                                                                                                             
 1 Mezerhane v. República Bolivariana de Venezuela, 785 F.3d 545, 546–47 
(11th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 800 (2016), discussed infra Part IV. 
 2 Id. at 547. 
 3 Id. 
 4 Id. 
 5 Id. 
 6 See, e.g., Jordan Gans-Morse, Threats to Property Rights in Russia: From 
Private Coercion to State Aggression, 28 POST-SOVIET AFF. 263, 264 (2012); 
Emily Korstanje, China’s Oppression of Tibetans has Dramatically Increased, 
2018] THE HUMAN RIGHT OF PROPERTY 583 
 
Contemporary deprivations of property rights do not always in-
volve instances in which a government rescinds prior title to land 
out of political pique. Claims to property, now as always, continue 
to be made by groups of indigenous peoples who have lived and 
farmed lands for generations without any formal legal title but who 
face displacement by a state’s decision to sell tracks of that land to 
private owners—frequently to huge agribusinesses.7 When this oc-
curred to the Sawhoyamaxa Community in Paraguay, they brought 
a claim in 2006 against that state before the Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights (IACHR).8 Both representatives of the tribe and 
expert witnesses on its behalf claimed that Paraguay’s denial of an-
cestral lands forced tribe members to live in “precarious” circum-
stances with limited access to food, drinkable water, or medical care, 
which led to many preventable deaths in violation of the tribe’s right 
to life9—and not only its right to property.10 Similar “land grabs” by 
multinational interests (in collusion with governments), along with 
other forms of governmental evictions—in violation of interdepend-
ent rights to food, shelter, and health as well as rights to property 
and life—have led to comparable complaints before the African 
Commission of Human Rights.11 
                                                                                                             
NEW INTERNATIONALIST (Feb. 4, 2016), https://newint.org/features/web-exclu-
sive/2016/02/04/chinas-oppression-of-tibetans-has-dramatically-increased. 
 7 See, e.g., Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay, Merits, Repara-
tions and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 146, at 16 (Mar. 29, 
2006). 
 8 Id. at 1–2. 
 9 Id. at 26–28, 47–49. 
 10 Id. at 68. 
 11 See, e.g., Soc. and Econ. Rights Action Ctr. v. Nigeria, Communication 
155/96, African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights [Afr. Comm’n 
H.P.R.], ¶¶ 1–9 (Oct. 27, 2001), http://www.achpr.org/files/sessions/30th/co-
munications/155.96/achpr30_155_96_eng.pdf; Malawi Afr. Ass’n v. Mauritania, 
Communication 54/91-61/91-96/93-98/93-164/97_196/97-210/98, African Com-
mission on Human and Peoples’ Rights [Afr. Comm’n H.P.R.], ¶ 17 (May 11, 
2000), http://www.achpr.org/files/sessions/27th/comunications/54.91-61.91-
96.93-98.93-164.97_196.97-210.98/achpr27_54.91_61.91_96.93_98.93_
164.97_196.97_210.98_eng.pdf. See also Olivier De Schutter, How Not to Think 
of Land-Grabbing: Three Critiques of Large-Scale Investments in Farmland, 38 
J. PEASANT STUD. 249, 249 (2011). 
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Despite such abuses, international lawyers, including human 
rights advocates, are ambivalent and sometimes hostile about recog-
nizing a “human right” to property protection. That skepticism ex-
tends to U.S. judges. As discussed below, if Venezuela steals the 
property of Mr. Mezerhane or if Paraguay deprives its own indige-
nous peoples of their livelihood, U.S. courts appear to be of the view 
that this is not an issue governed by international law.12 This Article 
explores the bases for such hostility and defends the reality (and the 
idea) of the human right of property. 
In doing so, this Article revisits questions that have been raised 
for centuries concerning the right of property and, at least since 
WWII, the role of international law with respect to that right. The 
latter was a particular source of tension when the U.N. first began to 
elaborate the “international bill of rights.”13 Whether to include a 
reference to property became a highly contentious issue when the 
U.N. General Assembly elaborated, in 1948, the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights, and much later, when that body considered 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR).14 On both occasions, there was considerable dis-
pute about whether the international community ought to include as 
a “fundamental human right” a right to the protection of property.15 
After a fraught battle (mostly on East-West lines), the U.N. opted to 
include what ultimately became Article 17 in the Universal Decla-
ration.16 That contested decision to include a purposely vague recog-
nition of the “right to own property,” in an instrument regarded as 
purely hortatory, came only after a series of votes on alternative for-
mulations (including one widely supported option to omit such a 
right altogether).17 Later in 1966, when the Assembly sought to 
                                                                                                             
 12 Mezerhane v. República Bolivariana de Venezuela, 785 F.3d 545, 549–52 
(11th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 800 (2016). 
 13 See John G. Sprankling, The Global Right to Property, 52 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 464, 469–71 (2014). 
 14 Id. 
 15 Id. at 471–72. 
 16 Id. at 472–73. 
 17 G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 17 (Dec. 
10, 1948) (“1. Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in associ-
ation with others. 2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.”). See 
Gudmundur Alfredsson, Article 17, in THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN 
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transform the Universal Declaration of Human Rights into a binding 
treaty, property rights were left on the cutting room floor.18 Such a 
right never made it into either the ICCPR or the ICESCR, the bases 
for the “international bill of rights.”19 While the West, led by the 
United States, was eager to protect the institution of private prop-
erty, the U.S.S.R., its allies, and many newly independent states 
were equally eager to defend the paramount right of sovereigns to 
exercise self-determination, particularly with respect to a matter so 
closely connected to a nation’s decision to be either a socialist or a 
market state.20 When the two covenants affirmed, as their respective 
first articles, the right of self-determination, the West’s preference 
for including the right to property was the first casualty.21 
Much has changed in international law since 1966 but some at-
titudes have not. Today, as is suggested by the list of thirty-five in-
ternational instruments accompanying this Article in the Appendix, 
property protections feature prominently in a number of widely rat-
ified treaties, including all of today’s most prominent regional hu-
man rights regimes. In the wake of the Cold War—and the inclusion 
                                                                                                             
RIGHTS: A COMMENTARY 255, 255–56 (Asbjørn Eide et al. eds., 1992). Opposi-
tion to including property rights among the “rights of man” was not limited to the 
U.N.’s East bloc members. See, e.g., H. LAUTERPACHT, AN INTERNATIONAL BILL 
OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN 163 (1945). Lauterpacht argued that the decision by the 
Institute of International Law in 1929 to include, as the first article in its Declara-
tion on the Rights of Man, the duty of states “to grant to every person the equal 
right to life, liberty, and property” is “unobjectionable,” so long as the intention 
is to require “respect on a footing of equality such rights” under national law. Id. 
But he argued that “social and economic changes have intervened” to preclude 
acceptance of what Locke, Blackstone, the Virginia Bill of Rights of 1776, and 
the French Declaration of the Rights of Man of 1789 had all considered an “invi-
olable and sacred right.” Id. Lauterpacht omitted property rights from his bill of 
rights not only because of the rise of states reliant on collective ownership as the 
principal means of production, but because even states dependent on private prop-
erty interfered with such property “through taxation, death duties, and regulation 
in pursuance of general welfare.” Id. 
 18 See Sprankling, supra note 13, at 470. 
 19 Id. 
 20 Id. at 471–72. 
 21 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 1(1), adopted 
Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 173 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [herein-
after ICCPR]; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
art. 1(1), adopted Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 5 (entered into force Jan. 3, 
1976) [hereinafter ICESCR]. 
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of property rights in nearly all of the world’s constitutions—there is 
no longer a clear East-West divide on the question of whether legal 
protections for property rights exist as a matter of national or inter-
national law.22 As demonstrated by a case study of the property 
rights jurisprudence of the IACHR in Part III, such rights are now 
the subject of international adjudication, not only by regional human 
rights tribunals but by several human rights treaty bodies.23 Interna-
tional property rights scholarship exists with respect to a number of 
the treaty regimes identified in the Appendix, particularly jurispru-
dence under the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), in the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) relating to intellectual property, 
and in investor-state tribunals under International Investment 
Agreements (IIAs).24 Property rights also feature prominently in the 
work and reports issued by development experts and economists.25 
International financial institutions, such as the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), give high salience to property 
rights as part of good governance.26 Indeed, these institutions, and 
others that purport to measure “rule of law” compliance, presume 
that states have a duty to protect the property of both their own na-
                                                                                                             
 22 According to a 2012 study of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights’ 
potential impact on subsequent national constitutions, 85% of the world’s consti-
tutions contained a right to own property. Zachary Elkins et al., Imagining a 
World Without the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 19, tbl.1 (Mar. 7, 
2014) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ab-
stract_id=2469194. See also Sprankling, supra note 13, at 493 (noting that at a 
symposium in 1995, Louis Henkin, the chief Reporter for the 1986 U.S. Restate-
ment—which did not include the right to property in its list of established custom-
ary human rights in section 702—is reported to have said that, given changes in 
the world since 1986, “if he were drafting Section 702 today he would include as 
customary international law [the] right[] to property”) (quoting Richard B. Lillich, 
The Growing Importance of Customary International Human Rights Law, 25 GA. 
J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 7 n.43 (1995)). 
 23 See also infra Part V. 
 24 See infra Appendix. See also José E. Alvarez, The U.S. Contribution to 
International Investment Law, in AMERICAN CLASSICS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 1, 30 (José E. Alvarez ed., 2017) [hereinafter 
Alvarez, International Investment Law]. 
 25 See, e.g., Harvey M. Jacobs, Private Property and Human Rights: A Mis-
match in the 21st Century?, 22 INT’L J. SOC. WELFARE S85, S94 (2013). 
 26 See id. at S94–S95. 
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tionals and of foreign investors and traders located in their terri-
tory.27 But apart from these discrete regimes, attention to property 
rights as part of international human rights law lags.28 Indeed, even 
human rights defenders remain either ambivalent or overtly hostile 
to the idea that international law protects property as a fundamental 
human right. As a leading U.S. scholar on the subject, John Spran-
kling has noted, despite black letter treaty law to the contrary, the 
traditional answer to the question—does a right to property exist un-
der international law?—is “no.”29 
The few contemporary scholars who have taken international 
property protections seriously, such as Sprankling, have tended to 
assume that the piecemeal nature of international property protec-
tions, illustrated by the absence in the accompanying Appendix of a 
single overarching multilateral property protection treaty, is a prob-
lem that needs correcting.30 On this issue, as on many others, some 
suggest that international law’s approach to property protection 
needs harmonization.31 There is a presumption that it would be de-
sirable to encourage the development of an “international law of 
property” that would embrace a “global” human right to property 
recognized as a matter of general customary international law or 
general principles of law.32 Such a global right, applicable to all na-
tions irrespective of their adherence to any treaty and perhaps 
achieved through gradual case law development, would ideally re-
sult in clarity about the protected forms of both tangible and intan-
gible property, along with global agreement on the legitimate mo-
dalities for its creation and acquisition, including uniform rights to 
use, destroy, exclude, and transfer property.33 Of course, a global 
                                                                                                             
 27 See, e.g., Era Dabla-Norris & Scott Freeman, The Enforcement of Property 
Rights and Underdevelopment 3 (IMF, Working Paper No. WP/99/127, 1999), 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/1999/wp99127.pdf. 
 28 But see Christophe Golay & Ioana Cismas, Legal Opinion: The Right to 
Property from a Human Rights Perspective 2 (July 7, 2010) (unpublished manu-
script), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1635359. 
 29 Sprankling, supra note 13, at 465. 
 30 Id. at 500–02. 
 31 See id.; see generally Martti Koskenniemi & Päivi Leino, Fragmentation 
of International Law? Postmodern Anxieties, 15 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 553, 553 
(2002). 
 32 JOHN G. SPRANKLING, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF PROPERTY 347–60 
(2014). 
 33 See id. 
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human right to property would also contain consistent rules identi-
fying when states can legitimately regulate or interfere with the 
right. 
This Article explores why there is a continuing resistance to ac-
ceptance of such a human right in many circles even though inter-
national law embraces property rights while not cohering around a 
unified law of property. It also attempts to show, through select ex-
amples, what the human right of property has meant so far in prac-
tice. Part I surveys reasons for the continuing resistance to global 
property rights. Part II answers the canard that the international pro-
tection of property rights is fundamentally “un-American.” Part III 
provides a case study of how one regional human rights system has 
dealt with the right of property. Part IV addresses, by contrast, U.S. 
courts’ responses to claims based on such a human right. Part V ex-
plores, more broadly, what contemporary international law says 
about the right, while Part VI advances some normative justifica-
tions for the black letter law. A final section concludes that, contrary 
to advocates of defragmentation or harmonization, the human right 
of property, admittedly a product of the West, will remain a viable 
proposition in the West and beyond only to the extent that it remains 
subject to distinct contextualized interpretations in international re-
gimes and diverse international adjudicative forums. 
I. THE RIGHT TO PROPERTY PROTECTION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 
Hostility to the idea that international law should protect a hu-
man right to property applicable to a state’s own nationals, and not 
only to foreigners within it, cuts across the left-right political spec-
trum. While left-leaning international lawyers are sympathetic to the 
claims of groups such as the Sawhoyamaxa community in Paraguay, 
they are likely to see demands by indigenous peoples as special 
cases involving the self-determination or the “cultural” rights of a 
group—and not an instance that invokes a general human right to 
property under international law.34 At the same time, critics of so-
cialist or undemocratic regimes may recoil at the property abuses 
committed by such regimes when directed at a state’s own nationals 
                                                                                                             
 34 See, e.g., Ariel E. Dulitzky, When Afro-Descendants Became “Tribal Peo-
ples”: The Inter-American Human Rights System and Rural Black Communities, 
15 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 29, 58–59 (2010). 
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(such as the treatment accorded to Mr. Mezerhane) but still remain 
reluctant to open the door of their own courts to claims by foreigners 
or to permit supranational scrutiny of how states treat the property 
rights of their own citizens.35 
Human rights advocates’ ambivalence about this alleged funda-
mental right is deeply rooted in history.36 The right to property un-
derlies, after all, some of the darkest episodes in history and they are 
skeptical about elevating the status of a right that has impeded the 
realization of what they consider “more important” human rights.37 
They are aware that some theologians have used the right of prop-
erty (recast as sovereign “dominium”) to justify “just war” and its 
consequences, including the plunder of property owned by “infi-
dels”38; that the “father” of international law, Hugo Grotius, used 
property rights to justify the Dutch East India Company’s unilateral 
rights to protect Dutch trading routes;39 and that nineteenth century 
lawyers argued that the need to protect the rights of foreign investors 
from the North required resort to gun-boat diplomacy and even mil-
itary interventions in the Global South.40 The ostensible right to 
property has privileged powerful and wealthy elites within states,41 
                                                                                                             
 35 See, e.g., FOGADE v. ENB Revocable Tr., 263 F.3d 1274, 1294–95 (11th 
Cir. 2001). 
 36 See Jacobs, supra note 25, at S86. 
 37 Id. at S95–96. 
 38 WILHELM G. GREWE, THE EPOCHS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 105 (Michael 
Byers trans., 2000); JAMES THUO GATHII, WAR, COMMERCE, AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 43–46 (2010). 
 39 Martti Koskenniemi, International Law and the Emergence of Mercantile 
Capitalism: Grotius to Smith, in THE ROOTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 3, 6–9 
(Pierre-Marie Dupuy & Vincent Chetail eds., 2014). 
 40 See, e.g., O. Thomas Johnson, Jr. & Jonathan Gimblett, From Gunboats to 
BITs: The Evolution of Modern International Investment Law, in Y.B. INT’L INV. 
L. & POL’Y 2010–2011, 649, 651 (Karl P. Sauvant ed., 2012). 
 41 See Jacobs, supra note 25, at S95–96. 
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been used to limit the right to vote,42 perpetuated patriarchy,43 pro-
moted inequality,44 and hampered efforts to redistribute.45 Indeed, 
given the concentration of wealth in the world, the right to property 
would appear to be a problem to be solved rather than a right that 
needs defending.46 
The right to property has been charged, in short, with many sins. 
It has been used as an imperialist cudgel to colonize,47 to privilege 
only one kind of market state,48 and to support wrong-headed “pri-
vatization” demands by the IMF.49 Today, the most prominent in-
ternational property rights regime—pursued under treaties like the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),50 which protects 
the property rights of foreign investors in its three states—is seen as 
chilling environmental regulations even in rich countries like Can-
ada and the U.S.51 The fact that property rights feature so promi-
nently in institutions like the IMF is one reason they are seen with 
great suspicion by those who have long questioned the conse-
quences of that institution’s ideologically loaded development 
                                                                                                             
 42 See RALPH FEVRE, INDIVIDUALISM AND INEQUALITY: THE FUTURE OF 
WORK AND POLITICS 74 (2016). 
 43 See Kerry Rittich, The Properties of Gender Equality, in HUMAN RIGHTS 
AND DEVELOPMENT: TOWARDS MUTUAL REINFORCEMENT 87, 87 (Philip Alston 
& Mary Robinson eds., 2005) [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT]. 
 44 See Jacobs, supra note 25, at S95–96. 
 45 See Gregory S. Alexander, Property as a Fundamental Constitutional 
Right? The German Example, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 733, 770–71 (2003). 
 46 See FEVRE, supra note 42, at 1–2. It has not escaped the notice of interna-
tional lawyers that the two human rights covenants’ sole mention of property tar-
gets the well-known uses of property entitlements to engage in harmful discrimi-
nation. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 21, art. 2(1) (barring distinctions among per-
sons “of any kind, such as . . . property, birth or other status”); ICESCR, supra 
note 21, art. 2(2) (same). 
 47 See Jacobs, supra note 25, at S87. 
 48 Id. 
 49 See, e.g., Ukraine Receives IMF Support But Must Accelerate Reforms, 
IMF Country Focus (Apr. 4, 2017), https://www.imf.org/en/News/Arti-
cles/2017/04/03/na040417-ukraine-receives-imf-support-but-must-accelerate-re-
forms. 
 50 North American Free Trade Agreement, Can.-Mex.-U.S., Dec. 17, 1992, 
32 I.L.M. 289 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA]. 
 51 See Vicki Been & Joel C. Beauvais, The Global Fifth Amendment? 
NAFTA’s Investment Protections and the Misguided Quest for an International 
“Regulatory Takings” Doctrine, 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 30, 32 (2003). 
See generally Jacobs, supra note 25, at S85–99. 
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agenda, including experts on human rights or transitional justice. If 
one’s view of what international property rights mean is dominated 
by its role in investor-state arbitrations or in the conditionality agen-
das of the IMF—regimes that are now subject to considerable back-
lash—there is no mystery surrounding resistance to such rights.52 To 
the extent internationalized property protections are seen as the 
product of discredited formulas to promote economic development 
in less developed states, these are likely to suffer the same criticisms 
as the Washington Consensus (or post-Washington Consensus) 
frames for justifying them.53 
Resistance to an individual “right” to property protection is not 
limited to modern day skeptics of economic globalization.54 It has 
deeper roots in conceptual and moral contradictions that have been 
obvious to legal philosophers for centuries.55 How can persons sim-
ultaneously be protected from government for a right that exists only 
because it is created by government? Why protect private property, 
a creature of society, from society, when society needs at times to 
take property without full compensation, as with land reform?56 For 
                                                                                                             
 52 See, e.g., Letter from Alliance for Justice, to Members of Congress (Mar. 
11, 2015), http://www.afj.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/ISDS-Letter-3.11.pdf 
(letter signed by 100 U.S. law professors urging Congress to reject investor-state 
dispute settlement provisions in order “to protect the rule of law” as trade agree-
ments are negotiated). 
 53 See, e.g., José E. Alvarez, Why are We “Re-Calibrating” Our Investment 
Treaties?, 4 WORLD ARBITRATION & MEDIATION REV. 143, 144 (2010) [herein-
after Alvarez, Our Investment Treaties]. 
 54 See, e.g., PIERRE-JOSEPH PROUDHON, WHAT IS PROPERTY? 13 (Donald R. 
Kelley & Bonnie G. Smith, eds., trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1994) (1840). 
 55 See id.; see also Rhonda E. Howard-Hassmann, Reconsidering the Right to 
Own Property, 12 J. HUM. RTS. 180, 182 (2013). 
 56 See, e.g., LAUTERPACHT, supra note 17, at 163. These tensions emerge 
even in documents that affirm official long-standing U.S. policy affirming the il-
legality of government takings of foreign owned property. Thus, the influential 
Third Restatement on Foreign Relations Law, whose chief reporter was Louis 
Henkin, affirms that states are responsible for injury to nationals of other states, 
including for acts or omissions that violate their right to property. RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 711 (AM. 
LAW INST. 1986). It also acknowledges that while there is lack of agreement on 
the scope of the right, “the right of an individual to own some property and not to 
be deprived of it arbitrarily is recognized as a human right.” Id., cmt. d. Nonethe-
less, it acknowledges that states other than the U.S. have frequently asserted an 
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many it is hard to take seriously a right whose limitation may be 
necessary—even vital—to give effect to the rights of others or 
whose essence (the right to sell, trade or destroy one’s property) 
seems at odds with the inalienability that for some distinguishes 
“genuine” civil and political rights.57 While we would be aghast by 
the idea that someone should be able to bargain away his right not 
to be tortured, it would be a feeble property right that does not in-
clude the rights to sell, trade or destroy it. 
As this suggests, skepticism about a right to property is not lim-
ited to international lawyers. For some legal philosophers, the al-
leged right to property does not derive from the human condition but 
rather from the mere material (and arbitrary) fact that someone has 
managed to secure first possession.58 Other critics argue that the pur-
ported right is largely a claim made against the state and has little to 
say about the most important consequence of recognizing such a 
right: namely, that it diminishes the rights of other persons by ex-
cluding them from possession.59 The right to property largely con-
sists, after all, in the right to exclude others from enjoying one’s 
property. Recognition of such a “right” limits the freedom of others 
since it imposes a duty on them to abstain from interfering with it.60 
If one defines “genuine” human rights61 as those that serve to con-
nect individuals by reminding them of their common humanity, 
                                                                                                             
exception from compensation in cases involving a national program of agricul-
tural land reform which would not be possible if full compensation were to be 
paid. Id. § 712 reporter’s note 3. 
 57 See, e.g., Francis Cheneval, Property Rights as Human Rights, in 1 
REALIZING PROPERTY RIGHTS 11 (Hernando de Soto & Francis Cheneval eds., 
2006); LOUIS HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS 3 (1990). 
 58 See Manuel Monteagudo, The Right to Property in Human Rights and In-
vestment Law: A Latin American Perspective of an Unavoidable Connection 6, 
n.26 (SECO / WTI Academic Cooperation Project Working Paper Series No. 
2013/06, 2013) (citing Héctor Faúndez Ledesma). For a thoughtful critique of ef-
forts to justify private property on theories of historic entitlement, see JEREMY 
WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 253–83 (1988). 
 59 For an effort to square this circle, see HANOCH DAGAN, PROPERTY: 
VALUES AND INSTITUTIONS 37–40 (2011). 
 60 See, e.g., Joseph Raz, Human Rights in the Emerging World Order, in 
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 217, 220 (Rowan Cruft et al. 
eds., 2015) [hereinafter PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS] (not-
ing that this is characteristic of all rights). 
 61 Monteagudo, supra note 58, at 6 (discussing whether the right to property 
is a “genuine” human right). 
2018] THE HUMAN RIGHT OF PROPERTY 593 
 
property rights appear to do the opposite. Encouraging people, like 
children, to claim—“that’s mine”—does not seem, at first glance, a 
particularly promising way to encourage individuals to relate to one 
another. Why protect a right, in short, that, as the Ten Command-
ments suggest, is largely defined by the right to exclude others from 
what is one’s own?62 
As this suggests, religious leaders have not generally (or always) 
been strong proponents of property rights, particularly if these are 
seen as individual rights to private property.63 Christian theologians 
have long struggled with the moral justifications for allocating pri-
vate property.64 Many of them have pointed out that, since man—
not God—created the institution of private property and God’s earth 
was created for the use and enjoyment of all, there needs to be a 
particular justification offered for privileging a right that allocates 
particular objects or pieces of land to individuals to use as they 
please to the exclusion of others who may have a greater need.65 
Other theologians have struggled with the moral justifications of a 
right they associated with several of the deadly sins—from avarice 
to gluttony.66 And those with a sense of history have questioned the 
need to elevate to the status of a “right” a concept that has justified 
slavery and is still used around the world to subjugate the rights of 
women.67 Why privilege a bundle of rights, including inheritance, 
                                                                                                             
 62 “You shall not covet your neighbor’s house; you shall not covet your 
neighbor’s wife or his male servant or his female servant or his ox or his donkey 
or anything that belongs to your neighbor.” Exodus 20:17. For general critiques 
of the right to property along these lines, see Laura Dehaibi, The Case for an 
Inclusive Human Right to Property: Social Importance and Individual Self-Real-
ization, 6 W. J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 1 (2015). 
 63 See, e.g., Louis W. Hensler III, What’s Sic Utere for the Goose: The Public 
Nature of the Right to Use and Enjoy Property Suggests a Utilitarian Approach 
to Nuisance Cases, 37 N. KY. L. REV. 31, 36 (2010). 
 64 See id. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. at 37. 
 67 See, e.g., Exodus, supra note 62, or, for that matter, JEAN-JACQUES 
ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT & DISCOURSES 221 (G.D. H. Cole ed., J.M. 
Dent & Sons 1913) (1755) (“[They] bound new fetters on the poor, and gave new 
powers to the rich . . . irretrievably [they] destroyed natural liberty, eternally fixed 
the law of property and inequality, converted clever usurpation into unalterable 
right, and, for the advantage of a few ambitious individuals, subjected all mankind 
to perpetual labour, slavery, and wretchedness.”). 
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which perpetuates the accumulation of wealth—and which only 
makes it harder, as Jesus suggested, for rich men (property holders 
have historically been predominately male) to get into Heaven?68 
Indeed, even defenders of private property, such as John Locke, ar-
gued that persons should not possess more property than they could 
use or suggested, as did Rousseau, that the right to one’s personal 
property does not include the right to make a profit from it.69 Many 
prominent scholars have treated property as a form of theft, have 
called for its abolition, have seen it as a manifestation of pernicious 
possessive individualism, or have associated it with violence pur-
sued for the sake of dispossession.70 
And even defenders of national property rights have been skep-
tical of the need for supra-national scrutiny in furtherance of such 
rights. For example, U.S. property scholars have been critical of the 
need for international rules to protect the rights of those whose rights 
are already subject to the considerable protections accorded under 
relevant U.S. law, including the Takings Clause of the U.S. Consti-
tution.71 For many such critics, international property rights, such as 
those that accompany the investment chapter of NAFTA, have be-
come more like swords wielded by powerful foreign investors to 
challenge legitimate regulation and less like shields against the 
abuse of state power.72 Critics allege that IIAs, originally touted as 
                                                                                                             
 68 Matthew 19:24 (“[I]t is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle, 
than for a rich man to enter the kingdom of God.” (quoting Jesus). Thus, even 
John Locke, a foremost defender of rights to private property, took contradictory 
positions regarding the “natural rights” of heirs to their inheritance. See 
WALDRON, supra note 58, at 241–51. 
 69 See, e.g., Howard-Hassmann, supra note 55, at 182 (“As much land as a 
man tills, plants, improves, cultivates, and can use the product of, so much [only] 
is his property.”) (quoting JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 308 
(Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1960) (1690)); ROUSSEAU, supra note 
67, at 50–51. 
 70 See, e.g., Howard-Hassmann, supra note 55, at 182 (citing PIERRE JOSEPH 
PROUDHON, WHAT IS PROPERTY? AN ENQUIRY INTO THE PRINCIPLE OF RIGHT AND 
OF GOVERNMENT (1840); KARL MARX & FRIEDRICH ENGELS, THE COMMUNIST 
MANIFESTO (Samuel H. Beer et al eds., 1955) (1888); C.B. MACPHERSON, THE 
POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM: HOBBES TO LOCKE (1962)); 
Stefan Andreasson, Stand and Deliver: Private Property and the Politics of 
Global Dispossession, 54 POL. STUD. 3 (2006)). 
 71 See, e.g., Been & Beauvais, supra note 51, at 59. 
 72 See id. at 40. 
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tools to promote the rule of law, have become mechanisms to un-
dermine it.73 
Others, particularly on the right, laud defenders of private prop-
erty––from Robert Nozick to Friedrich Hayek––but insist that deci-
sions on how a government chooses to treat the property of its own 
citizens should not be subject to the dictates of international adjudi-
cators. Some of the populist resistance to the European Union un-
doubtedly stems from resentments generated by property-restricting 
mandates issued from Brussels and enforced by the European Court 
of Justice.74 In the United States, for self-described members of the 
“Alt-Right,” the fact that many human rights treaties identified in 
the Appendix purport to intrude on “sovereign” rights to allocate 
property rights is yet one more reason for opposing such treaties as 
inconsistent with “American values.” 
Outside of Western countries like the United States, hostility to 
the internationalization of property rights has a long history that ex-
tends as far back as attempts to establish a “New International Eco-
nomic Order” in the 1970s.75 It is not lost on critical scholars of in-
ternational law that the idea of protecting property on the basis of 
international norms first arose in connection with protecting the 
rights of (Western) foreign investors.76 For some scholars associated 
with Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL), those 
                                                                                                             
 73 See Letter from Alliance for Justice, supra note 52. For some U.S. critics, 
the property protections in the international investment regime are reminiscent of 
discredited property protections imposed under the Lochner era as described in, 
HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE & DEMISE OF 
LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE 10, 19–22 (1993). 
 74 Indeed, the very first property rights case brought to the European Court of 
Justice was a challenge brought by a German farmer who was precluded from 
planting new wine vines by an E.U. edict that precluded use of her land for this 
purpose to maintain a “quantitative balance” of the market in wine. The farmer 
lost the case on the basis that the restriction was not an “undue limitation upon the 
exercise of the right to property.” Case 44/79, Hauer v. Land Rheinland-Pfalz, 
1979 E.C.R. 3727, 3748–49. 
 75 James Thuo Gathii, Neoliberalism, Colonialism and International Govern-
ance: Decentering the International Law of Governmental Legitimacy, 98 MICH. 
L. REV. 1996, 2032 n.116 (2000). 
 76 For example, see, Ursula Kriebaum & August Reinisch, Property, Right 
to, International Protection, in MAX PLANCK ENCYC. OF PUB. INT’L L. (Rüdiger 
Wolfrum ed., 2009) (noting that international investment law has served as a back-
bone for international rules on the protection of private property). 
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historical origins continue to dominate, and therefore, the contem-
porary property rights instruments identified in the Appendix con-
stitute struts supporting the “structural violence” of racialized priv-
ilege and embedded asymmetries that international law continues to 
impose on the formerly colonized.77 To such critics, the human right 
to property perpetuates “Westernised legal modernities of individu-
alised property rights and land designation titles.”78 As this suggests, 
arguments first heard at the U.N. in 1948 and 1966—that each na-
tion should be able to determine for itself when to create alternatives 
to private property, including common property (e.g. national parks) 
or communal property (such as communal lands governed by a 
tribe)—continue to be made today.79 Then, as now, many see the 
idea of an international human right to property protection as funda-
mentally incompatible with the U.N. Charter’s prohibition on inter-
ference with states’ domestic jurisdiction or its recognition that 
every state enjoys the right to self-determination.80 
Finally, even those who might be willing to concede that prop-
erty rights should ideally be recognized at the national and interna-
tional levels differ considerably as to the nature of the “right” in 
question. Both defenders and detractors of the human right to prop-
erty in the United States tend to see it as an individualized right to 
secure compensation under the Takings Clause of the U.S. Consti-
tution.81 To the extent they consider them at all, they see interna-
tionalized property rights as demanding freedom from state interfer-
ence.82 But even European states equally disposed to protecting pri-
vate property as a constitutional right have not seen such rights in 
                                                                                                             
 77 See, e.g., B.S. Chimni, Capitalism, Imperialism, and International Law in 
the Twenty-First Century, 14 OR. REV. INT’L L. 17, 27–28 (2012). 
 78 Phanuel Kaapama, The Enduring Colonial Legacies of Land Disposses-
sions and the Evolving Property Rights Legal Discourse: Whither Transitional 
Justice?, 11 HUM. RTS. & INT’L LEGAL DISCOURSE 108, 112 (2017). See gener-
ally Gathii, supra note 75, at 2027. 
 79 See, e.g., Howard-Hassmann, supra note 55, at 181–82. 
 80 Indeed, the Calvo Doctrine – which opposed the idea that an international 
minimum standard of treatment protects the property rights of foreigners – was 
grounded in Latin American apprehension of external pressures that affront self-
determination. See, e.g., Monteagudo, supra note 58, at 6–7 nn.29–30. 
 81 See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, THE CLASSICAL LIBERAL CONSTITUTION: 
THE UNCERTAIN QUEST FOR LIMITED GOVERNMENT 347 (2014). 
 82 See id. 
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quite the same way.83 Property rights in places like Germany are 
associated with both positive duties on states as well as negative ob-
ligations not to impose harm.84 Others, including the IACtHR (as 
discussed in Part III), have seen the protection of property as a spe-
cies of economic, social, and cultural rights that imposes duties on 
governments to respect, protect, and fulfill certain basic needs be-
yond merely providing a social safety net.85 For these and other rea-
sons, many on the left and the right, in the East and the West, think 
that the idea of a global right to property is so deeply contested that 
it cannot be the subject of international rule. On this view, property 
protection surely cannot be a “fundamental,” genuinely universal 
state obligation—and therefore cannot be a “human” right. 
II.  INTERNATIONAL PROPERTY PROTECTION AS AN “AMERICAN” 
IDEA 
It hardly needs be said that respect for property rights is deeply 
ingrained in the American DNA—and its law. As scholars on the 
U.S. founding have noted, it is likely that only rhetorical elegance 
prevented Thomas Jefferson from proclaiming, in the Declaration of 
Independence, that the “pursuit of happiness” includes, most prom-
inently, the pursuit and protection of property.86 The contemporary 
Virginia Declaration of Rights had proclaimed, after all, that all have 
“inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society, 
they cannot . . . deprive or divest their posterity . . . “ including “the 
means of acquiring and possessing property . . . .”87 Neither of these 
declarations confine their “inalienable rights” by nationality. Like 
the 1789 French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, 
they consider rights to property as extending to all persons as human 
beings irrespective of nationality or other status.88 
                                                                                                             
 83 See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 45, at 775. 
 84 Id. at 733, 742 (noting that the concept of the Sozialstaat embraces duties 
on the state to redistribute wealth and not only individual rights against state 
abuse). 
 85 See, e.g., Golay & Cismas, supra note 28, at 2, 28–29. 
 86 See Carli N. Conklin, The Origins of the Pursuit of Happiness, 7 WASH. U. 
JURIS. REV. 195, 197–99 (2015). 
 87 VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS § 1 (1776). 
 88 See DÉCLARATION DES DROITS DE L’HOMME ET DU CITOYEN DE 1789 
[DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND OF THE CITIZEN], art. 2 (“Le but 
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Despite the clear universal implications of such documents, a 
common view in the United States is that such property protections 
are our own, designed to protect our nationals, perhaps even when 
they reside or invest abroad, and are thus not conferred by interna-
tional law. This is historically inaccurate.89 While the U.S. Framers 
were careful to embed individual property rights directly into the 
U.S. Constitution and its Bill of Rights—in its takings, contract, due 
process, and equal protection clauses—and U.S. judges eventually 
required individual states of the Union to respect such rights for all 
those residing in the country, from the start the Framers saw prop-
erty rights as having international repercussions and dimensions.90 
As scholars of the founding period have pointed out, those who 
established the Republic revered the merchants’ chapter of the 
Magna Carta which had proclaimed that 
[a]ll merchants shall have safe and secure exit from 
England, and entry to England, with the right to tarry 
there and to move about as well by land as by water, 
for buying and selling by the ancient and right cus-
toms, quit from all evil tolls, except (in time of war) 
such merchants as are of the land at war with us.91 
While it would be anachronistic to describe the English noble-
men of 1215 behind the merchants’ chapter as the equivalent of to-
                                                                                                             
de toute association politique est la conservation des droits naturels et impre-
scriptibles de l’Homme. Ces droits sont la liberté, la propriété, la sûreté, et la ré-
sistance à l’oppression.” [“The aim of all political association is the preservation 
of the natural and imprescriptible rights of Man. These rights are liberty, property, 
security, and resistance to oppression.”]), https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/Droit-
francais/Constitution/Declaration-des-Droits-de-l-Homme-et-du-Citoyen-de-
1789. 
 89 See David Cole, Are Foreign Nationals Entitled to the Same Constitutional 
Rights as Citizens?, 25 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 367, 370 (2003). 
 90 See David M. Golove & Daniel J. Hulsebosch, A Civilized Nation: The 
Early American Constitution, the Law of Nations, and the Pursuit of International 
Recognition, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 932, 934–35 (2010). 
 91 MAGNA CARTA ch. 41 (1215). 
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day’s “free traders” in their attitudes, the Founders were deeply in-
fluenced by them.92 They saw the rights to private property as em-
bedded in the English common law imported to the colonies and saw 
the mother country’s failure to respect it as a betrayal justifying rev-
olution and eventually independence. As is also well known, the 
Founders, including James Madison, followed John Locke in pro-
claiming that “[g]overnment is instituted no less for the protection 
of the property than of the persons of individuals.”93 Given these 
views, it is no surprise that they sought to convince foreign govern-
ments that the fledging U.S. Republic would respect the laws of na-
tions, including, as the Golden Rule demands, customary norms to 
protect the property rights of all.94 As legal historians have docu-
mented, the founding documents of the United States—from its 
Constitution to its first treaties with Great Britain—were intended to 
speak to a foreign as well as a domestic audience.95 These instru-
ments emphasized that the United States, like other nations worthy 
of international legitimacy, would respect both national and foreign 
owned property. 
From the start, America’s infatuation with property rights did 
not stop at its border. The Founders, particularly Alexander Hamil-
ton, argued that international law, and not only U.S. law, required 
extending the property rights protections enjoyed by U.S. citizens 
under the Constitution even to British “traitors” whose contract and 
property rights were violated by state courts in the United States in 
the wake of the revolutionary war.96 Accordingly, thanks largely to 
                                                                                                             
 92 See José E. Alvarez, Alexander Hamilton’s Defense of Foreign Capital 4 
(N.Y.U. Law IILJ MegaReg Forum Paper 2017/1), http://www.iilj.org/wp-con-
tent/uploads/2017/01/Alvarez_IILJ-MegaRegForumPaper_2017-
1.pdf [hereinafter Alvarez, Defense of Foreign Capital]. 
 93 THE FEDERALIST NO. 54, at 313 (James Madison) (ABA ed., 2009) 
(1788) (echoing LOCKE, supra note 69, at 368–69 (“The great and chief end . . . 
of men’s uniting into Commonwealths, and putting themselves under Govern-
ment, is the Preservation of their Property.”). 
 94 See Alvarez, Defense of Foreign Capital, supra note 92, at 4. 
 95 See Golove & Hulsebosch, A Civilized Nation, supra note 90, at 934–35. 
 96 See, e.g., Alvarez, International Investment Law, supra note 24, at 8–9. See 
also Alvarez, Defense of Foreign Capital, supra note 92, at 8. In The Defence, 
Hamilton did not distinguish the contract rights of foreigners from their rights 
against government takings of property even though, at the time, the U.S. 
Constitution barred states from impeding contract rights but the federal takings 
clause had not yet been extended to the states. 
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Hamilton’s efforts—whose instructions deeply influenced the 
United States’ negotiator, John Jay—George Washington’s first 
treaty, the 1794 Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation be-
tween Great Britain and the United States (otherwise known as the 
“Jay Treaty”) included recognition of the substantive rights owed to 
British investors and creditors.97 The Jay Treaty also established a 
mixed claims arbitral commission to settle claims of property rights 
deprivations.98 
At a time when the Jay Treaty was being passionately denounced 
and Jay was being burned in effigy in several U.S. cities for negoti-
ating a treaty that was as unpopular then as trade agreements appear 
to be today, Hamilton, became its “undisputed champion.” 99 Ham-
ilton and an ally wrote twenty-eight erudite essays, nearly 100,000 
words, defending sequentially the Treaty’s twenty-eight articles,100 
entitled The Defence.101 The principal arguments arrayed against the 
Jay Treaty by its critics were that Jay had concluded a wildly une-
qual and possibly unconstitutional agreement that undercut U.S. 
sovereignty and fundamental U.S. national interests—all while un-
democratically allocating important adjudicative decisions to arbi-
trators instead of Article III judges.102 Hamilton responded that the 
terms of the Jay Treaty were not only in the national interests of the 
new republic, but also the best alternative to renewed conflict or 
war.103 Hamilton’s defense was equal parts law and policy. He ar-
gued that everything in the treaty was supported by the Constitution, 
fulfilled pledges made in the Treaty of Peace that had ended the rev-
olutionary war, and had the backing of the law of nations.104 Turning 
to international arbitration was necessary, Hamilton argued, because 
                                                                                                             
 97 See, e.g., RON CHERNOW, ALEXANDER HAMILTON 487–500 (2004); Alva-
rez, International Investment Law, supra note 24, at 4–6. 
 98 Alvarez, International Investment Law, supra note 24, at 10. 
 99 CHERNOW, supra note 97, at 496. 
 100 Alvarez, Defense of Foreign Capital, supra note 92, at 2. 
 101 For a text of The Defence, see generally ALEXANDER HAMILTON, 5 THE 
WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON (Henry Cabot Lodge ed., 1904) (Hamilton, 
writing as “Camillus,” a wise Roman general who, according to Plutarch’s Lives, 
was sorely misunderstood by his people, wrote nos. I–XXII, XXXI–XXXIII, and 
XXXVI–XXXVIII; Rufus King, a federalist ally of Hamilton, wrote under Ham-
ilton’s supervision, nos. XXIII-XXX and XXXIV–XXXV). 
 102 Alvarez, Defense of Foreign Capital, supra note 92, at 3. 
 103 HAMILTON, supra note 101, at 213. 
 104 Id. at 158–60. 
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the courts of neither Britain nor the U.S. could be trusted to address 
those claims impartially.105 
Hamilton appealed to morality as well as pragmatism to defend 
the need to protect private property even when owned by foreign-
ers.106 “No powers of language at my command[,]” he stated, “can 
express the abhorrence I feel at the idea of violating the property of 
individuals . . . .”107 Although the law of nations accepted that a na-
tion was free to determine for itself whether to permit foreigners to 
bring property into or acquire property in its territory, once it did so, 
it had a “duty . . . to protect that property, and to secure to the owner 
the full enjoyment of it” as “it tacitly promises protection and secu-
rity.”108 Anything else is “inconsistent with the notion of prop-
erty[,]” as it would violate the “contract between the society and the 
individual” ensuring that the latter retains his property and its use.109 
“The property of a foreigner placed in another country, by permis-
sion of its laws, may justly be regarded as a deposit, of which the 
society is the trustee.”110 A violation of that trust would be an act of 
“perfidious rapacity,” offensive to “moral feeling” and its perpetra-
tor would deserve “all the opprobrium and infamy of violated 
faith.”111 The sixth article of Jay’s Treaty permitting compensation 
to British creditors for their losses and damages notwithstanding 
state laws that made it impossible for them to collect on these debts 
wiped away what Hamilton called a stain on the “honor and charac-
ter of the country” and was required by morality, natural justice, and 
the “spirit and principles of good government . . . .”112 Respecting 
this public pledge and renouncing recourse to such sequestrations in 
the future were a “valuable pledge for the more strict future ob-
servance of our public engagements . . . .”113 Doing anything else 
would sanction “the power of committing fraud, of violating the 
                                                                                                             
 105 Id. at 345–46. 
 106 Id. at 413–14. 
 107 Id. at 405–06. 
 108 Id. at 414. 
 109 Id. at 414–15. 
 110 Id. at 415. 
 111 Id. at 415–16. 
 112 Id. at 347–48. 
 113 Id. at 348. 
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public faith, of sacrificing the principles of commerce, [and] of pros-
trating credit.”114 “To Hamilton, protecting a nation’s reputation for 
respecting private rights of property under the rule of law was vital 
to ensuring incoming flows of capital.”115 Even temporary suspen-
sions of the exercise of foreigners’ property rights could not be jus-
tified for “extraordinary and great emergencies[,]” because any such 
exception, “if conceived to exist, would be, at least, a slow poison, 
conducing to a sickly habit of commerce . . . .”116 
Hamilton’s The Defence is the first in a long line of significant 
policy speeches, adjudicative innovations, and treaties, initiated by 
virtually every U.S. President in the modern era and designed to pro-
tect foreign capital both here and abroad through various tools of 
national and international law.117 There is a remarkable continuity 
with respect to these matters across Democratic and Republican ad-
ministrations.118 The Jay Treaty planted the seed for what would 
eventually become U.S. post-WWII treaties of Friendship, Com-
merce and Navigation (FCNs)119 with significant property protec-
tions for their respective parties—treaties which eventually led to 
contemporary bilateral investment treaties and investment chapters 
in today’s free trade agreements (such as Chapter Eleven of 
NAFTA).120 
Given the fact the United States has been, for much of its history, 
the world’s greatest importer and exporter of capital, it should sur-
prise no one that it has long used the tools of international law to 
protect such capital flows. This policy has been pursued through, for 
example, sixty-five international claims commissions established 
over the two centuries since the Jay Treaty, as well as through U.S. 
                                                                                                             
 114 Id. at 410. 
 115 Alvarez, Defense of Foreign Capital, supra note 92, at 5. 
 116 HAMILTON, supra note 101, at 445. 
 117 See Alvarez, International Investment Law, supra note 24, at 20, 63. See 
also KENNETH J. VANDEVELDE, THE FIRST BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES: 
U.S. POSTWAR FRIENDSHIP, COMMERCE, AND NAVIGATION TREATIES 48 (2017). 
 118 See Alvarez, International Investment Law, supra note 24, at 63. 
 119 See José E. Alvarez, Political Protectionism and United States Interna-
tional Investment Obligations in Conflict: The Hazards of Exon-Florio, 30 VA. J. 
INT’L L. 1, 19 (1989) [hereinafter Alvarez, Political Protectionism]. 
 120 See José E. Alvarez, Is the Trans-Pacific Partnership’s Investment Chapter 
the New ‘Gold Standard’?, 47 VICTORIA U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 503, 503 
(2016). 
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diplomatic efforts to undermine the Calvo Doctrine (which tried to 
affirm that only national law determines the treatment of foreign 
capital) in the nineteenth century.121 By the mid-twentieth century, 
U.S. friendship, commerce and navigation treaties after WWII, 
which served to export Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s New Deal, and 
repeated affirmations by U.S. secretaries of state (starting with Cor-
dell Hull) expressed the view that expropriations directed against 
U.S. citizens abroad require “prompt, adequate and effective” com-
pensation.122 Eventually, by the 1970s, U.S. government opposition 
at the U.N. to establish a New International Economic Order (NIEO) 
went so far as to include U.S. legislation precluding aid to nations 
that resort to expropriations without compensation (as anticipated 
by the NIEO).123 Further, from the mid-1980s through at least the 
Obama Administration,124 America resorted to investor state arbi-
tration to protect foreign investor rights in BITs125 and investment 
chapters within FTAs (including Chapter Eleven of NAFTA).126 
Consistent with Hamilton’s admonitions in The Defence, the U.S. 
has always sought to protect private property, even in cases of war 
and national emergency.127 U.S. leaders presumed that the same 
Lockean social contract struck between a government and the gov-
erned to protect the property of citizens has been struck among at 
least some nations through treaties that extend to such protections to 
foreign-owned property once it is permitted to enter the country.128 
U.S. officials have always argued, as did Hamilton, that protecting 
national and foreign capital helps to ensure more of both.129 Their 
efforts to use FCNs (and eventually BITs and FTAs) to protect such 
                                                                                                             
 121 See Alvarez, International Investment Law, supra note 24, at 1–10, 70–71. 
 122 Id. 
 123 Id. 
 124 See Alvarez, Defense of Foreign Capital, supra note 92, at 8. 
 125 See Johnson & Gimblett, supra note 40, at 685–90. 
 126 See Alvarez, Political Protectionism, supra note 119, at 139. For an over-
view of Jay Treaty’s contribution to arbitration, see Charles H. Brower II, Arbi-
tration, MAX PLANCK ENCYC. OF PUB. INT’L L., http://opil.ouplaw.com/
home/EPIL (last updated Feb. 2007) (type “arbitration” in search bar and follow 
“Arbitration” hyperlink). 
 127 See, e.g., Alvarez, Political Protectionism, supra note 119, at 136; Alvarez, 
International Investment Law, supra note 24, at 67. 
 128 Alvarez, International Investment Law, supra note 24, at 62–63. 
 129 See id. at 65; Alvarez, Defense of Foreign Capital, supra note 92, at 5–6, 
8. 
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rights was seen by U.S. negotiators as an effort to export the protec-
tions accorded by U.S. law to the world; that is, an effort to elevate 
the standards of property protections extended to one’s nationals to 
foreign investors located in one’s territory.130 
Of course, the idea that everyone’s right to property requires re-
spect because it is essential for a nation’s people to live peacefully 
in common, because it enables sovereigns to engage with one an-
other, and because it provides a suitable base for a common law 
among nations—jus gentium—were not justifications newly minted 
by the U.S. Founders. The framers of the U.S. Constitution and the 
Jay Treaty drew on the intellectual heritage forged by Western fore-
bears of property rights writ large, including Aristotle, Aquinas, 
Francisco de Vitoria, Domingo de Soto, Hugo Grotius, Adam Smith, 
and John Locke.131 Hamilton’s thoughts on the value of property 
derived in no small part from those of the Scholastics, for example. 
The Dominican friars of Salamanca, Francisco de Victoria and Do-
mingo de Soto, borrowed ideas from Aristotle and Aquinas to pro-
vide a Christian justification for private property and its protec-
tion.132 Long before Hamilton, they argued that even though God 
originally created shared or communal property, after the Fall when 
humans came to associate in society, natural law compelled the es-
tablishment of private property because this made everyone more 
diligent, enabled human affairs to be conducted in a more reliable 
way, and the rise of commerce made peace more likely.133 There is 
a direct line between that Salamanca school and the “father of inter-
national law,” Hugo Grotius, which continues through the more sec-
ular arguments of enlightenment thinkers like Locke, Adam Smith, 
and avid absorbers of this heritage like Hamilton.134 
Those who suggest that Judeo-Christian civilization is under-
mined by globalization and property respecting pacts that facilitate 
                                                                                                             
 130 See, e.g., Kenneth J. Vandevelde, Investment Liberalization and Economic 
Development: The Role of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 36 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 501, 502 (1998). 
 131 See generally WALDRON, supra note 58, at 6–7, 242. 
 132 See Martti Koskenniemi, Empire and International Law: The Real Spanish 
Contribution, 61 U. TORONTO L.J. 1, 5–6 (2011). 
 133 Id. at 16. 
 134 Id. at 7, 26, 30; see also Martti Koskenniemi, Sovereignty, Property and 
Empire: Early Modern English Contexts, 18 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 355, 383 
(2017). 
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it should remember that the forebears of Judeo-Christian ethics pro-
vided the intellectual firepower that enabled and justified private 
property institutions to emerge, along with the institutions that in-
ternationalized it, such as lex mercatoria, international banking, or-
ganizations to enable global trade and capital flows, and, as the Jay 
Treaty and its successors illustrate, international adjudicative mech-
anisms to settle property disputes with a transnational dimension.135 
Those who criticize the internationalization of property rights as 
creatures of (predominately Western) notions of mercantile capital-
ism are therefore not wrong. There is little question that interna-
tional law, long before Jeremy Bentham coined the term,136 has 
served to grease the wheels of global capitalism, not least by elevat-
ing the status of private property from an individual right to a sov-
ereign right over territory137—and that many of the contemporary 
instruments listed in the Appendix reflect increasing reliance on 
Western legal frameworks that Lauterpacht, back in 1945, argued 
were undermined by modernity.138  
For centuries, Western scholars and policymakers have justified 
the right to property on the basis that it advances efficiency, pro-
motes stability, and is conducive to peace within and between na-
tions. After 1989, those assumptions, flawed or seriously incomplete 
as they may be, have underpinned liberal aspirations to “reform the 
world”139—as well as many of the property regimes in the Appen-
dix. But, as the next part illustrates, human rights regimes, including 
the regional systems that incorporate a right of property, have been 
subject to their own evolution over time. As Part III shows, the prop-
erty jurisprudence of the IACtHR does not replicate U.S. takings 
law; the American Convention of Human Rights’ inclusion of the 
                                                                                                             
 135 Alvarez, Defense of Foreign Capital, supra note 92, at 8–9. 
 136 See M. W. Janis, Jeremy Bentham and the Fashioning of “International 
Law”, 78 AM. J. INT’L L. 405, 408 (1984). 
 137 See Sprankling, supra note 13, at 467 (“A fundamental precept of interna-
tional law is that each nation has sovereignty over its own territory.”) (footnote 
omitted). 
 138 See LAUTERPACHT, supra note 17, at 163. 
 139 GUY FITI SINCLAIR, TO REFORM THE WORLD: INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATIONS AND THE MAKING OF MODERN STATES 13–20 (2017) (historical 
survey of de facto constitutional transformations through changes in the operation 
of U.N. peacekeeping, the turn to ILO technical assistance, and World Bank 
“good governance” efforts). 
606 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:580 
 
right to property140 has not simply exported U.S. takings jurispru-
dence to the Western hemisphere and the same appears to be the 
case with respect to the other human rights instruments that incor-
porate property rights in the Appendix. The complex international 
regimes extending property protections to citizens of the world to-
day may have been inspired by Western ideas but, as is suggested 
by the case study in Part III, have taken distinct forms and continue 
to evolve. 
III.  CASE STUDY OF THE PROPERTY JURISPRUDENCE OF THE 
INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) provides 
one gateway to understanding how contemporary international law 
handles the human right of property—and the many critiques that 
have accompanied that right. To be sure, the European Court of Hu-
man Rights has handled more property claims than has the IAC-
tHR.141 But European property rights jurisprudence, including that 
produced by the European Court of Justice, the product of consider-
able scholarship, requires no summary here.142 The international 
property jurisprudence of our own hemisphere is ironically, less well 
known—and in some respects, more enlightening to those seeking 
                                                                                                             
 140 Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights 
art. 21, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 (entered into force 
July 18, 1978) [hereinafter ACHR]. 
 141 The ECtHR was established in 1959 under Article 19 of the Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 
213 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953). Twenty years later, in 1979, 
the IACtHR was created by the ACHR, supra note 140. 
 142 See, e.g., Georg Ress, Reflections on the Protection of Property under the 
European Convention on Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS, DEMOCRACY AND 
THE RULE OF LAW 625, 625 (Stephan Breitenmoser et al. eds., 2007); Mar 
Aguilera Vaqués, Right of Property and Limits on its Regulation (Additional Pro-
tocol No. 1, Article 1), in EUROPE OF RIGHTS: A COMPENDIUM ON THE EUROPEAN 
CONVENTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 537, 537 (Javier García Roca & Pablo Santolaya 
eds., 2012); Florian Becker, Market Regulation and the ‘Right to Property’ in the 
European Economic Constitution, 26 Y.B. EUROPEAN L. 265, 265–68 (P. Eeck-
hout & T. Tridimas eds., 2008). Indeed, the fact that, according to the latest figures 
produced by the ECtHR, one in six rulings of that Court deal with property rights 
accounts in part for the considerable scholarship on point. See EUR. CT. H.R., 
OVERVIEW 1959–2016 9 (2017), http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Over-
view_19592016_ENG.pdf [hereinafter ECTHR OVERVIEW]. 
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to understand the complexities of today’s internationalized right of 
property. 
The first part below addresses how the IACtHR handled the 
Saxhoyamaxa Community’s claim, mentioned at the outset of this 
Article, as well as six other rulings of that Court issued through April 
of 2017, raising rights to communal property. The second part can-
vasses the eighteen claims in which the IACtHR has addressed the 
merits of alleged violations of private property.143 
A. Recognizing the Communal Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
The IACtHR has considered seven cases in which a violation of 
Article 21 was found in relation to communal, and not individual 
property.144 In the course of these decisions, that Court has expanded 
the protections accorded under that provision by (1) interpreting that 
Article to include not only individual, but also communal property; 
(2) developing requirements for communities to enjoy these entitle-
ments; (3) elaborating the obligations of states regarding such com-
munal rights; and (4) indicating ways to balance the rights of states 
vis-à-vis the communities asserting such rights. These innovations 
are considered in turn. 
1. SECURING COMMUNAL PROPERTY 
In the seminal 2001 Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community 
case, the Court acknowledged that “[a]mong indigenous peoples 
there is a communitarian tradition regarding a communal form of 
                                                                                                             
 143 These numbers were distilled from the decisions available in the database 
elaborated by the Court and the Supreme Court of Mexico, available at BDJH: 
Sistema Interamericano (BDJH: Interamerican System) http://www.bjdh.org.mx/
interamericano (enter search terms “derecho a la propiedad privada” and “Ar-
ticulo 21”) (only in Spanish). The total number of property claims is small relative 
to the 187 rulings issued by the IACtHR during this period. The eighteen rulings 
involving non-communal property rights were identified through a search in that 
database for decisions containing the words “right to property” and “Article 21.” 
Decisions in which property claims were dismissed prior to consideration of the 
merits, e.g. based on procedural grounds, are not included in these figures. 
 144 ACHR, supra note 140, art. 21 (“1. Everyone has the right to the use and 
enjoyment of his property. The law may subordinate such use and enjoyment in 
the interest of society. 2. No one shall be deprived of his property except upon 
payment of just compensation, for reasons of public utility or social interest, and 
in the cases and according to the forms established by law. 3. Usury and any other 
form of exploitation of man by man shall be prohibited by law.”). 
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collective property of the land, in the sense that ownership of the 
land is not centered on an individual but rather on the group and its 
community.”145 It later clarified that this “notion of ownership and 
possession of land does not necessarily conform to the classic con-
cept of property, but [it still] deserves equal protection under Article 
21 of the American Convention.”146 In the Sawhoyamaxa case, the 
Court elaborated on why communal rights needed to be extended 
protection: 
Disregard for specific versions of use and enjoyment 
of property, springing from the culture, uses, cus-
toms, and beliefs of each people, would be tanta-
mount to holding that there is only one way of using 
and disposing of property, which, in turn, would ren-
der protection under Article 21 of the Convention il-
lusory for millions of persons.147 
The Court has justified this interpretation first on the basis of 
negotiating history and plain meaning, noting that the preparatory 
works of the American Convention suggest that every sort of prop-
erty right was purported to be included within the purview of Article 
21.148 Second, the Court has justified its interpretation on the basis 
that “human rights treaties are live instruments whose interpretation 
must adapt to the evolution of the times and, specifically, to current 
living conditions.”149 Third, the Court has referred to Article 29(b) 
of the Convention, which states that no provision may be interpreted 
as “restricting the enjoyment or exercise of any right or freedom rec-
                                                                                                             
 145 Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Cmty. v. Nicaragua, Merits, Reparations 
and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79, ¶ 149 (Aug. 31, 2001). 
 146 Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations and 
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 146, ¶ 120 (Mar. 29, 2006). 
 147 Id. 
 148 Mayagna, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79, ¶ 145 (noting, among other 
things, that the drafters decided to refer to the “use and enjoyment of his property” 
instead of “private property”). 
 149 Id. ¶ 146 (footnote omitted). In the 2005 Yakye Axa case, the Court linked 
this resource explicitly to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. 
Yakye Axa Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judg-
ment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 125, ¶ 125 (June 17, 2005). 
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ognized by virtue of the laws of any State Party or by virtue of an-
other convention to which one of the said states is a party.”150 Fi-
nally, the Court has relied on the need for systemic interpretation of 
treaties under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.151 Ac-
cordingly, the IACtHR has interpreted Article 21 in light of ILO 
Convention No. 169,152 the ICCPR, and the ICESCR, as well as in-
terpretations issued by relevant interpretive bodies of all of these 
instruments.153 
2. DETERMINING WHETHER A GROUP ENJOYS SUCH RIGHTS 
The Court has identified two principles that should be taken into 
account when interpreting the requirements for a community to have 
a claim under Article 21. The first principle is the community’s re-
lation to the land. As the Court put it in the 2001 Mayagna (Sumo) 
Awas Tingni Community case: 
Indigenous groups, by the fact of their very exist-
ence, have the right to live freely in their own terri-
tory; the close ties of indigenous people with the land 
must be recognized and understood as the fundamen-
tal basis of their cultures, their spiritual life, their in-
tegrity, and their economic survival. For indigenous 
communities, relations to the land are not merely a 
matter of possession and production but a material 
                                                                                                             
 150 Mayagna, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79, ¶ 147. 
 151 See, e.g., Yakye Axa, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 125, ¶ 126 (noting 
that the “interpretation of a treaty should take into account not only the agreements 
and documents directly related to it (paragraph two of Article 31 of the Vienna 
Convention), but also the system of which it is a part (paragraph three of Article 
31 of said Convention)”). 
 152 Id. ¶¶ 127–30. 
 153 Saramaka People v. Suriname, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Repara-
tions and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172, ¶¶ 93–95 (Nov. 
28, 2007) (noting that while Suriname had not ratified ILO Convention No. 169 
or recognized a right to communal land under its domestic law, the ICESCR com-
mittee had interpreted the right of self-determination included in that convention 
as being applicable to indigenous peoples, while the ICCPR committee had inter-
preted Article 27 of that convention as requiring minorities not to be denied the 
right, in community with other members of the same group, to enjoy their culture 
which may consist of a way of life closely associated with territory and use of 
resources). 
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and spiritual element which they must fully enjoy, 
even to preserve their cultural legacy and transmit it 
to future generations.154 
The second principle is the need to protect a people’s natural 
resources. In Sarayaku, the Court said the following: 
Given this intrinsic connection that indigenous and 
tribal peoples have with their territory, the protection 
of property rights and the use and enjoyment thereof 
is necessary to ensure their survival. In other words, 
the right to use and enjoy the territory would be 
meaningless for indigenous and tribal communities 
if that right were not connected to the protection of 
natural resources in the territory. Therefore, the pro-
tection of the territories of indigenous and tribal peo-
ples also stems from the need to guarantee the secu-
rity and continuity of their control and use of natural 
resources, which in turn allows them to maintain 
their way of living. This connection between the ter-
ritory and the natural resources that indigenous and 
tribal peoples have traditionally used and that are 
necessary for their physical and cultural survival and 
the development and continuation of their worldview 
must be protected under Article 21 of the Convention 
to ensure that they can continue their traditional way 
of living, and that their distinctive cultural identity, 
social structure, economic system, customs, beliefs 
and traditions are respected, guaranteed and pro-
tected by the States.155 
                                                                                                             
 154 Mayagna, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79, ¶ 149. See also, e.g., Moi-
wana Cmty. v. Suriname, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, 
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 124, ¶ 133 (June 15, 2005); Yakye Axa, 
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 125, ¶ 137. 
 155 Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador, Merits and Repara-
tions, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 245, ¶ 146 (June 27, 2012) (citing 
Yakye Axa, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 125, ¶¶ 124, 135, 137; Sawhoyamaxa 
Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 146, ¶¶ 118, 121 (Mar. 29, 2006)). 
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In giving effect to these two principles, the Court has concluded 
that a community need not have been indigenous to the land in the 
sense of being its first occupiers,156 and that the group seeking to 
demonstrate the necessary customary connection to the land need 
not have a formal title over the property to deserve protection. Pos-
session, as determined by customary practices, suffices.157 As the 
Court indicated in the Saxhoyamaxa case: 
1) traditional possession of their lands by indigenous 
people has equivalent effects to those of a state-
granted full property title; 2) traditional possession 
entitles indigenous people to demand official recog-
nition and registration of property title; 3) the mem-
bers of indigenous peoples who have unwillingly left 
their traditional lands, or lost possession thereof, 
maintain property rights thereto, even though they 
lack legal title, unless the lands have been lawfully 
transferred to third parties in good faith; and 4) the 
members of indigenous peoples who have unwill-
ingly lost possession of their lands, when those lands 
have been lawfully transferred to innocent third par-
ties, are entitled to restitution thereof or to obtain 
other lands of equal extension and quality.158 
Moreover the IACtHR has concluded that the right to communal 
lands can be claimed indefinitely into the future, for as long as the 
relationship with the land lasts, and notwithstanding hindrances that 
prevent its exercise. 159 The Court has also clarified that states are 
not excused from fulfilling such communal rights by claiming that 
                                                                                                             
 156 Moiwana, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 124, ¶¶ 132–33. 
 157 Id. ¶¶ 130–31; see also Mayagna, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79, ¶ 
151. 
 158 Sawhoyamaxa, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 146, ¶ 128. See also Xák-
mok Kásek Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judg-
ment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 214, ¶ 109 (Aug. 24, 2010). 
 159 Sawhoyamaxa, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 146, ¶¶ 131–32. See also 
Xákmok Kásek, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 214, ¶ 113 (noting that this con-
nection can be expressed through traditional presence or use, by means of spiritual 
or ceremonial ties, sporadic settlements or crops, hunting, fishing or seasonal or 
nomadic gathering, use of natural resources related to indigenous customs, or any 
other element characteristic of their culture). 
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the land tenure system that is in effect for the indigenous group is 
unclear; lack of clarity is not itself an “insurmountable obstacle” but 
requires a state to consult with the members of the group.160 Finally, 
the Court has explained that the community’s right extends over 
their own territory, not that of their ancestors.161 
3.  STATE OBLIGATIONS WHERE COMMUNAL RIGHTS ARE 
ESTABLISHED 
Once a communal right to property exists, states have “a positive 
obligation to adopt special measures that guarantee members of in-
digenous and tribal peoples the full and equal exercise of their right 
to the territories they have traditionally used and occupied.”162 This 
obligation includes taking steps to ensure that such right is guaran-
teed; merely offering the possibility of judicial remedies should 
breaches occur is not sufficient to comply with Article 21.163 Re-
quired steps include first, an obligation to delimit the land owned by 
the community, after engaging in consultation with community 
members.164 Second, the state must 
abstain from carrying out, until that delimitation, de-
marcation, and titling have been done, actions that 
might lead the agents of the State itself, or third par-
ties acting with its acquiescence or its tolerance, to 
affect the existence, value, use or enjoyment of the 
property located in the geographical area where the 
members of the Community live and carry out their 
activities.165 
                                                                                                             
 160 Saramaka People v. Suriname, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Repara-
tions, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172, ¶ 101 (Nov. 28, 
2007). 
 161 Xákmok Kásek, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 214, ¶ 95. 
 162 Saramaka, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172, ¶ 91. 
 163 See id. ¶ 115. 
 164 See Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Cmty. v. Nicaragua, Merits, Repara-
tions, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79, ¶ 153 (Aug. 31, 
2001); Saramaka, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172, ¶ 115. 
 165 Mayagna, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79, ¶ 153. 
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Third, the state must provide the community with a title and not 
merely extend a “privilege” to use the land.166 
Finally, the communal right to property must be appropriately 
balanced against any individual right to property that might be in 
play. In balancing the rights to property of an indigenous community 
with the rights to private property held by individuals or corpora-
tions, the IACtHR has emphasized that the former rights need not 
always prevail, but that it is important to keep in mind that the an-
cestral rights of members of indigenous communities “could affect 
other basic rights, such as the right to cultural identity and to the 
very survival” of that community.167 The Court has noted that re-
stricting 
the right of private individuals to private property 
might be necessary to attain the collective objective 
of preserving cultural identities in a democratic and 
pluralist society, in the sense given to this by the 
American Convention; and it could be proportional, 
if fair compensation is paid to those affected pursu-
ant to Article 21(2) of the Convention.168 
The Court has also noted that striking the appropriate balance needs 
to involve, consistent with ILO Convention No. 169, consulting the 
indigenous communities involved “in accordance with their own 
mechanism of consultation, values, customs and customary law.”169 
In the case involving the Sawhoyamaxa Community, the core of 
the complaint relied on the American Convention’s Article 21. The 
IACtHR ruled that the Saxhoyamaxa’s traditional possession of 
tribal lands could be treated as the functional equivalent to that of “a 
state-granted full property title” that entitled the tribe to restitution 
and that Paraguay’s actions fell short of its obligations.170 In doing 
                                                                                                             
 166 Saramaka, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172, ¶ 115 (noting that “title 
must be recognized and respected, not only in practice, but also in law, in order 
to ensure its legal certainty”). 
 167 Yakye Axa Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations and Costs, 
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 125, ¶¶ 147–49 (June 31, 2005). 
 168 Id. ¶ 148. 
 169 Id. ¶ 151. 
 170 Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations and 
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 146, ¶ 128 (Mar. 29, 2006). 
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so, the Court rejected Paraguay’s three claimed defenses, namely 
that the claimed lands had been conveyed to private owners “for a 
long time,” that the lands were “adequately exploited,” and that the 
private owners’ rights in the lands were now protected by a bilateral 
investment agreement between Paraguay and Germany.171 With re-
spect to the defense that the claimed lands were now in private 
hands, the Court demurred from deciding “that Sawhoyamaxa Com-
munity’s property rights to traditional lands prevail over the right to 
property of private owners or vice versa, since the Court is not a 
domestic judicial authority with jurisdiction to decide disputes 
among private parties. This power is vested exclusively in the Para-
guayan State.”172 
The Court did not hesitate, however, to find the presence of in-
nocent third party purchasers insufficient as a ground for dismissing 
prima facie the claims by indigenous peoples since otherwise those 
rights would “become meaningless.”173 It also rejected defenses that 
the land was currently productive since this argument addressed 
only the economic productivity of the land and not the “distinctive 
characteristics” of the indigenous peoples. 174 With respect to Para-
guay’s third argument, the Court noted that it had not been provided 
with the text of the bilateral investment agreement but understood 
that this treaty permitted nationalizations for a “public purpose or 
interest” and did not in itself preclude restitution of the land.175 It 
also added that the enforcement of such bilateral treaties “should 
always be compatible with the American Convention, which is a 
multilateral treaty on human rights that stands in a class of its own 
and that generates rights for individual human beings and does not 
depend entirely on reciprocity among States.”176 Ultimately the 
IACtHR found that Paraguay had not ensured the right protected un-
der Article 21 since, 
when a State is unable, on objective and reasoned 
grounds, to adopt measures aimed at returning tradi-
tional lands and communal resources to indigenous 
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 172 Id. ¶ 136. 
 173 Id. ¶ 138. 
 174 Id. ¶ 139. 
 175 Id. ¶ 140. 
 176 Id. (footnote omitted). 
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populations, it must surrender alternative lands of 
equal extension and quality, which will be chosen by 
agreement with the members of the indigenous peo-
ples, according to their own consultation and deci-
sion procedures.177 
B. Claims Involving Private Property 
1. DEFINING PROTECTED PROPERTY 
The IACtHR has explored three sets of issues relating to the def-
inition of property: the general definition of the term; whether it ex-
tends to rights held by shareholders; and the extent to which it covers 
certain “acquired rights.” Early on, the IACtHR defined “property” 
in Article 21 broadly, as including “material objects that may be ap-
propriated, and also any right that may form part of a person’s pat-
rimony; this concept includes all movable and immovable property, 
corporal and incorporeal elements, and any other intangible object 
of any value.”178 In its 2005 ruling in Palamara-Iribarne, the Court 
elaborated on this last element and included intellectual property.179 
It explained this on the basis of a presumptive link between labor 
and property: 
The protection of the use and enjoyment of a per-
son’s works, grants the author rights which have both 
tangible and intangible aspects. The tangible dimen-
sion of such property rights includes, among other 
aspects, the publication, exploitation, assignment, or 
transfer of the works, while the intangible dimension 
                                                                                                             
 177 Id. ¶ 135 (citing Yakye Axa Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay, Merits, Repa-
rations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 125, ¶ 149 (June 31, 
2005)). 
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of such rights is related to the safeguard of the au-
thorship of the works and the protection of the integ-
rity thereof. The intangible dimension is the link be-
tween the creator and the works, which extends over 
time. The exercise of both the tangible dimension 
and the intangible dimension of property rights is 
susceptible of having value and becomes part of a 
person’s assets.180 
On the issue of shareholders’ rights, the IACtHR has elaborated 
and distinguished the concept in four rulings. In the 2001 Ivcher-
Bronstein case, the Court relied on the ICJ’s Barcelona Traction de-
cision to distinguish the legal rights of companies (not covered by 
the Convention) and the specific direct rights of shareholders (which 
are protected).181 In Ivcher-Bronstein, the Court found that the chal-
lenged government measures had indeed obstructed shareholders’ 
specific rights and that therefore these rights had been violated.182 It 
reached a similar conclusion in 2007 in Chaparro Álvarez & Lapo 
Íñiguez, where the Court examined whether the underlying govern-
ment measures affected the shareholders’ rights to receive divi-
dends, to attend and vote at general meetings, and to receive part of 
the company’s assets at liquidation.183 
In its 2009 ruling in Perozo v. Venezuela, however, the Court 
clarified that demonstrating harm to company assets does not in and 
of itself prove harm to the specific rights enjoyed by that company’s 
shareholders.184 In that case the Court found that the property of 
Globovisión TV was damaged as a result of government action, but 
that damage to its premises was not proven to cause an “an abridg-
ment of the rights of Mr. Ravell and Zuloaga, in their capacity as 
shareholders of the company.”185 It maintained these views in the 
notorious case of Radio Caracas Televisión v. Venezuela, which 
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arose from the decision of the Venezuelan government of Hugo 
Chávez to not renew the broadcasting license of that network, which 
had been very critical of the government.186 In response to a conten-
tion that the radio station (RCTV) was a vehicle for freedom of ex-
pression, the Court reiterated its position distinguishing the property 
rights of the company from the property rights of its shareholders: 
On the argument that the general rule of separation 
of the assets of the company and that of the share-
holders should not be applied, the Court has estab-
lished that the legal person of RCTV was a vehicle 
for the freedom of expression of its workers and di-
rectives, however, it does not find that this consti-
tutes sufficient legal ground to hold that as a result of 
that instrumental function the separation between the 
assets of the legal person and that of the shareholders 
has disappeared. The Court reiterates that the rights 
of the shareholders of a company are different to the 
rights of a legal person. Thus, to dismiss the legal 
personality of the company and to attribute the part-
ners the legitimacy to claim for the damages gener-
ated by acts aimed at the company, there must be suf-
ficient evidence to support said relationship.187 
A third category of definitional issues arose in a series of appli-
cations regarding the rights that emerge, under Article 21, from the 
assignment of pensions and, in more recent cases, other obligations 
owed to individuals. In the seminal 2003 “Five Pensioners” case, 
the applicants had retired and their employer, the Superintendency 
of Banks and Insurance of Peru (SBS) had assigned them a pension 
equal to the salary earned by the person in their former position at 
that time.188 Subsequently, the SBS decided to decrease or discon-
tinue the payments without notice189 and the pensioners argued that 
                                                                                                             
 186 Granier y Otros (Radio Caracas Televisión) v. Venezuela, Preliminary Ob-
jections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) 
No. 293, ¶¶ 1, 338–39 (June 22, 2015). 
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 188 “Five Pensioners” v. Peru, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 98, ¶ 8 (Feb. 28, 2003). 
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they had an acquired right to these payments.190 After considering 
the domestic legislation in point, the Court upheld the pensioners’ 
claims, concluding that pursuant to the Peruvian Constitution they 
had an acquired right to their former pensions.191 The Court further 
explained the meaning of an acquired right by stating, “in other 
words, a right that has been incorporated into the patrimony of the 
persons.”192 The Court built on its “Five Pensioners” decision in its 
2009 ruling in Acevedo Buendía.193 There, it found that the claim-
ants enjoyed a right to an adjustable pension that had been affirmed 
by Peruvian courts.194 The IACtHR concluded that the govern-
ments’ lack of observance of constitutional judgments which had 
affirmed these “patrimonial” rights was itself a violation of Article 
21 of the Convention.195 
In the 2011 Abrill Alosilla case, the Court extended this reason-
ing to include not only pensions, but also other similar sources of 
income that produced “wealth effects.”196 According to the Court, 
“just as pensions that have complied with all legal requirements are 
part of the wealth of a worker, the salary, benefits and raises earned 
by that worker are also protected by the right to property enshrined 
in the Convention.”197 In that case, a series of decrees issued during 
the Peruvian process of state reform of the early 1990s, under the 
presidency of Alberto Fujimori, imposed retroactive cuts in the sal-
aries of public workers that were operative approximately one year 
before the decrees were issued.198 As a result, the workers began 
receiving their salaries with reductions, because, according to the 
new scheme envisaged in the decrees, they had erroneously been 
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paid in excess during the past year.199 The Court found a violation 
based on the impact on a “vested right.”200  
It applied similar reasoning a year later in Furlan and Family v. 
Argentina.201 In that case, Sebastián Furlan had an accident while 
playing as a child in an abandoned military base near Buenos Aires, 
Argentina.202 As a result, he had several medical conditions and dis-
abilities which led to a suit and an eventual settlement with the gov-
ernment for compensation.203 However, a later law, passed in the 
early 1990s, changed the payment options available to Furlan.204 Af-
ter he opted for payment through consolidated bonds issued for six-
teen-year terms and attempted to sell these, Furlan ended up receiv-
ing less than 30% of the money from his initial settlement.205 For 
the Court, the question was whether Furlan had an acquired right 
over the settlement, and whether the payment method constituted a 
violation of Article 21 of the Convention.206 Although the Court 
found that Argentina had the right to change the payment terms in 
response to an economic crisis, it found the impact on Furlan’s set-
tlement to be disproportionate and found in his favor.207 But argu-
ments based on such acquired rights have not been successful in at 
least two other cases.208 
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2.  DEFINING DEPRIVATIONS OF PROPERTY 
The IACtHR has faced three kinds of cases in which it addressed 
what constitutes a deprivation of property: classic cases of expropri-
ation, instances involving civil forfeiture, and cases involving dam-
age to property in the course of law enforcement. It has also referred 
to a special category of “grave” cases. 
a. Expropriations 
The Court has repeatedly emphasized that the right to property 
is not an absolute right,209 and that deprivations of property may be 
lawful if three requisites are fulfilled, namely when government 
measures are based on “reasons of public utility or social interest, 
subject to the payment of just compensation,” proceed according to 
the forms established by law, and are carried out in accordance with 
the Convention.210 The Court has also underlined the social role of 
the right to property, namely that it 
must be understood within the context of a demo-
cratic society where in order for the public welfare 
and the collective rights to prevail there must be pro-
portional measures that guarantee individual rights. 
The social role of the property is a fundamental ele-
ment for its functioning and for this reason, the State, 
in order to guarantee other fundamental rights of vi-
tal relevance in a specific society, can limit or restrict 
the right to property, always respecting the cases 
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contained in Article 21 of the Convention and the 
general principles of international law.211 
Finally, the IACtHR has also suggested that its evaluation would 
be attentive to context, that is, that it “should not restrict itself to 
evaluating whether a formal dispossession or expropriation took 
place, but should look beyond mere appearances and establish the 
real situation behind the situation that was denounced.”212 
The IACtHR has defined reasons of public interest broadly, not-
ing that these 
comprise all those legally protected interests that, for 
the use assigned to them, allow a better development 
of the democratic society. To such end, the States 
must consider all the means possible to affect as little 
as possible other rights and therefore, undertake the 
underlying obligations in accordance with the Con-
vention.213 
It found such justifications absent in the 2001 case of Ivcher-Bron-
stein. There, the Court ruled that the precautionary measure, which 
effectively removed Mr. Ivcher from his role as director and chair-
man of a media company, could not be justified on the basis that his 
Peruvian nationality had been annulled by the government.214 Spe-
cifically, it found 
no evidence or argument to confirm that the precau-
tionary measure ordered by Judge Percy Escobar was 
based on reasons of public utility or social interest; 
to the contrary, the proven facts in this case coincide 
to show the State’s determination to deprive Mr. 
Ivcher of the control of Channel 2, by suspending his 
rights as a shareholder of the Company that owned 
it.215 
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But it found the government’s justifications fully justified in the 
2008 Salvador Chiriboga case, where it concluded that an expropri-
ation carried out to build a public park was acceptable.216 
The IACtHR’s view of what constitutes “just compensation” has 
been influenced by, among other things, determinations made by the 
ECtHR.217 The IACtHR has suggested that such compensation 
needs to be “prompt, adequate, and effective.”218 It has noted that at 
least in the context of expropriation, the just compensation that must 
be paid needs to take into account “the trade value of the property 
prior to the declaration of public utility . . . and also, the fair balance 
between the general interest and the individual interest . . . .”219 The 
Court has also focused attention on whether the domestic legislation 
fulfills this principle of just compensation, and whether the state au-
thorities exercise “due diligence” in applying the law.220 
In the 2008 Salvador Chiriboga case, the Court elaborated on 
the need to follow procedures established by law: 
[T]his Tribunal notes that the domestic legislation of 
Ecuador provided for in the then Article 62 of the 
Political Constitution, at the moment, article 33 of 
the Constitution, the requirements to exercise the 
condemnatory function of the State. Among such re-
quirements, the law emphasizes the need to follow a 
procedure within the term established in the proce-
dural rules, by means of a prior appraisal, payment 
and compensation[]. In this sense, the European 
Court of Human Rights . . . in the expropriation 
cases, has pointed out that the nullum crimen nulla 
poena sine lege praevia principle [principle of law-
fulness] is a decisive condition in order to verify the 
combination of a violation of the right to property 
and has insisted on the fact that this principle implies 
that the legislation that regulates the deprivation of 
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the right to property must be clear, specific and fore-
seeable.221 
The Court also suggested the type of national legislation needed to 
satisfy the rule of law. It noted that, 
it is not necessary that every cause for deprivation or 
restriction to the right to property be embodied in the 
law; but that it is essential that such law and its ap-
plication respect the essential content of the right to 
property. This right entails that every limitation to 
such right must be exceptional. As a consequence, all 
restrictive measure must be necessary for the attain-
ment of a legal goal in a democratic society in ac-
cordance with the purpose and end of the American 
Convention.222 
b.  Civil Forfeiture 
The first civil forfeiture case faced by the IACtHR was relatively 
easy.223 In 1995, Daniel Tibi was arrested in Ecuador under false 
charges of drug-dealing.224 At that moment, eighty-five items that 
were in his possession (including some valuable art and gems) were 
seized by the police and entered into the record.225 When Tibi was 
finally released, in 1998 (after being tortured and subject to a num-
ber of atrocities),226 and requested the return of his possessions, “the 
judge asked Mr. Tibi to demonstrate “pre-existence and property” 
of the goods seized”—an order that was reversed by an appeals 
court.227 Not surprisingly, the IACtHR seized the opportunity to 
clarify that in such a context those subject to civil forfeiture do not 
have the burden of proof.228 Since Mr. Tibi had the goods on him 
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when he was seized, he “was not under the obligation to demonstrate 
pre-existence or property of the goods seized for them to be returned 
to him.”229 
The second case of civil forfeiture proved more difficult. Hum-
berto Antonio Palamara-Iribarne was a naval mechanic engineer 
who served for twenty-one years in the Chilean navy.230 In 1992, he 
wrote a book entitled “Ética y Servicios de Inteligencia” (“Ethics 
and Intelligence Services”) and asked for authorization to publish it, 
as required by the rules of the Navy.231 When Palamara-Iribarne was 
denied the authorization on the basis that the book allegedly posed 
a threat to national security and defense, he decided to publish it 
nevertheless.232 The Navy then instituted criminal proceedings 
against him.233 During the process, a naval prosecutor seized all cop-
ies of the book and deleted the electronic copies available both at 
the publishing offices and at Palamara-Iribirane’s house.234 Later in 
the process, the naval prosecutor conducted investigations to find 
the “missing copies” of the book, “and the Naval Judge prevented 
the case from being sent to full trial until all copies of the book were 
collected.”235 After lengthy proceedings, Palamara-Iribarne was fi-
nally found guilty and sentenced to more than two years of prison.236 
The Naval Judge also ordered the 
forfeiture of 900 copies of the book . . . a floppy disk 
containing the complete text of the publication, 6,213 
loose sheets of paper making up the book . . . 90 thin 
cardboard covers of said book, 4 of which were half 
printed, 31 brochures advertising the book and 15 
thin cardboard sheets with the cover design of the 
book . . . .237 
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Although the Navy ultimately decided to acquit Plamara-Iribi-
rane, a further legal battle ensued after he criticized the actions of 
the Navy at a press conference. Palamara-Iribirane ultimately sought 
relief in the IACtHR arguing, inter alia, that the seizure of the books 
and of the electronic data constituted a violation of his right to prop-
erty.238 The IACtHR confirmed that the actions of the state deprived 
Palamara-Iribarne of both his tangible and intangible property with-
out compensation.239 It also affirmed, along the way, that the taking 
of the books and the erasure of data “constituted acts of censorship” 
under Article 13 of the Convention.240 It concluded that the govern-
ment had not demonstrated that the deprivation of property in this 
case was justified by an “institutional interest.”241 
A third case, though similar to the Tibi case, had its own com-
plexities. Chaparro Álvarez and Lapo Íñiquez v. Ecuador also in-
volved false charges of drug-trafficking, but the property seized was 
not just personal belongings, but an entire factory.242 In 1997, Ecua-
dorian anti-narcotics police found illegal drugs inside ice chests con-
tained in a fish cargo shipment destined for Miami.243 Because Juan 
Carlos Chaparro Álvarez’s factory produced ice chests similar to 
those found with illegal drugs, the police arrested him and confis-
cated the factory; although he was later acquitted, the factory was 
not returned to him for almost five years since it had been confis-
cated.244 The Court first considered whether the adoption of precau-
tionary measures regarding property was a violation of Article 21.245 
The Court cautiously responded that such measures do not “consti-
tute per se a violation of the right to property, if it is considered that 
they do not signify a transfer of the ownership of the right to legal 
title.”246 But the Court suggested that these measures in context 
would be justified only if the government demonstrated 
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the inexistence of another type of measure that is less 
restrictive of the right to property. In this regard, it is 
only admissible to seize and deposit property when 
there is clear evidence of its connection to the of-
fense, and provided that it is necessary to guarantee 
the investigation and the payment of the applicable 
pecuniary responsibilities, or to avoid the loss or de-
terioration of the evidence. Also, these measures 
must be adopted and supervised by judicial officials, 
taking into account that, if the reasons that justified 
the precautionary measure cease to exist, the judge 
must assess the pertinence of maintaining the re-
striction, even before the proceedings are concluded. 
This point is extremely important, given that if the 
property ceases to fulfill a relevant role in continuing 
or promoting the investigation, the material precau-
tionary measure must be lifted, because they run the 
risk of becoming an anticipated punishment. The lat-
ter would constitute a manifestly disproportionate re-
striction of the right to property.247 
Further, the Court clarified that when issuing precautionary 
measures, “the national authorities are obliged to provide reasons 
that justify the appropriateness of the measure. This requires them 
to clarify the ‘fumus boni iuris,’ in other words, that there are suffi-
cient probabilities and evidence that the property was really in-
volved in the offense.”248 The Court also disapproved of the state’s 
attempt to impose charges on the accused for the maintenance of the 
seized property: 
In this regard, the Court emphasizes that material 
precautionary measures are adopted with regard to 
the property of a person who is presumed innocent; 
hence, these measures should not prejudice the ac-
cused disproportionately. The charges that a person 
whose case has been dismissed is required to pay, 
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with regard to the property of which he was provi-
sionally dispossessed, constitute a burden that is tan-
tamount to a sanction. This requirement is dispropor-
tionate for those persons whose guilt has not been 
proved.249 
The Court found that delays in the return of the property as well 
as the failure to return part of the property constituted a violation of 
Article 21.250 It also affirmed that the “unsatisfactory administra-
tion” of Mr. Chaparro’s property by the State amounted to a viola-
tion of Article 21, because he “was deprived arbitrarily of the possi-
bility of continuing to receive the profits that he obtained when the 
company was operating.”251 
The 2013 Mémoli v. Argentina decision presented a new chal-
lenge for the Court’s approach to civil forfeiture and judicial inter-
ference with property. This case concerned a suit for libel damages 
which lasted over seventeen years, during which the defendants, 
Carlos and Pablo Mémoli, were subject to a general injunction on 
their assets.252 The Court found that this constituted a violation of 
their rights, including the right to property: 
The Court finds that this lack of diligence of the au-
thorities is especially relevant when considering that 
the presumed victims have been subject to a precau-
tionary measure of a general injunction on property 
for more than 17 years, based on possible civil dam-
ages. According to the applicable domestic laws, this 
type of measure entails a “general prohibition to sell 
or encumber property” and is not limited to a specific 
amount. The Court recalls that the adoption of pre-
cautionary measures involving private property does 
not constitute per se a violation of the right to prop-
erty, even when it does represent a limitation of this 
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right, to the extent that it affects an individual’s abil-
ity to dispose freely of his property.253 
Although the Court found that measures imposed on the claim-
ants had been properly “established by law,”254 it found their appli-
cation in this instance unfairly punitive because: 
the domestic judicial authorities did not establish the 
possibility of moderating the impact of the duration 
of the civil proceeding on the ability of the presumed 
victims to dispose of their property, nor did they take 
into account that, according to Argentine law, “[t]he 
judge, to avoid unnecessary liens and prejudice to the 
owner of the property, may establish a precautionary 
measure other than the one requested, or limit it, tak-
ing into account the significance of the right that it is 
sought to protect.” Despite this provision, the precau-
tionary measure has been in force for more than 17 
years and, according to the information in the case 
file provided to this Court, was re-ordered in Decem-
ber 2011, which presumes that it will be in effect un-
til December 2016 . . . . In brief, the prolonged dura-
tion of the proceeding, in principle of a summary na-
ture, combined with the general injunction on prop-
erty for more than 17 years, has constituted a dispro-
portionate impairment of the right to property of 
Messrs. Mémoli and has resulted in the precaution-
ary measures becoming punitive measures.255 
c. Damage to Property in the Course of Law Enforcement 
Between 1998 and 2011, five members of the Barrios family 
were killed, and the whole family was subjected to different in-
stances of harassment by the police of the Venezuelan state of Ara-
gua.256 In this context, the Court found that the right to property of 
the surviving members 
                                                                                                             
 253 Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 254 Id. ¶ 179. 
 255 Id. ¶ 180 (footnotes omitted). 
 256 Barrios Family v. Venezuela, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, 
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 237, ¶ 36 (Nov. 24, 2011). 
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was affected by the fact that, during the search of 
their homes, police agents removed without authori-
zation and failed to return household appliances, 
money, medicines, clothes and articles of personal 
hygiene, destroyed documents, clothes and house-
hold appliances, and set fire to part of the residence 
of Luis Alberto Barrios and Orismar Carolina Alzul 
García. The victims were deprived of the said pos-
sessions without any justification, and the State has 
not specifically contested these facts or provided ex-
planations about what happened.257 
A similar case was decided by the Court a year later. In 2001, 
police agents in the state of Falcón, in Venezuela, raided Néstor José 
Uzcátegui’s home, beat members of his family, and assassinated 
him.258 His brother Luis, the main witness of the crime, had de-
nounced the killing publicly and had been subject to harassment and 
arbitrary detentions by the police.259 In this context, the Court con-
sidered that damage to the Uzcátegui’s property by law enforce-
ment, when raiding their home could be considered a violation of 
Article 21.260 The decision of the Court was highly contextual: 
The Court also finds that, given the circumstances in 
which the action took place and, in particular, the so-
cioeconomic status and vulnerability of the Uz-
cátegui family, the damage to their property during 
the raid had a far greater impact than it would have 
had for other family groups with other means. In this 
regard, the Court considers that States must take into 
account that groups of people living in adverse cir-
cumstances and with fewer resources, such as those 
living in poverty, experience an increase in the extent 
                                                                                                             
 257 Id. ¶ 149. 
 258 Uzcátegui v. Venezuela, Merits and Reparations, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. 
H.R. (ser. C) No. 249, ¶¶ 40, 89 n.117, 91, 96 n. 130, 97 n.132 (Sept. 3, 2012). 
 259 Id. ¶¶ 40 n.45, 89–96, 123–24, 184. 
 260 Id. ¶ 203 (noting that “police officers who entered the home of the Uz-
cátegui family damaged the roof of the house, broke locks on the doors of the 
house, broke down a door and smashed the windows and . . . in addition to dam-
aging the structure of the house, caused damage to objects inside the house”). 
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to which their rights are affected, precisely because 
of their more vulnerable situation.261 
The Court noted that “it is public knowledge that such people 
were frequently subjected to intimidation through the destruction of 
their goods, homes or personal belongings.”262 It found that 
the damage caused to the structure and furniture of 
the Uzcátegui’s home, had a significant impact on 
the family’s property and therefore concludes that 
the State violated the right to property established in 
Article 21(1) of the American Convention, in rela-
tion to Article 1(1) thereof . . . .263 
d. Cases of “Special Gravity” 
In the 2006 case of Ituango Massacres v. Colombia, the Court 
stated that certain violations of the right to property were of “partic-
ular gravity”264 or “particularly serious.”265 In that case, a paramili-
tary group in Colombia, while raiding a town, set fire to 80% of the 
houses and stole cattle.266 Members of the Colombian Army knew 
of the theft and even collaborated with the paramilitary by imposing 
a curfew that restricted the inhabitants from protecting their posses-
sions.267 
The Court first underlined how the theft of the livestock was a 
grave violation of Article 21 of the Convention: 
The Court finds it opportune to underscore the par-
ticular gravity of the theft of the livestock of the in-
habitants of El Aro and the surrounding areas. As the 
Commission and the representatives have empha-
sized, from the characteristics of the district and the 
daily activities of the inhabitants, it is clear that there 
                                                                                                             
 261 Id. ¶ 204. 
 262 Id. ¶ 205. 
 263 Id. ¶ 206. 
 264 Ituango Massacres v. Colombia, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Repara-
tions and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 148, ¶ 178 (July 1, 
2006). 
 265 Id. ¶ 192. 
 266 Id. ¶¶ 176, 218. 
 267 Id. ¶¶ 176–77. 
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was a close relationship between the latter and their 
livestock, because their main means of subsistence 
was cultivating the land and raising livestock. In-
deed, the damage suffered by those who lost their 
livestock, from which they earned their living, is es-
pecially severe. Over and above the loss of their main 
source of income and food, the way in which the live-
stock was stolen, with the explicit and implicit col-
laboration of members of the Army, increased the 
villagers’ feelings of impotence and vulnerability.268 
Moreover, the Court found that the violation of property rights 
in this case was “particularly serious[,]” noting its close relationship 
“to the maintenance of basic living conditions . . . .”269 It applied 
similar reasoning with respect to the house burnings: 
This Court also considers that setting fire to the 
houses in El Aro constituted a grave violation of an 
object that was essential to the population. The pur-
pose of setting fire to and destroying the homes of 
the people of El Aro was to spread terror and cause 
their displacement, so as to gain territory in the fight 
against the guerrilla in Colombia . . . . Therefore, the 
effect of the destruction of the homes was the loss, 
not only of material possessions, but also of the so-
cial frame of reference of the inhabitants, some of 
whom had lived in the village all their lives. In addi-
tion to constituting an important financial loss, the 
destruction of their homes caused the inhabitants to 
lose their most basic living conditions; this means 
that the violation of the right to property in this case 
is particularly grave.270 
The Court has reiterated its stance on the right to property in 
relation to massacres in later cases. In the 2012 Massacres of El 
Mozote case against El Salvador, where the armed forces had carried 
                                                                                                             
 268 Id. ¶ 178. 
 269 Id. ¶ 181. 
 270 Id. ¶ 182 (citation omitted). 
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out “a consecutive series of massive, collective and indiscriminate 
executions of defenseless individuals[,]”271 the Court found that 
soldiers stripped the victims of their possessions, set 
fire to their homes, destroyed and burned their crops 
and killed their animals, so that the operation of the 
Armed Forces consisted in a sequence of events that 
simultaneously affected a series of rights, including 
the right to property. Consequently, the Court con-
cludes that the State violated Article 21(1) and 21(2) 
of the American Convention, in relation to Article 
1(1) of this instrument, to the detriment of the victims 
executed in the massacres or of their next of kin.272 
While addressing the surviving victims, the tribunal underlined, 
as in previous cases, the gravity of these violations: 
The right to property is a human right and, in this 
case, its violation is especially serious and signifi-
cant, not only because of the loss of tangible assets, 
but also because of the loss of the most basic living 
conditions and of every social reference point of the 
people who lived in these villages. As expert witness 
María Sol Yáñez de la Cruz underscored, “[n]ot only 
was the civilian population exterminated, but also the 
whole symbolic and social tissue. They destroyed 
homes and significant objects. They stripped the peo-
ple of their clothes, the children’s toys, and their fam-
ily photographs; they removed and destroyed every-
thing that was important to them. They killed or took 
the animals; they all recount that they took the cows, 
the hens; they took my cows, they killed two bulls: a 
loss of both material and affective significance in the 
peasant universe. Scorched earth is a type of viola-
tion and stigmatization by soldiers, created by the 
perpetrators. The scale of the horror perpetrated there 
                                                                                                             
 271 Massacres of El Mozote and Nearby Places v. El Salvador, Merits, Repa-
rations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 252, ¶ 151 (Oct. 25, 
2012). 
 272 Id. ¶ 168. 
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was aimed at annihilating the area, with all its inhab-
itants, to vacate the territory, to expel them from the 
area.” Furthermore, “[i]t was a rationale of extermi-
nation, of total destruction of the social mechanisms. 
[ . . . ] The massacre disintegrated the collective iden-
tity, by leaving a social vacuum where the commu-
nity had once carried out its rituals, its affective ex-
changes, the context and the framework in which 
they knew they were part of a community.”273 
That same year, the Court rendered its judgment concerning the 
Santo Domingo Massacre. In that case, the Colombian armed forces 
bombed a small village, forced its inhabitants to abandon the area, 
and looted their houses.274 As in previous cases, the Court referred 
to the jurisprudence of international criminal tribunals to emphasize 
that looting constitutes “a serious violation of the laws and customs 
of war.”275 It then took a step further, suggesting that the gravity of 
the situation was heightened by the situation of poverty in which the 
victims lived: 
In addition, the Court has considered that, owing to 
the circumstances in which the events took place, and 
especially owing to the socio-economic conditions 
and vulnerability of the presumed victims, the dam-
age caused to their property may have a greater effect 
and significance than that caused to other persons or 
groups under other conditions. In this regard, the 
Court finds that the States must take into account that 
groups of people who live in poverty face an in-
creased degree of harm to their rights, precisely due 
to their situation of greater vulnerability.276 
                                                                                                             
 273 Id. ¶ 180 (footnotes omitted). 
 274 Santo Domingo Massacre v. Colombia, Preliminary Objections, Merits and 
Reparations, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 259, ¶¶ 68–69, 75, 79 
(Nov. 30, 2012). 
 275 Id. ¶ 272 (quoting Prosecutor v. Simić, Case No. IT-95-9-T, Judgment, ¶ 
101 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 17, 2003)). 
 276 Id. ¶ 273 (citing Uzcátegui v. Venezuela, Merits and Reparations, Judg-
ment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 249, ¶ 204 (Sept. 3, 2012)). 
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IV. U.S. COURTS’ DIFFICULTIES WITH THE HUMAN                     
RIGHT OF PROPERTY 
As scholars of U.S. Indian law have pointed out, U.S. jurispru-
dence on point—not international law—has largely defined the ex-
tent of inherent tribal “sovereignty” or “self-determination” in terms 
of the scope of the federal government’s powers over Indian tribes 
under the U.S. Constitution.277 While the international law of “dis-
covery,” played a role in the original U.S. cases dealing with Indian 
rights—largely in terms of justifying the United States’ exclusive 
right to buy or approve the sale of Indian lands based on Europeans’ 
claims over the New World that transferred to the United States—
the role of international law, and especially of international human 
rights, has played a peripheral role at best in modern U.S. case law 
on point.278 While there is some uncertainty in U.S. Indian law ju-
risprudence as to whether its “particular doctrines arise out of [U.S.] 
constitutional law, international law, or domestic common law,”279 
that case law does not rely on an alleged human right to communal 
property as defined by the IACtHR in its interpretation of Article 21 
of the American Convention.280 
U.S. courts’ focus on assessing the extent of relevant federal 
power—whether defined as “plenary” or as expressing a unique ob-
ligation of “trusteeship” towards Indian tribes281—is dramatically 
different from the concerns expressed by the IACtHR in comparable 
cases. Whereas the IACtHR seems acutely aware of the historic in-
justices done to indigenous peoples and the need to rectify these, 
preferably through restitution of lost lands and close consultation 
                                                                                                             
 277 See, e.g., Note, International Law as an Interpretive Force in Federal In-
dian Law, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1751, 1752–53 (2003). 
 278 Id. at 1752–54, 1762–64. 
 279 Id. at 1755. 
 280 See id. at 1762–63. This is hardly surprising since, as is demonstrated by 
the Appendix, the U.S. is not a party to the American Convention of Human 
Rights – or to many of the human rights conventions listed there. 
 281 See, e.g., United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200 (2004) (reaffirming con-
gressional plenary power in modern Indian affairs); Cherokee Nation v. Hitch-
cock, 187 U.S. 294, 302 (1902) (“As we have said, the title to these lands is held 
by the tribe in trust for the people . . . . While we have recognized these tribes as 
dependent nations, the government has likewise recognized its guardianship over 
the Indians and it obligations to protect them in their property and personal 
rights.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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with the affected communities, such “therapeutic” concerns and 
remedies do not register in relevant U.S. jurisprudence.282 The IAC-
tHR’s emphasis on the need to take into account the ways indige-
nous peoples have traditionally associated with the land—for cul-
tural identity and economic survival—and to adopt consensus-based 
remedies that allow these communities to enjoy land rights in per-
petuity, despite intervening interruptions, are not characteristic of 
relevant U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence.283 Indeed, even when 
U.S. courts have ruled in favor of tribal rights, this is most likely to 
occur as a result of a need to defer to the express will of Congress.284 
The lack of attention in U.S. Indian law to the possibility that 
international law might require restoring communal land rights is 
reflected even in the work of those who would like to reform such 
law. A recent Harvard Note proposing that international law should 
play a greater role in federal Indian law identifies the “emerging” 
law governing indigenous peoples (including ILO Convention No. 
169), the international law with respect to self-determination, and 
international human rights requiring non-discrimination with re-
spect to cultural integrity—but does not mention the rights of prop-
erty contained in all the human rights instruments contained in the 
Appendix.285 
But if the international law of property plays a non-role with re-
spect to U.S. Indian law, its fate with respect to efforts to attempt to 
enforce an international human right relating to the protection of pri-
vate property in U.S. courts is even more dire. While such claims 
have arisen in U.S. courts in a number of different contexts, the sta-
tus of the human right of property has arisen most often in connec-
tion with suits against foreign states involving rights in property 
“taken in violation of international law”—an anomalous exception 
                                                                                                             
 282 See, e.g., S. James Anaya, The United States Supreme Court and Indige-
nous Peoples: Still a Long Way to Go Toward a Therapeutic Role, 24 SEATTLE 
U. L. REV. 229, 229 (2000). 
 283 See id. at 231 (discussing the Supreme Court’s failure to embrace “due 
process” values attentive to accommodating the views of both majority institu-
tions and minorities such as indigenous peoples). 
 284 Id. at 232–33. 
 285 Note, supra note 277, at 1756–62. This is so even though the Note includes 
discussion of the IACtHR’s Awas Tingni case. Id. at 1761. 
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from foreign sovereign immunity contained in the U.S. Foreign Sov-
ereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA).286 As one U.S. circuit court 
has noted, this exception “was intended to subject to United States 
jurisdiction any foreign agency or instrumentality that has national-
ized or expropriated property without compensation, or that is using 
expropriated property taken by another branch of the state.”287 The 
four requisites that must be satisfied to apply this exception from 
sovereign immunity—proving that “property rights” are at issue, 
that the property was indeed “taken,” that the taking was in violation 
of international law, and that the claim involves a nexus to the 
United States (such as a commercial nexus)—have each generated 
significant interpretative case law.288 The focus here is on how U.S. 
courts have interpreted the third crucial requirement, namely 
demonstrating that the taking was “in violation of international law.” 
United States courts, including the Eleventh Circuit which fore-
closed Mr. Mezerhane’s claims against Venezuela289 mentioned at 
the outset, have uniformly resisted claims that government takings 
of its own national’s property violates international law. Courts have 
dismissed property claims against foreign sovereigns when such 
claims involve what the courts call “domestic takings”—that is tak-
ings of property owned by a state’s own nationals.290 This judicially 
                                                                                                             
 286 Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 28 U.S.C.). 
 287 De Sanchez v. Banco Central de Nicar., 770 F.2d 1385, 1395 (5th Cir. 
1985) (quoting Vencedora Oceanica Navigacion, S.A. v. Compagnie Nationale 
Algerienne de Navigation, 730 F.2d 195, 204 (5th Cir. 1984)). 
 288 See Zappia Middle E. Constr. Co. Ltd. v. Emirate of Abu Dhabi, 215 F.3d 
247, 251 (2d Cir. 2000). See also Abelesz v. Magyar Nemzeti Bank, 692 F.3d 
661, 671 (7th Cir. 2012), aff’d sub nom. Fisher v. Magyar Allamvasutak Zrt., 777 
F.3d 847 (7th Cir. 2015). The D.C. Circuit has taken a slightly different approach. 
It has indicated that such a claim “must meet three requirements to fit within the 
FSIA’s expropriation exception: (i) the claim must be one in which ‘rights in 
property’ are ‘in issue’; (ii) the property in question must have been ‘taken in 
violation of international law’; and (iii) one of two commercial-activity nexuses 
with the United States must be satisfied.” Simon v. Republic of Hungary, 812 
F.3d 127, 140 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (citations omitted); see also Agudas Chasidei Cha-
bad v. Russian Fed’n, 528 F.3d 934, 939–42 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
 289 Mezerhane v. República Bolivariana de Venezuela, 785 F.3d 545, 549, 551 
(11th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 800 (2016). 
 290 Id. at 549 (noting the Fifth Circuit’s “long-standing rule that closes the 
doors of American courts to international-law claims based on a foreign country’s 
domestic taking of property”). 
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created “domestic takings” rule apparently stems from language de-
ployed by the U.S. Supreme Court in its 1937 decision in United 
States v. Belmont.291 There, the Supreme Court explained that 
“[w]hat another country has done in the way of taking over property 
of its nationals, and especially of its corporations, is not a matter for 
judicial consideration . . . . Such nationals must look to their own 
government for any redress to which they may be entitled.”292 Fol-
lowing this precedent, U.S. courts have concluded that, “[a]s a rule, 
when a foreign nation confiscates the property of its own nationals, 
it does not implicate principles of international law.”293 
The leading application of this “domestic takings” rule remains 
the Fifth Circuit’s decision in De Sanchez v. Banco Central de Nic-
aragua.294 The oft-cited passages from that 1985 ruling state that, 
[w]ith a few limited exceptions, international law de-
lineates minimum standards for the protection only 
of aliens; it does not purport to interfere with the re-
lations between a nation and its own citizens. Thus, 
even if Banco Central’s actions might have violated 
international law had they been taken with respect to 
                                                                                                             
 291 301 U.S. 324 (1937). 
 292 Id. at 332. 
 293 FOGADE v. ENB Revocable Tr., 263 F.3d 1274, 1294 (11th Cir. 2001) 
(citations omitted). See also, e.g., Chuidian v. Philippine Nat’l Bank, 912 F.2d 
1095, 1105 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Expropriation by a sovereign state of the property of 
its own nationals does not implicate settled principles of international law.”) (ci-
tations omitted), abrogated by Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305 (2010); Sider-
man de Blake v. Republic of Arg., 965 F.2d 699, 711 (9th Cir. 1992) (explaining 
“the exception does not apply where the plaintiff is a citizen of the defendant 
country at the time of the expropriation”); Altmann v. Republic of Austria, 317 
F.3d 954, 968 (9th Cir. 2002), amended on denial of reh’g, 327 F.3d 1246 (9th 
Cir. 2003), aff’d on other grounds, 541 U.S. 677 (2004) (explaining that “[t]o fall 
into this exception, the plaintiff cannot be a citizen of the defendant country at the 
time of the expropriation”); Beg v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 353 F.3d 1323, 
1328 n.3 (11th Cir. 2003) (“International law prohibits expropriation of alien 
property without compensation, but does not prohibit governments from expro-
priating property from their own nationals without compensation.”) (citation 
omitted); Santivanez v. Estado Plurinacional De Bolivia, 512 F. App’x 887, 889 
(11th Cir. 2013) (“[B]ecause the Bolivian government expropriated land owned 
by Francisco Loza—a Bolivian national—no violation of international law oc-
curred.”). 
 294 770 F.2d 1385, 1390 (5th Cir. 1985). 
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an alien’s property, the fact that they were taken with 
respect to the intangible property rights of a Nicara-
guan national means that they were outside the ambit 
of international law.295 
. . . . 
International law, as its name suggests, deals with re-
lations between sovereign states, not between states 
and individuals . . . . Nations not individuals have 
been its traditional subjects . . . . Injuries to individu-
als have been cognizable only where they implicate 
two or more different nations: if one state injures the 
national of another state, then this can give rise to a 
violation of international law since the individual’s 
injury is viewed as an injury to his state. As long as 
a nation injures only its own nationals, however, then 
no other state’s interest is involved; the injury is a 
purely domestic affair, to be resolved within the con-
fines of the nation itself . . . .296 
Recently, this traditional dichotomy between injuries 
to states and to individuals—and between injuries to 
home-grown and to alien individuals—has begun to 
erode. The international human rights movement is 
premised on the belief that international law sets a 
minimum standard not only for the treatment of al-
iens but also for the treatment of human beings gen-
erally. Nevertheless, the standards of human rights 
that have been generally accepted—and hence incor-
porated into the law of nations—are still limited. 
They encompass only such basic rights as the right 
not to be murdered, tortured, or otherwise subjected 
to cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment; the right 
not to be a slave; and the right not to be arbitrarily 
detained . . . . At present, the taking by a state of its 
national’s property does not contravene the interna-
tional law of minimum human rights. This has been 
                                                                                                             
 295 Id. at 1395. 
 296 Id. at 1396 (citations and footnote omitted). 
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held to be true in much more egregious situations 
than the present, including cases where the plaintiff 
had had his property taken pursuant to Nazi racial de-
crees.297 
The judges in De Sanchez also indicated, along the way, what 
may be a more fundamental reason for their resistance to the invo-
cation of the FSIA’s expropriation exception: 
The doctrine that international law does not generally 
govern disputes between a state and its own nationals 
rests on fundamental principles. At base, it is what 
makes individuals subjects of one state rather than of 
the international community generally. If we could 
inquire into the legitimacy under international law of 
Nicaragua’s actions here, then virtually no internal 
measure would be immune from our scrutiny. Con-
comitantly, actions of the United States affecting the 
property of American citizens would become subject 
to international norms and hence reviewable by the 
courts of other nations. In the field of international 
law, where no single sovereign reigns supreme, the 
Golden Rule takes on added poignancy. Just as we 
would resent foreign courts from telling us how we 
can and cannot rule ourselves, we should be reluctant 
to tell other nations how to govern themselves. Only 
where a state has engaged in conduct against its citi-
zens that outrages basic standards of human rights or 
that calls into question the territorial sovereignty of 
the United States is it appropriate for us to inter-
fere.298 
The reasoning used in De Sánchez has been widely cited by and 
relied upon by other U.S. courts. Thus, when Mr. Mezerhane pre-
sented his claims against Venezuela outlined at the beginning of this 
Article, the results were in a sense pre-ordained. The Eleventh Cir-
cuit felt no need to consider whether, as expert witness Joseph 
                                                                                                             
 297 Id. at 1396–97 (citations and footnote omitted). 
 298 Id. at 1397–98. 
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Weiler had argued below to the district court,299 a right to property 
exists as a matter of customary law or general principles.300 Instead, 
the appellate court simply adhered to established precedent to find, 
once again, that “[a]s a rule, when a foreign nation confiscates the 
property of its own nationals, it does not implicate principles of in-
ternational law . . . . such claims simply are not international.”301 
The court rejected Mezerhane’s argument that, in the thirty years 
since De Sanchez was decided, international human rights law had 
developed such that FSIA’s “expropriation exception” now encom-
passed so-called “domestic takings.”302 As in De Sanchez, the Me-
zerhane Court added that its conclusion also stemmed from a reluc-
tance to “open the courts of this country to suits involving takings 
abroad by foreign governments that have little or no nexus to the 
United States.”303 
Although the “domestic takings” rule remains operative within 
U.S. courts, it may be subject to one exception. Despite the reference 
to Nazi takings in De Sanchez, some U.S. courts have since come to 
accept claims under the FSIA’s “expropriation exception” to the ex-
tent these involve “genocidal takings.”304 In a series of decisions 
concerning the taking of property during the Holocaust, U.S. circuit 
courts have upheld jurisdiction to consider these claims against for-
eign states on the proposition that such claims, unlike the typical 
“domestic taking,” really do involve human rights law.305 Genocidal 
takings have successfully punctured sovereign immunity because, 
as the Fifth Circuit put it, these deprivations of property violate 
                                                                                                             
 299 Rep. and Op. of Prof. Joseph H.H. Weiler at 4, 9–11, Mezerhane v. 
República Bolivariana de Venezuela, No. 1:11–CV–23983–MGC (S.D. Fla. Nov. 
30, 2012), ECF No. 59-1 [hereinafter Weiler Report]. 
 300 Mezerhane v. República Bolivarian De Venezuela, 785 F.3d 545, 549–52 
(11th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 800 (2016). 
 301 Id. at 549–50 (quoting FOGADE v. ENB Revocable Tr., 263 F.3d 1274, 
1294 (11th Cir. 2001)). 
 302 Id. 
 303 Id. at 549. 
 304 Simon v. Republic of Hungary, 812 F.3d 127, 145–46 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
 305 Id. 
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“such basic rights as the right not to be murdered, tortured, or oth-
erwise subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment; the 
right not to be a slave; and the right not to be arbitrarily detained.”306 
The Seventh Circuit’s 2012 ruling in Abelesz, for example, 
acknowledged the continuing application of the domestic takings 
rule,307 but found that 
the plaintiffs’ allegations about the relationship be-
tween genocide and expropriation in the Hungarian 
Holocaust take these cases outside the domestic tak-
ings rule and its foundations. Genocide, the com-
plaints here clearly imply, can be an expensive prop-
osition. Expropriating property from the targets of 
genocide has the ghoulishly efficient result of both 
paying for the costs associated with a systematic at-
tempt to murder an entire people and leaving desti-
tute any who manage to survive. The expropriations 
alleged by plaintiffs in these cases—the freezing of 
bank accounts, the straw-man control of corpora-
tions, the looting of safe deposit boxes and suitcases 
brought by Jews to the train stations, and even charg-
ing third-class train fares to victims being sent to 
death camps—should be viewed, at least on the 
pleadings, as an integral part of the genocidal plan to 
depopulate Hungary of its Jews. The expropriations 
thus effectuated genocide in two ways. They funded 
the transport and murder of Hungarian Jews, and 
they impoverished those who survived, depriving 
them of the financial means to reconstitute their lives 
and former communities.308 
That court concluded that given the uniform condemnation of 
genocide, it did not “believe the domestic takings rule can be used 
to require courts to turn a blind eye to the means used to carry out 
                                                                                                             
 306 De Sanchez v. Banco Central de Nicaragua, 770 F.2d 1385, 1397 (5th Cir. 
1985). 
 307 Abelesz v. Magyar Nemzeti Bank, 692 F.3d 661, 674–75 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 308 Id. at 675. 
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those ends—in this case, widespread expropriation of victims’ prop-
erty to fund and accomplish the genocide itself.”309 The D.C. Circuit 
took the same stance in its 2016 Simon v. Republic of Hungary de-
cision.310 
In summary, the position of those U.S. courts that have most di-
rectly addressed the status of an alleged human right to property pro-
tection is not different from that suggested by Lauterpacht back in 
1945. Even now, some twenty years after the collapse of the Berlin 
Wall, the Eleventh Circuit and other U.S. federal courts continue to 
conclude, at least by way of dicta, that international human rights 
law does not exist or that, even if does, that law does not extend to 
protecting property rights of all human beings, except perhaps in the 
unusual case where deprivations of property are used as tools to 
commit genocide.311 The Mezerhane Court found not only that Ven-
ezuela’s purported violation of the American Convention of Human 
Rights (which contains a right to property) does not constitute a “vi-
olation of international law” as demanded by the FSIA, but, that the 
human rights revolution prompted by the adoption of the interna-
tional bill of rights and the number of human rights instruments 
listed in the Appendix never happened.312 That court drew upon 
prior domestic takings rulings by U.S. courts to say that international 
                                                                                                             
 309 Id. at 676. 
 310 See Simon, 812 F.3d at 144–46. Most recently, the U.S. Supreme Court, 
faced with a D.C. circuit decision that decided to proceed with an FSIA claim 
against Venezuela for an alleged discriminatory taking of property on the basis 
that such a claim was “not frivolous,” remanded the case on the basis that courts 
need to determine at the threshold, for purposes of upholding jurisdiction, whether 
an expropriation in violation of international law has been committed and not only 
that this might have occurred. The Court did not decide whether a discriminatory 
taking of a state’s own nationals’ property violated international law but indicated 
that “there are fair arguments to be made that a sovereign’s taking of its own na-
tionals’ property sometimes amounts to an expropriation that violates interna-
tional law . . . .” Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela v. Helmerich & Payne Int’l 
Drilling Co., 137 S. Ct. 1312, 1321 (2017). 
 311 See, e.g., Mezerhane v. República Bolivarian De Venezuela, 785 F.3d 545, 
551 (11th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 800 (2016); Chuidian v. Philippine 
Nat’l Bank, 912 F.2d 1095, 1105–06 (9th Cir. 1990), abrogated by Samantar v. 
Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305 (2010). 
 312 Mezerhane, 785 F.3d at 546, 549–51. 
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law only regulates the actions of states vis-à-vis one another and 
does not address what a state does internally, to its own citizens.313 
The courts of the nation that have, since the time of Alexander 
Hamilton, been among the most forceful proponents of internation-
alizing property protections remain hostile to the idea, except when 
“domestic takings” accompany genocide or when the deprivation of 
property is directed at a U.S. national and the stolen property is lo-
cated in the United States. These rulings share few commonalities 
with those by the IACtHR, canvassed in Part III, in which interna-
tional law is used as a license to scrutinize and often trump domestic 
property rules that intrude on the property rights of a state’s own 
citizens. While there is a greater similarity in terms of result between 
U.S. court rulings involving “genocidal takings” and some of the 
IACtHR’s decisions involving cases of “special gravity,” the sug-
gestion made by U.S. courts that only property deprivations involv-
ing genocide (presumably because only these implicate violations of 
genuine human rights like the right to life) violate international law 
is not supported by the IACtHR, and of course, such statements ig-
nore the property protecting human rights instruments in the Appen-
dix. None of those treaties suggest that the property rights of nation-
als, indigenous peoples, aliens, or others are lesser rights that only 
become international law breaches when the state committing the 
property violation is also violating other presumably more serious 
human rights. 
It is, of course, understandable that U.S. judges do not want to 
take jurisdiction over complaints against foreign governments that 
have no connection to the United States. As judges indicate in many 
of these cases, they do not want to turn U.S. courts into all-purpose 
forums for foreign takings and certainly do not want to license for-
eign courts to do the same and second guess U.S. government deci-
sions with no direct connection to their territory or their nationals. 
But, as the FSIA case law makes clear, there are many routes to dis-
missing such claims from U.S. courts. Jurisdiction over such claims 
can be denied by, for example, interpreting the FSIA to encompass 
only violations of international law with a “commercial” or other 
nexus to the United States, through the use of other doctrines (e.g., 
the Act of State doctrine or failure to exhaust local remedies), or the 
                                                                                                             
 313 Id. at 550. 
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deployment of other U.S. statutes (e.g., the Hickenlooper Amend-
ment).314 One could even imagine a narrow reading of the FSIA’s 
reference to “international law” to refer only to “customary interna-
tional law.” If so, U.S. courts that dismiss “domestic takings” law-
suits would only be finding that they have not been convinced that 
customary international law has evolved to the point of protecting 
the property of a state’s own nationals and not just foreign inves-
tors.315 But the statements in cases like Mezerhane are far broader 
and suggest, in defiance of clear evidence to the contrary, that inter-
national law (treaty or customary) does not impose duties on a state 
with respect to its own citizens or that only genocidal deprivations 
of property do so. 
V.  WHAT THE HUMAN RIGHT OF PROPERTY IS (AND ISN’T) 
Part III suggests a number of generalizations about the property 
jurisprudence of the IACtHR. Article 21 of the American Conven-
tion of Human Rights, as interpreted by the IACtHR, the body 
charged with its interpretation, protects both communal and private 
property and extends its protections to certain groups (indigenous 
peoples) as well as individuals. These rights include the right for 
individuals to be fairly compensated for government deprivations of 
property and, at least on some occasions, to have not only equal el-
igibility to own property, but to actually enjoy its possession and 
use. The protections accorded to property under the American Con-
vention, as interpreted by the Court, have evolved over time in ac-
                                                                                                             
 314 For discussion of these possibilities, see, e.g., Todd Grabarsky, Note, Com-
ity of Errors: The Overemphasis of Plaintiff Citizenship in Foreign Sovereign Im-
munities Act “Takings Exception” Jurisprudence, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 237, 240 
(2011). 
 315 Even within Europe, there has not always been a consensus that the “gen-
eral principles of international law,” referred to in Protocol to the Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 1, Mar. 20, 1952, 
213 U.N.T.S. 262 [hereinafter Protocol to the Convention], apply where a state 
has taken property from its own nationals. See, e.g., Hélène Ruiz Fabri, The Ap-
proach Taken by the European Court of Human Rights to the Assessment of Com-
pensation for “Regulatory Expropriations” of the Property of Foreign Investors, 
11 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. J. 148, 161 (2002) (discussing the position taken by the 
ECHR’s Commission in Gudmundsson v. Iceland and by the ECtHR in later 
cases). See also infra Conclusion. 
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cordance with the Court’s view of the Convention as a “living in-
strument” responsive to changing technology, changing national 
laws establishing certain entitlements, and other “current living con-
ditions” within the region’s democracies.316 Through 2017, this 
means that undefined “property” given protection under Article 21 
has been seen as extending to “sacred” lands farmed (but not for-
mally owned) by identified indigenous peoples, some forms of in-
tellectual property, certain rights enjoyed by corporate shareholders, 
tangibles seized from individuals in the course of law enforcement 
and civil forfeiture, and forms of “acquired rights” established under 
national laws (such as pensions). In designating these protected 
forms of property, that Court has treated as relevant the economic, 
social, and “affective” associations formed between the property 
and persons,317 the expectations for continued enjoyment of prop-
erty established under national law on behalf of either groups or in-
dividuals,318 the satisfaction of due process requirements established 
under the rule of law within established democracies,319 and pre-
sumed connections between the freedom to work and the right to 
secure the benefits of one’s labor.320 Whether a claimant enjoys 
“first possession” of the property in question or even has formal title 
to it has not always proven determinative.321 As this suggests, while 
the Court has often been concerned with ensuring that individuals 
receive equal treatment with respect to property under national law, 
its determinations that property rights have been breached have not 
been limited to cases of discrimination. Although the hurdles to 
                                                                                                             
 316 Mayangna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Cmty v. Nicaragua, Merits, Reparations 
and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79, ¶ 146 (Aug. 31, 2001). 
 317 See, e.g., id. ¶ 149; Massacres of El Mozote and Nearby Places v. El Sal-
vador, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 
252, ¶ 180 (Oct. 25, 2012); Ituango Massacres v. Colombia, Preliminary Objec-
tions, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 
148, ¶ 178 (July 1, 2006). 
 318 See supra notes 188–208 and accompanying text. 
 319 See, e.g., Salvador Chiriboga v. Ecuador, Preliminary Objection and Mer-
its, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 179, ¶ 56 (May 2, 2008). 
 320 See, e.g., Palamara-Iribarne v. Chile, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judg-
ment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 135, ¶¶ 102–03 (Nov. 22, 2005). 
 321 See, e.g., Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay, Merits, Repara-
tions and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 146, ¶ 128 (Mar. 29, 
2006). 
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reaching the IACtHR are formidable and subject to interminable de-
lays, the few property rights claims that reach the Court often result 
in considerable scrutiny over national laws and practices under 
which the Court has found a number of state actions to be defective. 
The application of Article 21 has led to a second, supra-national 
look at even politically sensitive actions taken by governments in 
response to crime or economic or other crises.322 In such cases the 
Court has noted that property rights are “not absolute” and need to 
be judged relative to any competing rights of distinct groups of per-
sons—as well as the right of governments to regulate in the public 
interest.323 The IACtHR accepts that, as Louis Henkin acknowl-
edged, “[f]ew, if any, human rights are absolute[,]” and that even 
human rights may bow to compelling public interests.324 In under-
taking this balancing, the Court appears to proceed on a “case by 
case” basis in which a number of factors (e.g., burdens of proof in 
criminal cases, the relative poverty of the claimant, or the serious-
ness of the property deprivation) are considered both for purposes 
of determining whether a treaty breach has occurred as well as to 
decide the appropriate remedy. 
The IACtHR’s approach to states’ corresponding duties encom-
passes a wealth of “positive” and not just “negative” duties on gov-
ernment. Some might suggest that it has more in common with the 
German constitutional tradition which sees property rights, as Alex-
ander described it, “not [as] a Lockean right, but a right that fuses 
the traditions of Kantian liberalism and civic republicanism.”325 
Whether or not this is the case, the IACtHR’s jurisprudence is 
starkly different from U.S. Indian law jurisprudence or even U.S. 
Supreme Court jurisprudence involving direct or indirect takings.326 
                                                                                                             
 322 See, e.g., Furlan & Family v. Argentina, Preliminary Objections, Merits, 
Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 246, ¶ 222 
(Aug. 31, 2012). 
 323 See supra note 209 and accompanying text. 
 324 Louis Henkin, The Universality of the Concept of Human Rights, 506 
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 10, 11 (1989). For examples, see supra Part 
II, particularly the expropriation cases at Section III.B.2.a. 
 325 Alexander, supra note 45, at 739. 
 326 Scholarly analysis of both is voluminous. On U.S. Indian law, see FRANCIS 
PAUL PRUCHA, 2 THE GREAT FATHER: THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND 
THE AMERICAN INDIANS (1984). For introductions to U.S. takings jurisprudence 
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Under the IACtHR’s case law, governments are not expected merely 
to refrain from doing harm to property (as by refraining from expro-
priations), rather they may be expected to be more proactively pro-
tective of property to the extent vulnerable groups (such as those 
living in poverty) are affected. Further, governments subject to that 
Court’s scrutiny may not satisfy their property rights obligations 
merely by making available certain judicial remedies. Depending on 
the property right at stake, governments may be expected to satisfy 
legitimate expectations generated by prior laws that establish, for 
example, entitlements to pensions at a certain level. States’ duties to 
protect some forms of property (such as the historic rights of indig-
enous peoples) are perceived to overlap with their affirmative obli-
gations to satisfy basic human needs, as for shelter and access to 
natural resources. Further, consistent with the demands of Article 
31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,327 the 
IACtHR has argued that states’ property obligations may also be af-
fected by their other obligations (e.g., as under the ILC Convention 
No. 169, the ICCPR, and the ICESCR), but that such treaties (such 
as the Germany-Paraguay Bilateral Investment Treaty) cannot be 
used to undermine the human rights commitments made under the 
American Convention.328 While on rare occasion (as with respect to 
communal lands) the Court has required restitution of specific lands, 
in most instances it has been satisfied with other remedies, includ-
ing, but not limited to, compensation.329 
The Inter-American regime is only one of twenty-one instru-
ments listed in the Appendix that most would identify as “human 
                                                                                                             
from different perspectives, see EPSTEIN, supra note 81, at 347–66; Carol M. 
Rose, Property as the Keystone Right?, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 329, 329 (1996). 
 327 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(3)(c), May 23, 1969, 
1155 U.N.T.A. 339 (authorizing treaty interpreters to consider “relevant rules of 
international law”). 
 328 See, e.g., Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay, Merits, Repara-
tions and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 146, ¶ 140 (Mar. 29, 
2006). It is not clear that national courts in general or that other international 
courts would adhere to this particular prioritization among the property rights in-
struments identified in the Appendix. 
 329 Id. ¶ 226. 
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rights” instruments.330 It is beyond the scope of this Article to con-
sider how many of the above generalizations of the IACtHR’s prop-
erty rights jurisprudence apply to the other twenty instruments in the 
Appendix that include property rights within their human rights pro-
tections. What can be said with more certainty is that, despite the 
IACtHR’s frequent references to the case law of the ECtHR,331 for 
a number of reasons its own property jurisprudence is not likely to 
be identical to that of the ECtHR (or, as is evident, that of the U.S. 
Supreme Court). Divergent interpretations are likely due to the IAC-
tHR’s occasional reliance on the particular negotiating history (and 
texts) of the American Convention; frequent resort to the national 
laws, national traditions, and legal practices common to American 
states to complement its interpretation of the requirements of the 
vague property rights in the Convention; and efforts to emulate, in 
its own jurisprudence, the hemisphere’s historic reverence for giv-
ing effect to the affirmative obligations of states to satisfy “essential 
needs.”332 
The IACtHR also has had to confront property claims that in-
volve “special gravity,”333 involving violent deprivations and loss of 
life at a considerable remove from the more quotidian property vio-
lations that the ECtHR has most often considered. The IACtHR has 
                                                                                                             
 330 The “human rights” instruments for purposes of this Article are numbers 
5–6, 8–11, 13–15, 19–20, 23–26, 30–31, and 33–35 in the Appendix. They range, 
in chronological order by date of conclusion, from the oldest, the Universal Dec-
laration of Human Rights and the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties 
of Man (both from 1948), to the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration (from 2012). 
Of course, some might consider other instruments in the Appendix as protective 
of “human rights” depending on one’s definition of the term. See infra Appendix. 
 331 The IACtHR has relied on ECtHR rulings for the proposition, for example, 
that human rights instruments like the American Convention are “liv[ing] instru-
ments” that evolve over time. Yakye Axa Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay, Merits, 
Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 125, ¶ 125 
(June 31, 2005). 
 332 Organization of American States, American Declaration of the Rights and 
Duties of Man art. 23, May 2, 1948, OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.L./V.II.23, doc. 21, rev. 
6, reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-Ameri-
can System, OEA/Ser.L.V./II.82, doc. 6, rev. 1, at 17 (1992). For this reason, it is 
possible that the IACtHR might find more commonalities with the ways the Ger-
man Constitutional Court has evolved the property right in the German Constitu-
tion. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 45, at 742 (emphasizing the German court’s 
efforts to balance property rights with the state’s needs to fulfill basic needs). 
 333 See, e.g., Yakye Axa, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 125, ¶ 169. 
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needed to evolve its own jurisprudence to address such grave 
cases—and the prospect of greater resistance to its rulings in such 
cases. It has also needed to evolve its own creative property rights 
jurisprudence in response to claims made by distinctive indigenous 
peoples within the Americas. At the same time, the luxury of not 
having to address particularly grave deprivations of property rights 
has enabled the ECtHR to focus, with more care, on the procedural 
elements of due process that property rights holders enjoy.334 More-
over, even some of the interpretative rules that might be seen as en-
couraging harmonized interpretations of human rights law, such as 
Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treatises 
(“VCT”), may not have that effect since some other treaties used to 
interpret the American Convention, like the Indigenous and Tribal 
Peoples Convention No. 169, play no comparable role in the EC-
tHR.335 
For all these reasons, neither the ECtHR nor the IACtHR—the 
two regional human rights courts most attentive to the human right 
of property—should be seen as producing harmonious property 
rights jurisprudence, and those courts’ respective case law cannot be 
presumed to indicate the parameters of “the international law of 
property” applicable to the world. As is suggested by the diverse 
objects and purposes evident among the instruments in the Appen-
dix—and the absence of a single comprehensive property treaty on 
                                                                                                             
 334 This helps to explain one of the appeals of the ECtHR’s case law to other 
international adjudicators looking for applicable procedural standards. See, e.g., 
José E. Alvarez, The Use (and Misuse) of European Human Rights Law in Inves-
tor-State Dispute Settlement, in THE IMPACT OF EU LAW ON INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 519, 571–86 (Franco Ferrari ed., 2017). Of course, 
there are other differences between the two courts with respect to property rights. 
For example, while the ECtHR’s Protocol I, Article 1 explicitly extends its prop-
erty protections to both “natural and legal persons,” the IACtHR has, as a matter 
of interpretation, recognized only certain property rights protections on behalf of 
corporate shareholders. See, e.g., Granier y Otros (Radio Caracas Televisión) v. 
Venezuela, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, In-
ter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 293, ¶ 64 (June 22, 2015). 
 335 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 327, art. 31. But the 
possibility that interpreters may resort to Art. 31(3)(c) (and other arguments) to 
draw from other treaties that deal with property rights for purposes of interpreting 
the human rights instruments in the Appendix means that the other property re-
specting instruments in that Appendix that are not considered human rights trea-
ties may sometimes be used to assist the interpretation of treaties like the ACHR. 
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point—there is no such thing as a single global regime for property 
protection. The sheer diversity of these instruments and the forums 
charged with interpreting them impose formidable obstacles to-
wards reaching such a goal, even if such a prospect were desirable. 
Indeed, even the twenty-one instruments whose titles suggest that 
they deal with “human rights” contained in the Appendix differ to 
some extent among themselves. The non-regional human rights trea-
ties included, such as CEDAW and CERD, for example, encompass 
only non-discrimination guarantees with respect to property and 
only provide access for individual claimants to committees of ex-
perts that are not formally delegated the power to issue legally bind-
ing judgments.336 Further, the Appendix of “select” texts understates 
the sheer diversity of relevant international instruments; it only in-
cludes documents which explicitly identify “property” as their sub-
ject.337 It does not include treaties, like the ICESCR, that include 
rights to other things that might plausibly be seen as species of 
“property,” such as the right to shelter, food, or medical care.338 Nor 
does the Appendix include compacts that guard “security” interests 
in things, such as vessels or minerals extracted from the deep seabed 
as regulated under the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea 
                                                                                                             
 336 See, e.g., Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 
General Recommendation on Article 16 of the Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (Economic Consequences of Mar-
riage, Family Relations and Their Dissolution), ¶¶ 37–38, 55 U.N. Doc. 
CEDAW/C/GC/29 (Oct. 30, 2013) [hereinafter General Recommendation on Ar-
ticle 16]. 
 337 Note that the European Convention of Human Rights is included because 
even though the first paragraph of Art. 1, Protocol 1 extends to the enjoyment of 
one’s “possessions,” “property” is mentioned in the second paragraph of that pro-
vision and the ECtHR has made clear that Art. 1 protects the right to property as 
broadly understood. See, e.g., Marckx v. Belgium, 31 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), ¶ 63 
(1979) (drawing from the rest of the text of the Article as well as its travaux 
préparatoires the conclusion that this provision “is in substance guaranteeing the 
right of property”). 
 338 Indeed, many would find it more intuitively appealing to include, under the 
“human right of property,” such treaties even though they do not identify these as 
“property.” See generally Saramaka People v. Suriname, Preliminary Objections, 
Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172, ¶¶ 
27–28 (Nov. 28, 2007). 
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(UNCLOS) and the “Mining Code” issue by the International Sea-
bed Authority, even though these are undoubtedly a species of prop-
erty rights.339 
The Appendix also does not include the over 3,000 bilateral in-
vestment treaties (“BITs”) and free trade agreements (collectively 
“IIAs”) that include protections for foreign investments and inves-
tors. These treaties do not adhere to a single text and despite some 
generally common provisions, differ among themselves in terms of 
the precise rights conferred.340 Inclusion of this number of treaties 
would vastly eclipse the others in the Appendix. As a placeholder 
for the widespread international investment regime—which in-
cludes some 180 states that are parties to at least one BIT—the Ap-
pendix includes only one such treaty, Chapter Eleven of NAFTA. 
That treaty, like many other IIAs, protects not only investments (in-
cluding corporations) but individual investors, including sharehold-
ers whose holdings may be entirely wiped out if a state expropriates 
a company.341 There is no question that IIAs like NAFTA protect 
property rights, albeit only those held by certain foreign investors. 
Indeed, international law rules (including rules of customary inter-
national law such as the “international minimum standard” and the 
duty to pay “prompt, adequate, and effective compensation” in case 
of expropriation) designed to protect the property rights of foreign 
investors emerged before many of the other treaties in the Appen-
dix—including the human rights instruments listed.342 
Another obstacle to elaborating a unified human right of prop-
erty is the fact that international lawyers do not agree even on what 
                                                                                                             
 339 See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea arts. 133–37, 153, 
Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397; The Mining Code, INT’L SEABED AUTHORITY, 
https://www.isa.org.jm/mining-code/Regulations (last visited Feb. 26, 2018). 
While Article 136 of UNCLOS determines that the deep seabed and its resources 
are the “common heritage of mankind,” states such as the United States resist the 
conclusion that this means that these are “common” or “communal” property. 
Martin A. Harry, The Deep Seabed: The Common Heritage of Mankind or Arena 
for Unilateral Exploitation?, 40 NAVAL L. REV. 207, 214–16 (1992) (discussing 
U.S. interpretation of “common heritage of mankind”). 
 340 See, e.g., José E. Alvarez, Is Investor-State Arbitration ‘Public’?, 7 J. INT’L 
DISP. SETTLEMENT 534, 557–58 (2016). 
 341 NAFTA, supra note 50, art. 1110. 
 342 See, e.g., José E. Alvarez, A BIT on Custom, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 
17, 18–19, 33 (2009) [hereinafter Alvarez, A BIT on Custom]. 
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a “human right treaty” is, for purposes of distinguishing among in-
ternational instruments. The suggestion made here that twenty-one 
of the texts in the Appendix are “traditionally” seen as human rights 
instruments (based on their titles) sidesteps the absence of such a 
definition. Not everyone agrees, for example, that treaties that pro-
tect foreign investors (either as individuals or as corporate legal per-
sons) should be seen as protective of “human” rights.343 Whether 
some instruments in the Appendix should be considered human 
rights instruments even when the texts (or titles) of such treaties 
make no such reference may turn on whether, for example, such a 
treaty intends to recognize as a third party beneficiary a human be-
ing, and endows such persons rights to bring their own claims for 
breach before some kind of adjudicator. If that is what a “human 
rights treaty” is, agreements as varied as the Vienna Convention on 
Consular Relations, and many IIAs (apart from NAFTA) could be 
so classified.344 But if the universe of “human rights” treaties is con-
fined only to those that enable individual claims to be brought before 
international courts capable of issuing legally binding determina-
tions without the need for the individual’s home state to intercede, 
and without the possibility that this home state can “waive” or oth-
erwise undermine such claims once brought, only a handful of the 
instruments in the Appendix can be so classified.345 Indeed, this nar-
row definition—intended to demarcate rights that are truly inalien-
able and genuinely enforceable would exclude all the U.N. human 
rights instruments in the Appendix, including CEDAW and CERD, 
since these enable individual complaints to be heard only before 
committees with no authority to issue legally binding rulings. That 
                                                                                                             
 343 See, e.g., José E. Alvarez, Are Corporations “Subjects” of International 
Law?, 9 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 1, 27 (2011); See generally Alvarez, supra note 
334, at 571. 
 344 This proved to be a contentious question before the International Court of 
Justice. See, e.g., Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), Judgment, 
2004 I.C.J. Rep. 12, ¶ 15 (Mar. 31). 
 345 See generally Raz, supra note 60, at 223 (articulating a position that comes 
close to adopting this strict view of enforceability as necessary for a genuine hu-
man rights international obligation to exist); see also David Miller, Joseph Raz on 
Human Rights: A Critical Appraisal, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 60, at 232–34 (criticizing Raz’s definition as being 
inconsistent with the diverse remedies available within international regimes and 
with the uses to which international law is put). 
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definition would also exclude NAFTA’s investment chapter, which 
permits its state parties to issue binding interpretations that can un-
dermine even investor claims that have been submitted to investor-
state arbitration.346 
All of these suggest the many things that the human right of 
property is not. The human right of property is not one idea but 
many. The property jurisprudence of the IACtHR presented in Part 
III is only one example of what the internationalization of property 
rights has meant. Anyone seeking to understand more fully what the 
human right of property means would need to explore the common-
alities (and differences) among the regional human rights regimes 
that have generated property rights jurisprudence, as well as those 
multilateral regimes in the Appendix that might plausibly be seen as 
addressing human rights. The 130 states that are parties to the prin-
cipal four regional human rights treaties, the additional three states 
that are parties to the Commonwealth of Independent States’ Con-
vention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and the 189 
countries (including the United States) that are state parties to at 
least one treaty that prohibits discrimination with respect to property 
(such as CEDAW or CERD) have accepted the idea that a human 
right to property protection exists as a matter of black letter treaty 
obligation—even as its instantiation has been left to regime-by-re-
gime elaboration.347 
The diversity of the instruments in the Appendix indicate that 
states have long been aware that the concept of property—and of an 
individual’s right to it—is deeply contested both within societies 
and naturally among them.348 Numerous failed attempts to craft 
                                                                                                             
 346 NAFTA, supra note 50, art. 1131. 
  347 As indicated in the Appendix, 45 states are parties to Protocol I of the Eu-
ropean Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, 24 are parties to the American Convention of Human Rights, 39 states are 
parties to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, and 22 are parties 
to the Arab Charter on Human Rights (for a total of 130). The Convention on 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of the Commonwealth of Independent 
States (not included in the Appendix) has been ratified by Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, 
the Russian Federation, and Tajikistan. See, e.g., Andrei Richter, Commonwealth 
of Independent States Convention on Human Rights, available at http://www.un-
hcr.org/protection/migration/4de4eef19/cis-convention-human-rights-fundamen-
tal-freedoms.html. 
 348 See, e.g., WALDRON, supra note 58, at 30 (“The objects of property—the 
things which in lay usage are capable of being owned—differ so radically in legal 
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comprehensive multilateral rules regarding even a subpart of this 
subject—namely the treatment that states owe the property of for-
eign investors under international law—have provided states with 
abject lessons about the difficulties of overcoming these differences 
among all states.349 The distinct instruments in the Appendix, rati-
fied by separate numbers and groups of states, are the product of the 
sheer difficulty of such an undertaking on a global scale. What the 
IACtHR has begun to do with respect to most states of the Americas 
is to delineate with some greater precision in the context of a single 
treaty what constitutes protected forms of common, communal, and 
private property, specify what it means for groups and individuals 
to enjoy these rights, and delineate state responsibilities applicable 
to each form of protected property. 
To the extent claims of international property rights are 
grounded in the instruments in the Appendix, and not on universally 
applicable customary rules or general principles of law,350 the treaty 
basis of the international right of property protection provides one 
answer to sovereigntists who object to the very idea of internation-
alized property rights. Sovereignty is not a fatal objection to the ex-
tent states remain free to ratify (and even to withdraw from) prop-
erty-protective treaties. The à la carte and treaty-based nature of in-
ternational property rights means that this capacious right remains 
responsive to sovereign consent—and, at least to this extent, to the 
discrete needs, cultures, and historic traditions of nations. Even 
those instruments in the Appendix designated as protecting “human 
rights” differ on the types of “property” they protect, the kind of 
limitations they impose on states, and the forums (and enforceable 
remedies) anticipated to handle breaches of their terms. These dis-
                                                                                                             
theory, that it seems unlikely that the same concept of ownership could be applied 
to them all, even within a single legal system.”). Nonetheless, in his book, Wal-
dron proceeds to provide a right-based argument for a right to private property. 
See id. at 62–105. 
 349 For one such ambitious attempt, see Louis B. Sohn & R. R. Baxter, Re-
sponsibility of States for Injuries to the Economic Interests of Aliens, 55 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 545, 547 (1961) (an attempt to develop a “draft convention” on the sub-
ject). 
 350 For efforts to address whether the right to property exists as a rule of cus-
tom or as a general principle of law, see Sprankling, supra note 13, at 485–88, 
and Weiler Report, supra note 299, at 8. See also infra Conclusion. 
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tinctions—which, to be sure, enable and even encourage the “frag-
mentation” of the law and undermine stable expectations and the 
predictability of the underlying rules—understandably generate 
suggestions for remedying this threat to international law’s unity (as 
through a global pact). But the fragmented nature of international-
ized property rights—and even the contained uncertainty of whether 
some treaties define them as “human rights”—can be seen as a 
strength and not a flaw. The capacity of states to pick and choose 
among property rights and for each treaty regime to define them over 
time is international law’s (predictable) way of responding to the 
complexity of property rules as well as to concerns about the pro-
spects for undermining “sovereignty,” including self-determination. 
The design features of these treaties help explain the substantive 
property rights that they contain. Instruments that were originally 
intended to be merely hortatory, such as the U.N. General Assem-
bly’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights or the American Dec-
laration of the Rights and Duties of Man (both from 1948), could 
afford to proclaim the right to property in the broadest (and vaguest) 
of terms—after all, these rights were not intended for direct applica-
tion in a court of law.351 But even the property rights texts of these 
contemporaneous declarations show some sensitivity to distinct 
concerns for sovereignty. As would be expected of the more diverse 
membership of the U.N.’s General Assembly, which in 1948 in-
cluded both communist and capitalist governments, the Universal 
Declaration’s Article 17 is strikingly non–specific with respect to 
the right to “own” property, extending that right without distinction 
to personal, as well as other forms of property.352 Article 17’s con-
straint on government takings is also minimal: its only restriction is 
                                                                                                             
 351 “Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association 
with others. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.” G.A. Res. 217 
(III) A, supra note 17, art. 17. “Every person has a right to own such private prop-
erty as meets the essential needs of decent living and helps to maintain the dignity 
of the individual and of the home.” American Declaration of the Rights and Duties 
of Man, supra note 332, art. 23. 
 352 As Rhoda E. Howard-Hassmann points out, the division between socialist 
and capitalist states during the Cold War, which explains both the absence of a 
property right in the 1966 Covenants as well as the vagueness in Article 17 of the 
Universal Declaration, was over whether international law should recognize all 
forms of property (including communal and common) or merely the right to per-
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that such deprivations cannot be “arbitrary.”353 As the negotiating 
history of the Universal Declaration indicates, a more detailed draft 
proposed by the Human Rights Commission that would have spe-
cifically recognized the right to own personal property and that 
spelled out more particular limits on its deprivation (including the 
need to do so for the “public welfare” and with “just compensation”) 
was rejected.354 As a leading commentary on Article 17 indicates, it 
is possible to infer (but it is not altogether certain) that the drafters 
of the Universal Declaration sought to make the taking of property 
by a state without compensation, by definition, “arbitrary” and 
therefore illegal; it is a bit clearer, based on the Declaration’s sim-
ultaneous prohibitions on discrimination based on “other status,” 
that distinctions based on owning property (such as to vote) would 
violate the Declaration’s Articles 2 and 7.355 As noted, the American 
Declaration’s comparable right, though similarly vague, reflects 
strong sentiments prevailing in the hemisphere in favor of using law 
to defend “essential needs.”356 
The property rights provision in the ECHR and the subsequent 
caselaw of the ECtHR suggests the greater depth of protection that 
is sometimes possible within a region with greater shared historical, 
                                                                                                             
sonal property (along with the right of compensation for deprivations of it). Com-
munist states did not oppose mention of property rights as such. See Howard–
Hassmann, supra note 55, at 181–83. 
 353 G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, supra note 17, art. 17 (“No one shall be arbitrarily 
deprived of his property.”). 
 354 The rejected text stated: “Everyone has the right to own personal property. 
No one shall be deprived of his property except for public welfare and with just 
compensation. The State may determine those things, rights and enterprises, that 
are susceptible of private appropriation and regulate the acquisition and use of 
such property.” Alfredsson, supra note 17, at 256. Also rejected was a proposed 
text by a U.N. Working Group that bore some resemblance to the text ultimately 
adopted in the OAS insofar as it too restricted the right to own property “as meets 
the essential needs of decent living, that helps to maintain the dignity of the indi-
vidual and of the home . . . .” Id. 
 355 Id. at 256–57 (suggesting that distinctions made on the basis of property 
ownership or lack thereof would violate Article 2 as well as the right to equal 
protection under the laws in Article 7). 
 356 See Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations and 
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 146, ¶ 117–21 (Mar. 29, 2006). 
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cultural, and legal traditions.357 The ECHR accepts the right to enjoy 
undefined possessions for both individuals and legal persons like 
corporations; along with the right not to be deprived of these except 
for generalized and legitimate public reasons subject to the rule of 
law—and enables individuals, including a state’s own citizens, to 
file claims before an international court to protect these rights and 
ensure compensation under binding rulings that can second guess 
domestic laws and courts. The ECtHR has developed the largest 
body of property case law of any international court. Of the 19,570 
rulings that it issued between 1959 and 2016, 3,098—roughly one 
in six—involved claims under the right to property.358 The European 
countries that have traditionally had the greatest number of property 
claims brought against them have been Turkey, Russia, Romania, 
and Italy.359 The number of ECtHR rulings addressing the right to 
property increased dramatically after states engaged in democratic 
transitions in Eastern Europe—whose histories were different than 
those of Western Europe—joined the Court. Yet, even in Europe, 
the right to property is among the most violated provisions of the 
ECtHR—ranked third from 1959 through 2016, behind alleged de-
nials of right to liberty and security, claims of inhumane/degrading 
treatment, and denials of rights to fair trial.360 
The human rights instruments in the Appendix do not insist, as 
would the strongest defenders of private property rights like Her-
nando de Soto, that the only route to economic development lies in 
allocating private title to holders of land.361 Instruments like the 
American Convention purport to protect the human right of prop-
erty, not simply “private” property.362 This has enabled the IACtHR, 
                                                                                                             
 357 “Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his 
possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public in-
terest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general princi-
ples of international law.” Protocol to the Convention, supra note 315, art. 1. 
 358 ECTHR OVERVIEW, supra note 142, at 9. 
 359 Id. at 8–9. 
 360 Id. at 7. 
 361 HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM 
TRIUMPHS IN THE WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE 49–51 (2000). 
 362 ACHR, supra note 140, art. 21. 
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as noted, to embrace certain communal rights.363 And while a num-
ber of these treaties are fully compatible with and may even presume 
the existence of a liberal and democratic market state, these instru-
ments do not generally require recognition of “entrepreneurial free-
dom,”364 “freedom of commerce,”365 or a right to democracy.366 In 
theory and in fact (given the diversity of states that have ratified 
many of these treaties), these instruments extend to all forms of gov-
ernment and presumptively accommodate diverse approaches to al-
locating the powers of the state versus the market. Some interna-
tional property rights regimes may be components of the “Washing-
ton Consensus” or of misguided efforts to promote privatization or 
to encourage forms of “good governance” compatible with the de-
sires of certain hegemonic states, but the diverse property instru-
ments in the Appendix should not be conflated with these efforts. 
Despite the historical connections between some of these treaties 
and certain hegemonic powers, such as the rise of IIAs and influence 
of the United States addressed in Part II, contemporary international 
property protections do not merely reproduce a particular kind of 
free market ideology. 
Consider the ways that international law has increasingly come 
to recognize the many ways national property laws and practices 
subject women to unequal treatment. CEDAW reframes property 
rights by targeting the specific ways that women’s property rights 
have been violated—e.g., during marriage and divorce and inher-
itance.367 Today’s ever-evolving understanding of the diverse ways 
                                                                                                             
 363 See, e.g., Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador, Merits and 
Reparations, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 245, ¶ 146 (June 27, 
2012); Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations and 
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 146, ¶¶ 118, 121 (Mar. 29, 
2006); Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Cmty. v. Nicaragua, Merits, Reparations 
and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79, ¶ 149 (Aug. 31, 2001). 
 364 See, e.g., LOUIS HENKIN ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS 1536–40 (2d ed. 2009) 
(including, as a contested potential human right, “freedom of enterprise”). 
 365 But see LAUTERPACHT, supra note 17, at 164 (rejecting the idea of includ-
ing the freedom “to buy and to sell” within his bill of rights). 
 366 See, e.g., Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Govern-
ance, 86 AM. J. INT’L L. 46, 46 (1992). 
 367 Under Articles 15 and 16 of CEDAW, states “shall give women equal 
rights to conclude contracts and to administer property” and “shall take all appro-
priate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in all matters relating 
to marriage and family relations,” in particular to extend “[t]he same rights for 
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that national laws, cultural and religious practices make women less 
than human, deny them the full potential for self-realization, and 
treat them as objects in defiance of Kant’s categorical imperative is 
at least in part the result of the elaboration of equality instruments 
like CEDAW.  We have become ever more aware of the absence of 
genuine equality for women thanks to interactions between 
CEDAW-initiated practices and those of other human rights instru-
ments.368 Interpretations by the CEDAW committee recognizing the 
interaction between Articles 23.4 of the ICCPR (requiring states to 
ensure equality of rights and responsibilities of spouses) and Article 
16.1 of CEDAW (containing a similar demand but also directing 
states specifically to respect property rights in connection with mar-
riage and family relations), for example, have enabled a greater un-
derstanding of how women are unfairly treated in terms of the dis-
tribution of property rights between husband and wife, and between 
widows and their husbands’ relatives and surviving children (includ-
ing the rights of daughters).369 
                                                                                                             
both spouses in respect of the ownership, acquisition, management, administra-
tion, enjoyment and disposition of property . . . .” Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 
20378 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1981) [hereinafter CEDAW]. See also Rep. of 
the Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women on Its Thir-
teenth Session, U.N. Doc. A/49/38, at vii–xv, (Apr. 12, 1994) (adopting commen-
tary to elaborate on Articles 9, 15, and 16 of CEDAW to enable “equality in mar-
riage and family relations”). 
 368 For one example of how the CEDAW Committee’s scrutiny of national 
laws has furthered the interpretation of the rights in that Convention that relate to 
property rights, see Savitri W.E. Goonesekere, Article 15, in THE UN 
CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST 
WOMEN 388–407 (Marsha A. Freeman, Christine Chinkin & Beate Rudolf eds., 
2012). See also Marsha A. Freeman, Article 16, in THE UN CONVENTION ON THE 
ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN 432–36. 
 369 See, e.g., General Recommendation on Article 16, supra note 336, ¶¶ 10–
11 (criticizing the fact that the constitutions and laws of a number of states still 
provide that personal status laws, such as those governing the distribution of mar-
ital property, are exempt from scrutiny for non-discrimination); id. ¶¶ 25–26 (not-
ing that marriage registration protects the rights of spouses with regard to prop-
erty); id. ¶¶ 34–35 (noting the need for protecting women with respect to prenup-
tial and postnuptial agreements dealing with property); id. ¶¶ 36–38 (calling for 
attention to discriminatory systems of property management during marriage); id. 
¶¶ 43–48 (calling for equality with respect to legal arrangements for distribution 
of property after divorce or separation); id. ¶¶ 49–53 (calling for non-discrimina-
tory treatment of widows with respect to property rights after death of their 
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The specificity of the CEDAW Committee’s General Recom-
mendation No. 21 on these topics—its “attention to ways in which 
family relations, distribution of work and responsibilities in the 
household, and gender stereotypes can cause bias in the distribution 
of property rights between spouses”370—has encouraged human 
rights advocates to challenge the “double vulnerability” that women 
face with respect to remaining secure in their homes, insofar as their 
right to access to land and housing are challenged not only by na-
tional laws that fail to treat them equally, but also by embedded prac-
tices that emphasize male lineage with respect to tenure, inheritance, 
and even their right to their names.371 The specialized attention to 
gender equality prompted by the adoption of CEDAW, along with 
the gender mainstreaming in U.N. institutions that it has encouraged, 
has enabled international law to begin to address the many ways that 
international and national laws have fallen short of ensuring equal 
treatment for men and women. These flaws include the traditional 
“public/private” distinctions embedded in international rules, their 
focus on formal but not substantive equality, the presumption of 
male-headed households, and the emphasis on only some forms of 
                                                                                                             
spouses, including changes to customary rules permitting widows and her children 
to be dispossessed of their property, survivorship rights with respect to pensions 
and disability, and rules regarding the making of wills to override discriminatory 
laws). See generally Ingunn Ikdahl, Property and Security: Articulating Women’s 
Rights to Their Homes, in WOMEN’S HUMAN RIGHTS: CEDAW IN 
INTERNATIONAL, REGIONAL AND NATIONAL LAW 268, 268 (Anne Hellum & Hen-
riette Sinding Aasen eds., 2013). As Ikdahl points out, CEDAW’s efforts on be-
half of equal inheritance rights for daughters have been supported by the Com-
mittee on the Rights of the Child. Id. at 275–77 (citing Comm. on the Rights of 
the Child, General Comment No. 3: HIV/AIDS and the Rights of the Child, ¶ 33, 
U.N. Doc. CRC/GC/2003/3 (Mar. 17, 2003)); see also Human Rights Comm., 
General Comment No. 28: Equality of Rights Between Men and Women, ¶ 25, 
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev. 1/Add. 10 (Mar. 29, 2000) (noting that to fulfill their 
obligations with respect to ensuring the equality of spouses under Art. 23(4), 
states need to accord equal rights with respect to the “ownership or administration 
of property, whether common property or property in the sole ownership of either 
spouse”); id. ¶ 30 (noting that “[d]iscrimination against women is often inter-
twined with discrimination on other grounds such as . . . property”). 
 370 Ikdahl, supra note 369, at 272–73. 
 371 Id. at 271–77. For examples of national laws that now come under scrutiny 
by U.N. human rights committees and U.N. special rapporteurs, see, e.g., Janet 
Walsh, Women’s Property Rights Violations in Kenya, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND 
DEVELOPMENT, supra note 43, at 133. 
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financial contributions to marital property. These shortcomings, of-
ten shared with national laws, have harmed not only the rights of 
women, but have undermined efforts to promote sustainable devel-
opment.372 
Thanks to treaties like CEDAW as well as developments in other 
rights regimes, it is increasingly accepted (including within interna-
tional financial institutions) that “[t]he pursuit of gender empower-
ment without attention to the distribution of land is an enterprise that 
is fatally hobbled from the outset as, for a large percentage of the 
world’s population, real assets come primarily in the form of enti-
tlements to land.”373 Attention to the intersection between gender 
and property—and the intersectional insights produced by consider-
ing that interaction—is challenging assumptions, including within 
institutions like the World Bank, that only property regimes requir-
ing privatization and de-regulation as well as individualized and 
property titles are desirable.374 Kerry Rittich points out that the 
growing attention to gender equality is contesting traditional ap-
proaches to how (or whether) property rights need to be secured.375 
CEDAW’s insistence on contextualizing how property rights relate 
to the unequal status of women and girls—its committee’s insistence 
on “accommodating differences” not only between men and women 
but between different women (and girls) in different places and 
time—even casts doubt on the wisdom of uniform property rules.376 
The specific attention to how property and gender intersects enabled 
by CEDAW has allowed policymakers who are willing to listen to 
become more aware of the different ways that one can achieve 
                                                                                                             
 372 See generally Ikdahl, supra note 369, at 289; Karen O. Mason & Helene 
M. Carlsson, The Development Impact of Gender Equality in Land Rights, in 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 43, at 114. 
 373 Rittich, supra note 43, at 88. The literature on the deep connections be-
tween equality of land rights and development is substantial. See, e.g., Mason & 
Carlsson, supra note 371, at 114. Indeed, it has been mainstreamed into the work 
of international financial institutions. See, e.g., WORLD BANK, ENGENDERING 
DEVELOPMENT: THROUGH GENDER EQUALITY IN RIGHTS, RESOURCES, AND 
VOICE xi (2001), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/PGLP/Resources/
Engendering_Development.pdf. 
 374 See, e.g., Rittich, supra note 43, at 88. 
 375 Id. at 89. 
 376 This has encouraged, for example, more attention to the special needs of 
rural women and girls. See G.A. Res. 70/132, ¶ 2 (Dec. 17, 2015). 
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greater security, certainty, and predictability without requiring for-
malization or individualization of title or the commodification of all 
forms of property; notably, such efforts may require more, not less, 
by way of careful government regulation.377 
This critical take on property rights, which departs considerably 
from the individualistic property jurisprudence of countries like the 
United States, emerges from instruments like CEDAW and other 
“equality” instruments in the Appendix. Instruments like CEDAW 
require evaluating rights to property alongside the other equality 
rights spelled out in the convention. They put property rights in the 
context of the need to respect the equality rights of a particular vul-
nerable group and require that right to be treated as one among oth-
ers.378 Such treaties, embedded in institutional settings that include 
expert committees, special rapporteurs, periodic consideration of 
state reports, annual re-visitations by the U.N. General Assembly, 
and, where states have accepted optional protocols permitting indi-
vidual complaints, expert committees, encourage continuous con-
versations on how property rights impact vulnerable groups.379 They 
are, as the IACtHR would put it, “living instruments” for revisable 
property rights.380 
                                                                                                             
 377 See Rittich, supra note 43, at 101–03. See generally Dehaibi, supra note 
62, at 2 (arguing for a more “inclusive” human right to property that serves as a 
tool for positive social action to satisfy basic needs). 
 378 CEDAW, supra note 366, arts. 15, 16. The CEDAW committee’s contex-
tual property right might be seen, as is the case with the IACtHR’s, as more ac-
commodating of the view, suggested by the positive obligations imposed by 
CEDAW itself, that states need to take positive action to satisfy essential human 
needs and that property rights need to be among those positive actions. Compare, 
e.g., Alexander, supra note 45, at 736 (discussing German law), with Rory O’Con-
nell, The Role of Dignity in Equality Law: Lessons from Canada and South Africa, 
6 INT’L J. CONSTITUTIONAL L. 267, 267 (2008) (discussing evolutions of the needs 
demanded by substantive equality in those systems). 
 379 See e.g., CEDAW, supra note 367, art. 11. 
 380 Ituango Massacres v. Colombia, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Repara-
tions and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 148, ¶ 155 (July. 1, 
2006). This means that matters that might have been originally omitted from treaty 
texts in order to secure agreement—such as mention of inheritance rights in 
CEDAW’s Article 16—may re-emerge in the course of later treaty interpretations. 
See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 368, at 414. 
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The progressive attention paid to accommodating disparities 
among persons differentially situated—from women to the disa-
bled—encouraged by the distinct human rights treaty regimes in-
cluded in the Appendix has also inspired more critical takes on the 
ways different national laws (e.g., dealing with family law and in-
heritance, contracts, land regulation, rules for titling and registra-
tion, or rules on immigration) affect such persons, as well as the 
“devastating effects of property rights violations—including pov-
erty, disease, violence, and homelessness[.]”381 Interactions among 
these international regimes as well as within them have spurred hu-
man rights advocates to propose reforms to national laws and regu-
lations that, left unchanged, would make the property rights of 
women or minorities more vulnerable or even non-existent.382 
To be sure, these property rights instruments, devised by states, 
do not intrude on their sovereignty in equal respects.383 Critics of 
IIAs are not wrong when they suggest such treaties, which usually 
enable foreign investors to secure direct access to international arbi-
tral remedies that are, by international standards, unusually effec-
tive, provide more credible remedies than most human rights trea-
ties. It may indeed be true, as this author has suggested elsewhere, 
that a foreign investor’s right to property is the most enforceable 
“human right” in the canon.384 It is also true that even IIAs, much 
less human rights instruments, like the American Convention of Hu-
man Rights, may fail to change national laws and practices in place 
and do little to remedy systemic flaws in property rights protections 
beyond the occasional high-profile case. They may fail to secure the 
desired structural reforms sought by judges on international courts, 
investor-state arbitrators, or members of U.N. expert bodies. But 
these critical flaws—shared with other international legal regimes—
are also, from a different standpoint, their saving grace. These re-
gimes’ notorious enforcement gaps, and express and implied excep-
tions, make the human right of property a malleable instrument that 
does not always “trump” the state—or threaten its sovereignty. Tex-
tual weaknesses in CEDAW with respect to the actual requirements 
                                                                                                             
 381 Walsh, supra note 371, at 133. 
 382 See, e.g., Ikdahl, supra note 369, at 282–83 (noting how the interaction of 
certain laws and practices render many women essentially homeless). 
 383 See infra, Appendix. 
 384 Alvarez, International Investment Law, supra note 24, at 61–62. 
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imposed on states (e.g., the prevalence of hedge words like “all ap-
propriate” throughout its text),385 abundant and broad reservations, 
as well as the potential for outright defiance of the CEDAW com-
mittee’s non-binding views and recommendations, threatens to 
make that treaty, as well as many others in the Appendix, toothless 
tigers. But this weakness means that the threat that these human 
rights treaties pose to legitimate sovereignty concerns should not be 
exaggerated. Whatever it might be in IIAs (and its relatively effec-
tive arbitration system), the human right of property as applied in 
places like the CEDAW committee is not a sword of Damocles 
hanging over conscientious regulators bent on fulfilling the public 
good. 
Comparable sensitivity to sovereign concerns is suggested by 
the remedies available to those seeking to enforce the human right 
of property. That right, at least in the traditional human rights instru-
ments contained in the Appendix, is literally a right of and not nec-
essarily to property, even though the latter is how it is routinely (if 
inaccurately) described in some of these instruments.386 While in 
some cases, such as IACtHR rulings that grant indigenous peoples 
access to particular ancestral lands or a U.S. court’s recognition that 
a particular painting by Klimt, seized by the Nazis, belongs to the 
Altmann family,387 international law requires granting certain per-
sons title to particular lands or goods, in the vast majority of cases 
where international legal regimes extend relief for property depriva-
tions or other harms, that relief consists of some form of “just” or 
“proportional” compensation or other forms of redress (including 
perhaps merely an apology).388 International law instruments that 
address property do not typically proclaim a right to acquire or to 
have restored title to specific property and, in accord with their re-
luctance to award specific performance, it is extremely rare for an 
international court to demand restitution of even unjustly expropri-
ated property. As is clear from the IACtHR case law, except in very 
                                                                                                             
 385 CEDAW, supra note 367, art. 2. 
 386 For example, Article 21 is entitled “Right to Property” in the American 
Convention. ACHR, supra note 140. 
 387 See Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations 
and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 214, ¶ 281 (Aug. 24, 2010); 
Altmann v. Republic of Austria, 317 F.3d 954, 974 (9th Cir. 2002), aff’d on other 
grounds, 541 U.S. 677 (2004). 
 388 See Alvarez, Defense of Foreign Capital, supra note 92, at 7. 
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rare circumstances, international law does not establish or secure a 
right to specific property. This is true even when international law 
establishes, alongside the substantive right to property protection, 
an adjudicative mechanism capable of providing a legal remedy, 
such as regional human rights courts. These courts have historically 
been most attentive to securing the removal of states’ laws or prac-
tices that violate human rights, in accord with the view that their 
principal function is to prevent future abuses of rights. Although the 
increased attention to the right to an “effective remedy” (particularly 
in the ECHR) may be changing things, historically, such courts have 
been only secondarily attentive to the need to fully redress victims 
for their injuries through just compensation, even with respect to 
property rights.389 
Adjudicative mechanisms charged with protecting property 
rights do not adhere to a uniform view requiring damages that 
amount to the full market value of the property. Regional human 
rights courts—such as the European and Inter-American Courts—
do not necessarily take the same approach with respect to the extent 
of compensation even when they find that some level of compensa-
tion is due. The judges of these courts exercise considerable discre-
tion. Neither of these courts is obligated to award those who suffer 
property deprivations the “prompt, adequate and effective” compen-
sation that is often explicitly required under IIAs when property is 
lost due to an expropriation.390 Moreover, nothing in international 
law seems to require paying victims of property deprivations the full 
value of the property as the victim has experienced it. While inves-
tor-state arbitrators may be more willing to grant considerable mon-
etary relief to injured claimants than is the case for human rights 
tribunals (and have at times been heavily criticized for it), even they 
do not purport to compensate victims for the full subjective value of 
                                                                                                             
 389 For a fulsome description of the diverse (and competing) goals of regional 
human rights courts, see DINAH SHELTON, REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN 
RIGHTS Law (1999). 
 390 It is also worth noting that there is some flexibility with respect to compen-
sation even with respect to IIAs, particularly since those treaties generally do not 
specify the level of compensation owed to those who suffer from property depri-
vations that do not involve the full taking of their property, such as a violation of 
fair and equitable treatment. 
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what was lost.391 The diverse (and sometimes unpredictable) reme-
dies accorded to victims of property violations may correspond, in 
part, to the different texts of the underlying treaties. Human rights 
treaties, for example, usually affirm certain procedural rights with 
respect to how individuals are treated alongside their property rights. 
Treaties that protect individuals from “arbitrary” or discriminatory 
treatment, with respect to some uses of property or in some contexts, 
may result in remedial orders that only seek to ensure that a person 
is accorded just treatment. To that extent as well it is more accurate 
to say that international human rights instruments typically extend 
protections of property rather than specifically to it. 
VI.  NORMATIVE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE HUMAN RIGHT OF 
PROPERTY 
What is the international lawyer’s response to the many pro-
found critiques of property rights canvassed in Part I?392 
The existence of an internationalized right to property protection 
grounded in so many instruments might be seen as a piecemeal, 
pragmatic effort to correct, by fits and starts and subject to some 
reservations and the inevitable hypocrisy that characterizes all inter-
state human rights ventures, many of the objections to such a right 
canvassed in Part I. Those involved in crafting these instruments 
have said, in effect, “yes, the right to property has been used to ex-
clude from its reach slaves, women, prisoners, and refugees as well 
as to extend certain privileges only to those with property—but these 
unconscionable mistakes can be corrected without abolishing the 
only viable system that we have for organizing society and individ-
ual rights within it, namely schemes for allocating property rights.” 
The predictable absence of universal consensus around a single text 
recognizing a right to property protection has not precluded states 
from elaborating and joining, in increasing numbers, compacts that 
haltingly accept the proposition that all human beings—from those 
who create intellectual property, to members of racial minorities, 
                                                                                                             
 391 See Thomas W. Merrill, Incomplete Compensation for Takings, 11 N.Y.U. 
ENVTL. L.J. 110, 119 (2002). 
 392 This section puts to one side the oft-addressed debate about whether dis-
cussion of fundamental imprescriptible rights, natural or otherwise, is, as Jeremy 
Bentham suggested, “nonsense upon stilts.” WALDRON, supra note 58, at 16. 
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women, prisoners, indigenous peoples and others who work the 
land, migrants, refugees and stateless persons, and the disabled—
can only be fully human if their rights to property are respected with-
out discrimination.393 International law, at least in the form of the 
human rights instruments in the Appendix, recognizes that while it 
is true that unequal distribution of property rights tends to follow the 
lines of sex and race and that the right to property has, through much 
of recorded history, privileged the urban rich over the rural poor, the 
answer to these inequities is not to abolish the right to private prop-
erty (even if that were possible).  Nor is the answer to cede the sub-
ject entirely to the “domestic” realm ungoverned by international 
law. The human rights instruments that include property protections 
seek to expand the enjoyment of some property rights under the rule 
of law where possible on a non-discriminatory and non-arbitrary ba-
sis. 
The instruments in the Appendix also begin to suggest how in-
ternational law handles the balances that must be struck between in-
dividuals, and between individual and societal rights, whenever any 
human right is recognized. While it is true that property rights are 
notoriously grounded in excluding someone else from enjoying 
what is one’s property—that, for example, the IACtHR’s finding 
that the minority Sawhoyomaxa Community was entitled to certain 
lands meant that others were thereby excluded from them—it is im-
portant to recognize that the recognition of any right (even one as 
basic as free speech) imposes limits on the freedom of others, at least 
to the extent that it imposes a duty on others not to violate those 
rights.394 An absolutist free speech country like the United States 
imposes a duty on all to at least tolerate (and not respond violently 
to) even the most virulent repulsive hate speech, for example.395 In-
ternational law’s acceptance of property rights reflects deep seated 
needs—at the national and international levels—to establish a sys-
tem of rights (and attendant) duties on others, including the right to 
exclude. 
                                                                                                             
 393 See infra, Appendix. 
 394 See, e.g., Raz, supra note 60, at 220 (“Each right establishes a set of duties, 
and identifies a set of people who are subject to the various duties.”). 
 395 See, e.g., LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF 
SPEECH AND EXTREMIST SPEECH IN AMERICA (1986). 
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Internationalized human rights of property—and the diversity of 
treaties that they encompass—are also consistent with the idea that 
all societies have various forms of common and communal property 
and have the right to decide which types of property or possessions 
fall into each. While the instruments in the Appendix presume that 
all societies accept the basic institution of private property, they also 
suggest, as a group, that the objects or lands that are subject to it 
remain a contested concept (and are likely ever to be so). Contesta-
tions over what “property” is (e.g., whether it includes certain 
rights/things, tangibles/intangibles, land/other immovables, wa-
ters/oceans, air space/outer space) and whether the property so des-
ignated for protection includes all or only some of the bundle of 
rights associated with private property (e.g., the right to acquire, to 
use, to destroy, to exclude, or to transfer) have not precluded discrete 
agreements among states recognizing some forms of property rights 
as such. 396 Treaties like CEDAW—accepted by virtually every 
state—require at least non-discrimination with respect to property 
rights. Of course, this variable geometry with respect to many hu-
man rights (apart from those that might be regarded as jus cogens) 
is not unusual. Comparable disagreements have not precluded dis-
crete international law agreements, including at the regional level, 
with respect to other human rights, such as freedom of expression, 
association, or economic rights to health or social security despite 
severe differences of opinion among states about their contours and 
meanings.397 It is up to each state to decide whether the “compro-
mised” sovereignty entailed by adherence to any of these treaties is 
worth the reputational or other benefits the treaty confers.398 
As for the right of property itself, the utilitarian arguments for 
its protection are familiar.399 Multilateral human rights instruments, 
                                                                                                             
 396 Cf. SPRANKLING, supra note 32, at 352–53 (dealing sequentially with all 
of these distinctions). 
 397 See, e.g., ACHR, supra note 140, at arts. 13, 15; ICESCR, supra note 21, 
at arts. 11, 12. 
 398 It is not clear that as a group, the property rights instruments in the Appen-
dix uniformly endorse (or presume) either the “bundle of sticks” or the competing 
“right to things” approaches that is common to the U.S. literature on property. 
See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in 
Law & Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357, 357 (2001). 
 399 For an effort to distinguish utilitarian defenses of private property from 
moral or “right-based” contentions, see WALDRON, supra note 58, at 284–322. 
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like CEDAW and CERD, seem premised on the idea that since 
equality is essential to the rule of law, equal property rights are es-
sential to it as well.400 Others, like the instruments on indigenous 
peoples, on protecting wages or pensions, or the rights of perform-
ers, seek to achieve certain social justice goals. Those concerning 
the treatment of refugees and stateless persons aspire to fulfill cer-
tain foundational notions of fairness. Several, particularly CEDAW, 
rely, at least in part, on the need to promote economic development. 
More generally, the drafters of the property rights provisions in the 
human rights instruments in the Appendix in all probability as-
sumed, like the Scholastics, that a right to personal property is es-
sential to persons living in common because it generates and pro-
tects settled expectations, promotes diligence and efficiency, and de-
flects or avoids conflict. Utilitarian concerns certainly underlie 
many of Alexander Hamilton’s arguments in Part II as well as many 
of the rulings of the IACtHR canvassed in Part III. 
The harms that these treaties seek to prevent or to remedy often 
elicit more specific instrumental justifications. The right of property 
is needed to protect all of Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s “Four Free-
doms.” 401 In appropriate contexts, the right to individual or commu-
nal property serves to protect persons from want, may ensure their 
right to work and to benefit from it, enables freedom of expression, 
and provides some protection from fearful attacks (particularly from 
governmental forces). Some takings of property, like that of Mr. 
Mezerhanes’ newspaper and TV station, require protection because 
the underlying property was a vehicle for the freedom of expression 
and providing recompense for taking such property might deter fur-
ther media interventions.402 Some deprivations—as of communal 
lands of those who live off of it or the cases of “special gravity” 
considered by the IACtHR—require a remedy because of their in-
trinsic connections to basic human needs for food, shelter, and even 
to life.403 Some takings, as of a family painting in Altmann v. Austria 
                                                                                                             
 400 CEDAW, supra note 367, art. 15. 
 401 See FDR and the Four Freedoms Speech, FDR PRESIDENTIAL LIBR. & 
MUSEUM, https://fdrlibrary.org/four-freedoms (last visited Feb. 4, 2018). 
 402 But see Mezerhane v. República Bolivarian De Venezuela, 785 F.3d 545, 
551 (11th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 800 (2016). 
 403 See, e.g., Yakye Axa Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations 
and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 125, ¶ 169 (June 31, 2005). 
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seized by the Nazis, need to be restored to their rightful owners out 
of respect for the bonds of family, integral to personal identity.404 
The utilitarian case for property protections has been made, in 
short, by everyone from Aristotle to Garrett Hardin (whose “tragedy 
of the commons” is often seen as a justification for private property 
rights).405 Some of these strategic arguments extend to the interna-
tional protection of the right and some are more convincing than 
others. For authors like Hernando de Soto, granting discrete land 
titles to individuals, including those who formerly held land in com-
mon, is absolutely essential for economic development.406 Others, 
like the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Olivier De 
Shutter, or, as noted, certain feminist defenders of CEDAW, 
strongly dispute the wisdom of such efforts and argue that there are 
better ways to ensure security of tenure to poor farmers, including 
recognition of communal land ownership.407 
Today, as the hostility to “free trade pacts” in the United States 
demonstrates, there is considerable skepticism about the instrumen-
talist arguments that are sometimes made to defend global rights to 
property, particularly as applied to foreign traders and investors. 
Contentions that such rights are part and parcel of “economic free-
dom” (including free trade and capital flows and the spread of IIAs) 
and that market freedoms are the only, or best, way to promote pros-
perity and development no longer satisfy. Many resist the continua-
tion of the NAFTA or the ratification of the Trans-Pacific Partner-
                                                                                                             
 404 The famous Klimt saga, the subject of a Hollywood film (“Woman in 
Gold”), had a happy ending. But the Nazi looting of art was, of course, far more 
widespread and its full scope and consequences for the rightful owners of these 
works may never be fully known or addressed. See, e.g., LYNN H. NICHOLAS, THE 
RAPE OF EUROPA: THE FATE OF EUROPE’S TREASURES IN THE THIRD REICH AND 
THE SECOND WORLD WAR (1995); HECTOR FELICIANO, THE LOST MUSEUM: THE 
NAZI CONSPIRACY TO STEAL THE WORLD’S GREATEST WORKS OF ART 3 (1998); 
Will Gompertz, Nazi Trove in Munich Contains Unknown Works by Masters, 
BBC NEWS (Nov. 5, 2013), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-24818541; 
Nazi Loot Probe: More Art Found at Gurlitt Austria Home, BBC NEWS (Feb. 11, 
2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26133532. 
 405 Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1244–45 
(1968). See also WALDRON, supra note 58, at 5. 
 406 DE SOTO, supra note 361, at 49–51. 
 407 See, e.g., De Schutter, supra note 11, at 271; see also General Recommen-
dation on Article 16, supra note 336, ¶¶ 36–38. 
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ship, not because these pacts defend the right to property, but be-
cause they lack confidence in the real benefits produced by adher-
ence to David Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantage, they do 
not believe these treaties promote the desired trade or capital flows, 
or they believe that global trade and capital do not lift all boats but 
principally enrich those with yachts.408 Reasonable people disagree 
about the overall economic benefits of these treaties. Those who de-
fend the right to property only through instrumental arguments 
premised on the merits of free trade and capital flows are not likely 
to convince those who are skeptical, rightly or wrongly, about the 
wisdom of those flows.409 
Somewhat more plausible are utilitarian arguments that states 
that fail to respect the property rights that they have previously 
granted tend to be weak rule of law states, generally with less than 
independent judiciaries that cannot be counted on to enforce other 
human rights.410 On this view, the human right of property is a 
needed strut to support the rule of law more generally. Those who 
make this argument point out that authoritarian rulers—from 
Chavez to Putin to Xi—have used property deprivations to penalize 
political opponents like Mr. Mezerhane.411 
                                                                                                             
 408 Compare JAMES GWARTNEY, ROBERT LAWSON & JOSHUA HALL, 
ECONOMIC FREEDOM OF THE WORLD: 2015 ANNUAL REPORT v–vii (2015), 
https://www.fraserinstitute.org/sites/default/files/economic-freedom-of-the-
world-2015.pdf, with THOMAS POGGE, WORLD POVERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: 
COSMOPOLITAN RESPONSIBILITIES AND REFORMS (2d ed. 2008) (arguing, inter 
alia, that global inequality has become worse despite the turn to the free market 
solutions). See also THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 
572–73 (Arthur Goldhammer trans., Harv. Univ. Press 2014). 
 409 See, generally, POGGE , supra note 408. 
 410 See, e.g., Daniel Behn, Tarald Laudal Berge & Malcolm Langford, Poor 
States or Poor Governance? Explaining Outcomes in Investment Treaty Arbitra-
tion 15–17 (June 2, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://pa-
pers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2978546 (demonstrating a significant 
correlation between respondent states that lose investor-state disputes and those 
states’ capacity to protect property rights); David Gomtsyan & Suren Gomtysan, 
What Do the Decisions of the European Court of Human Rights Tell about Prop-
erty Rights across Europe? 2 (TILEC Discussion Paper No. 2016-009, 2016), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=2762522 (suggesting that 
the ECtHR is more likely to find property violations in countries, such as those in 
the new democracies of Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe, due to weaker 
rule of property law protections in those countries). 
 411 See, e.g., Gans-Morse, supra note 6, at 264. 
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The connections between respect for property rights at the na-
tional and international levels and the general health of a country’s 
devotion to the rule of law are particularly salient when the national 
rule of law completely breaks down. When the rule of law clearly 
collapses, it is more likely that a country will face the kinds of prop-
erty deprivations with “special gravity” that the IACtHR has faced. 
As U.S. court cases addressing “genocidal takings” remind us, prop-
erty rights abuses, including outright thefts of property, have long 
accompanied the systematic mass atrocities too often seen through-
out the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Property rights viola-
tions have served as a tool to pursue ethnic cleansing or to commit 
other crimes against humanity, or genocide, as in Mugabe’s Zimba-
bwe from 2000 to 2012; they can be used, as in perhaps Venezuela 
today, to enable “malnutrition by expropriation.”412 The Khmer 
Rouge in Cambodia targeted intellectuals-cum-property owners; 
Mao denied landed peasants access to their plots during his “Great 
Leap Forward.”413 It is also true that resort to property depriva-
tions—the routine destruction of titles, for example, during such 
mass atrocities—have complicated efforts to restore the rule of law 
or engage in transitional justice.414 Nor have governments bent on 
forms of ethnic cleansing stopped using property deprivations as a 
tool today. Legislation enacted in 1991 in Kosovo had the object and 
effect of restricting the sale of properties from Kosovo Serbs to Ko-
sovo Albanians as a means of ensuring that the Serb population did 
                                                                                                             
 412 Howard-Hassman, supra note 55, at 183–86, 193–94. 
 413 See Phnom Penh, Cambodia Land Rights in Focus, IRIN (Mar. 15, 2013), 
http://www.irinnews.org/report/97654/analysis-cambodian-land-rights-focus; 
Llewellyn H. Rockwell Jr., The Horrors of Communist China Under Mao Zedong 
That Most Westerners Don’t Know About, BUSINESS INSIDER (May 1, 2017), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/horrors-of-communist-china-under-mao-2017-
5. 
 414 Thus, recent press reports narrate problems associated with the Khmer 
Rouge’s decision to destroy all property rights records in the 1970s. See Pauline 
Chiou, Khmer Rouge Legacy: Land Disputes, CNN (Nov. 27, 2011, 11:54 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2011/11/25/world/asia/cambodia-property-development-
controversy/index.html; see also Penh, supra note 412 (noting that “[l]and rights 
remains a highly controversial issue in Cambodia, where the communist Khmer 
Rouge banned private property in the late 1970s in their effort to establish an 
agrarian society, destroying scores of land documents in the process”). 
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not decline.415 The pending ICC arrest warrant against al Bashir of 
Sudan includes a charge that forces under his control “systemati-
cally committed acts of pillaging” towns and villages.416 
But, not everyone is convinced that situations of rule of law col-
lapse tell us much about the everyday connection between respect 
for the rule of law and property rights—or that even if such a con-
nection exists, property rights need international protection via 
treaty. Even in the situations noted above, the causal arrows are not 
clear. It is doubtful that if property rights had been more secure or 
protected via treaty, any or some of these mass atrocities would not 
have occurred. Not everyone believes that a government willing to 
sacrifice the rights of foreign investors for the public good will next 
violate the rights of its own citizens, or that IIAs and human rights 
treaties with property protections are required to (or can) prevent 
either or both outcomes. 
Instrumental justifications aside, what can be said about whether 
an international human right of property advances the most common 
justification offered for human rights: protecting human dignity?417 
Human dignity played a large role in Louis Henkin’s path-break-
ing defense of human rights. Henkin was a revolutionary advocate 
that our age was the “age of rights,” in which every individual “has 
legitimate claims upon his or her own society,” justified not because 
these rights are necessary to achieve some common good or because 
they are granted to us by the grace of democratic governments, but 
                                                                                                             
 415 See, e.g., Margaret Cordial & Knut Rosandhaug, The Response of the 
United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo to Address Property 
Rights Challenges, in HOUSING, LAND, AND PROPERTY RIGHTS IN POST-CONFLICT 
UNITED NATIONS AND OTHER PEACE OPERATIONS: A COMPARATIVE SURVEY AND 
PROPOSAL FOR REFORM 61, 65–67 (Scott Leckie ed., 2008). 
 416 Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Warrant of Arrest for Omar 
Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, No. ICC-02/05-01/09, at 4–5 (Mar. 4, 2009), 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2009_01514.pdf. 
 417 Dignity is the most commonly relied upon justification for human rights, 
among both scholars and courts. See generally, Christopher McCrudden, Human 
Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 655, 655 
(2008); Gerald L. Neuman, Human Dignity in United States Constitutional Law, 
in ZUR AUTONOMIE DES INDIVIDUUMS: LIBER AMICORUM SPIROS SIMITIS 249, 
249–51 (Dieter Simon & Manfred Weiss eds., 2000); Oscar Schachter, Comment, 
Human Dignity as a Normative Concept, 77 AM. J. INT’L L. 848, 853 (1983); Jür-
gen Habermas, The Concept of Human Dignity and the Realistic Utopia of Human 
Rights, 41 METAPHILOSOPHY 464, 464 (2010). 
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because they are moral entitlements owed to all human beings.418 
He argued that dignity plays a foundational role in the very idea of 
calling some rules “human rights” and according them exceptional 
importance.419 He suggested that dignitarian entitlements are called 
“rights” to indicate that they are claims “as of right,” that is, not 
provided “by appeal to grace, or charity, or brotherhood, or love,” 
and not because they are “earned or deserved,” but because they are 
claims “upon society,” “derive[d] from moral principles governing 
relations between persons” that society has the burden to satisfy.420 
The dignitarian intuitions that underlie the human rights instru-
ments in the Appendix are not hard to discern. A number of these 
texts—such as the Refugee Convention, the treaty on indigenous 
peoples, and for stateless persons—explicitly recognize that the 
right of property is not dependent on sovereigns to give or withhold. 
Each of these recognizes that, as both Thomas Jefferson and Henkin 
said, certain property rights, “inherent” to personhood, are not de-
pendent on a person’s nationality or lack of one.421 Under these trea-
ties, states should not discriminate between refugees who are not 
part of their national social contract because they are people; they 
need to do the same with respect to stateless persons even if these 
human beings lack a state protector; they need to recognize the right 
to land of indigenous peoples even when a state has not formally 
given such persons or groups formal title. Such treaties usefully re-
mind us that foreigners are people too and that governments do not 
always get to decide unilaterally who a person with rights is. Equal-
ity instruments, such as CEDAW and CERD, might be seen as as-
sociating, at a fundamental level, equal treatment with dignity.422 
                                                                                                             
 418 Henkin, supra note 324, at 11. See also HENKIN, supra note 57, at 2. Hen-
kin’s conception of dignity appears to owe much to Kant’s well-known concept 
of human dignity as embracing the categorical imperative. See IMMANUEL KANT, 
GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 24–25 (Cambridge Univ. Press 
1998) (1785); see generally Michael J. Meyer, Kant’s Concept of Dignity and 
Modern Political Thought, 8 HIST. OF EUR. IDEAS 319, 319 (1987). 
 419 Henkin, supra note 324, at 11. 
 420 HENKIN, supra note 57, at 3. 
 421 See id.; see also Henkin, supra note 324, at 15; Va. DECLARATION OF 
RIGHTS, supra note 87. 
 422 For examples of this connection made by national courts, see, e.g., O’Con-
nell, supra note 378, at 271. 
2018] THE HUMAN RIGHT OF PROPERTY 675 
 
But, as often been noted, dignity itself is a contested concept 
with a plurality of meanings that is left undefined by all the human 
rights instruments that nonetheless rely on it, particularly in their 
preambles.423 Further, neither Henkin nor others of the founding hu-
man rights generation clarified what they meant when they said that 
dignity was “the foundational value” for human rights.424 Since the 
time that Henkin’s Age of Rights was published, however, there has 
been renewed attention to the philosophical study of the idea of hu-
man dignity.425 More recently, Jeremy Waldron has usefully pro-
vided four possible ways to understand the idea that dignity is a 
foundational concept for human rights. According to Waldron this 
might mean: (1) “that, as a matter of history and genealogy,” human 
rights was generated from conceptions of human dignity; (2) “that 
[human dignity] is the source of [human rights], in the way that the 
application of one legal proposition may be the source of the validity 
of another;” (3) that [human rights] can be derived logically from 
[human dignity], either deductively or with the help of empirical 
premises;” or (4) that [human dignity] throws some indispensable 
light on [human rights] or helps in the interpretation of [them].”426 
Waldron skeptically examines each of these conceptions and 
suggests that perhaps it is best to see dignity as a “status” concept 
“that comprises a given set of rights.”427 He suggests that we do not 
have human rights because we have human dignity, but that human 
dignity is what we enjoy when one’s human rights are respected.428 
Waldron also argues that contemporary international human rights 
instruments constitute an effort to elevate the rank or status of all 
                                                                                                             
 423 See Jeremy J. Waldron, Is Dignity the Foundation of Human Rights?, 6–9 
(N.Y.U. Pub. L. & Legal Theory Working Papers No. 374, 2013). Waldron also 
suggests that the absence of a definition for dignity makes it a questionable can-
didate on which to build a foundation for human rights. He notes George Kateb’s 
point that to the extent human rights are “nonsense on stilts,” the idea of human 
dignity only adds more nonsense. Id. at 9. See also McCrudden, supra note 417, 
at 702. 
 424 See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, Dignity and Rank: In Memory of Gregory Vlas-
tos (1907–1991), 48 EUR. J. SOC. 201, 205–07 (2007) [hereinafter Waldron, Dig-
nity and Rank]. 
 425 See, e.g., id. at 201; McCrudden, supra note 417, at 657–58; MICHAEL 
ROSEN, DIGNITY: ITS HISTORY AND MEANING 4–5 (2012). 
 426 Waldron, supra note 423, at 12. 
 427 Id. at 25. 
 428 Id. 
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persons to the level once given only to the rank of nobility; that is, 
that the human species is now owed rights once granted only to 
members of the nobility.429 Waldron acknowledges that the notion 
of dignity as a foundational idea may make sense to the extent that 
it provides a common rationale to explain how the various rights and 
duties in the international human rights canon hang together.430 He 
argues that dignitarian ideas may supply an underlying coherence to 
these rights as a whole.431 
The human right to the protection of property, including the pro-
tection of at least some forms of private as well as communal prop-
erty, can be plausibly examined using any of Waldron’s useful de-
lineations of what dignity means or what it means to use it as a 
“foundational” concept. Following Waldron, the right to property is 
demonstrably a “status” concept whose precise contents are defined, 
as many human rights instruments in the Appendix suggest, based 
on the characteristics of the persons to whom the right is accorded. 
Despite these treaties’ emphasis on equality, states have distin-
guished among the property protection rights to be accorded based 
on distinct categories of persons depending on their status.432 Chil-
dren, prisoners, stateless persons, and refugees, for example, do not 
receive the same treatment with respect to their property protections 
as do a state’s adult citizens and, to some extent, some international 
regimes (e.g., the NAFTA’s Investment Chapter, IIAs generally, 
and possibly the ECHR) continue to evince the solicitude for the 
property rights of foreigners that characterized the law of state re-
sponsibility long before the rise of human rights.433 One needs to be 
cautious though about concluding that the instruments in the Appen-
dix, taken as a whole, are an effort to elevate, in bits and pieces, the 
                                                                                                             
 429 Waldron, Dignity and Rank, supra note 424, at 201. 
 430 Waldron, supra note 423, at 10–11. 
 431 Id. at 26, 28–29. 
 432 See e.g., Yakye Axa Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations 
and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 125, ¶¶ 147–49 (June 17, 
2005). 
 433 See, e.g., Rosalyn Higgins, The Taking of Property and Human Rights, in 
THE TAKING OF PROPERTY BY THE STATE: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 355, 355–75 (1982); see also James v. United Kingdom, 98 
Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 68 (1986) (dicta suggesting that greater solicitude for the 
property rights of aliens is based on the fact that these persons do not have equal 
access to political processes for making laws in their host states). 
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status of all persons to enjoy the level of property protections once 
reserved for foreigners’ property. The idea that today even a coun-
try’s nationals are entitled to the extensive property protections now 
provided in IIAs ignores the differences among the property instru-
ments in the Appendix and presumes that a single level of property 
protection is required for all. Caution about such a simple conclu-
sion is also warranted because, as noted, IIAs—and the protections 
they extend to foreigners as well as the limitations imposed on 
states’ right to regulate—are a moving target. 
The dignitarian foundations for the human right to property pro-
tection can also be plausibly explained using Waldron’s four possi-
ble delineations of what this might mean noted above. These are 
considered in turn. 
Waldron is skeptical of his first, genealogical, frame. He argues 
that it is historically inaccurate to contend that human rights grew 
out of pre-existing discourses relating to human dignity and that it 
is probably more accurate to say the reverse, namely that the idea of 
dignity reflects socio-historical conceptions of basic rights and free-
doms that preceded it.434 But while this may be true for human rights 
as whole, a historical/genealogical view of the relationship between 
specific international rights of property and the foundational value 
of dignity is not implausible. As the chronology of human rights in-
struments indicates, while the right to property protection was in-
cluded in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a vague and 
possibly rhetorical value, that right was not given concrete form un-
til years later, in the course of repeated invocations by regional hu-
man rights courts (particularly the ECtHR and IACtHR)435 and as 
property protections came to be included in a number of legally 
binding instruments for different groups of persons. 
The various human rights treaties recognizing the right of prop-
erty and to non-discriminatory treatment with respect to it are mod-
ern post-U.N. products—as is the evolving institutional jurispru-
                                                                                                             
 434 Waldron, supra note 423, at 13–14. 
 435 See, e.g., Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Cmty. v. Nicaragua, Merits, Rep-
aration and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79, ¶¶ 142–45 (Aug. 
31, 2001); Abrill Alosilla v. Peru, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, In-
ter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 223, ¶ 82 (Mar. 4, 2011); Marckx v. Belgium, 31 
Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), ¶ 63 (1979); see also Fabri, supra note 315, at 149–51. 
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dence giving these rights ever more nuanced content. As is sug-
gested by the IACtHR case law noted above, as well as the ongoing 
dynamic re-interpretations of what the right of or to property means 
in the course of general comments and views issued by U.N. human 
committees and U.N. special rapporteurs, what that right means to-
day to women, indigenous peoples, children, prisoners, the disabled, 
or immigrants is not the same as it was in 1948.436 
Today, as Henkin would predict, the contours of property pro-
tections are often derived from certain dignitarian “moral intui-
tions.”437 The contemporary human right of property owes much to 
contested and evolving (but often strongly held) ideas of what hu-
man dignity means in the modern world. For example, the proposi-
tion that married women and widows are owed secure property 
rights (including to the marital home) and that national laws that fail 
to respect these rights are illegal is, to a considerable extent, derived 
from progressive notions of what it means to see women as fully 
human.438 Notably, these legal propositions may be read into instru-
ments (such as the ICCPR) whose texts do not contain such guaran-
tees.439 While human dignity as a general universal value may have 
been originally inspired by instruments like the U.N. Charter itself 
and the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, those instru-
ments did not close off dignity’s juris-generative ripples. It is not 
implausible to argue that institutional actors such as judges on the 
IACtHR now charged with defining the scope of the right of prop-
erty derive new ideas of what the static text on property before them 
means based on intuitive ideas about what “human dignity” requires 
in contemporary society. Determining the genealogical roots of the 
contemporary human right of property is a complex project and pre-
sents a moving target. The target is moving not least because to the 
extent the goal is to elevate the status of all persons to the level of 
property protections owed to aliens, the goalposts of that treat-
ment—set by IIAs—is changing rapidly, as states re-calibrate the 
                                                                                                             
 436 See, e.g., Ikdahl, supra note 369, at 289; Goonesekere, supra note 368, at 
396–97. 
 437 Henkin, supra note 324, at 10, 15. 
 438 See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, ARE WOMEN HUMAN?: AND OTHER 
INTERNATIONAL DIALOGUES 41–43 (2006). 
 439 ICCPR, supra note 21, arts. 1, 2. 
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balance between their rights to regulate versus the property protec-
tions they are willing to guarantee foreign investors.440 
Nor is Waldron’s second conception of the function of dignity—
dignity as the source of validity or legitimacy for human rights—
inapposite. While states are bound by the treaties identified in the 
Appendix because they are treaties—as a matter of positive law—
the extent to which states continue to violate these pacts and attempt 
on occasion to withdraw from them remains a source of great con-
cern. Human rights advocates, including those fighting property 
rights violations, continue to turn to human dignity as grundnorm to 
push for enforcement or implementation and to deter states from (as 
some have) withdrawing from regional human rights systems or oth-
erwise undermining rights protections.441 Appeals to dignity as a 
source of legitimacy and a deeper source of validity442 than mere 
pacta sunt servanda are particularly important for rights in the in-
ternational rights canon—such as property protections—which are 
otherwise fragile under positive law because of the ambivalence in 
which they are held or the fact that few claim they enjoy the status 
of jus cogens.443 The age of Brexit, Trump, Xi, and Putin may not 
be a promising time to rely simply on positive law and pacta sunt 
servanda as a basis for encouraging respect for human rights, in-
cluding the right to property protection. It may be, on the contrary, 
just the right moment for dignitarian appeals precisely to stress the 
“universality, inalienability, and non-forfeitability” of these 
rights—and the need to be consistent about ensuring the dignity of 
all persons.444 Indeed, appeals to such higher values may be all the 
                                                                                                             
 440 Thus, many of the changes being made to contemporary BITs and FTAs—
from the reformulation of FET guarantees to “clarifications” of the distinction 
between legitimate regulation and improper expropriations—are designed to pro-
tect the rights of states to regulate while still protecting the property of foreign 
investors. See generally Alvarez, Our Investment Treaties, supra note 53, at 143–
44. 
 441 See Waldron, supra note 423, at 14. 
 442 Id. at 14–16. 
 443 Higgins, supra note 433, at 355. 
 444 Waldron, supra note 423, at 15; see also WALDRON, supra note 58, at 414–
18 (arguing that defenses of property rights based on their contributions to the 
“freedom, autonomy, and the development of independence and responsibility” 
of individuals encourage consistent advocacy of such values on behalf of all, even 
the most property-less). 
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more necessary to mobilize civil disobedience to induce state com-
pliance with these treaties or to preclude withdrawal from needed 
institutions like the IACtHR or the ECtHR. 
Waldron’s third frame is supported by the rulings of interna-
tional courts such as that of the IACtHR surveyed in Part III. That 
court’s decisions, along with the views presented by others charged 
with the day to day application of the human right of property, 
whether legally binding or not, provide numerous examples of how 
adjudicative or other interpretative findings with respect to these 
treaty rights are derived logically from ideas of human dignity, ei-
ther deductively or with the help of empirical premises.445 A wealth 
of G.A. resolutions and World Bank reports that emphasize the ex-
tent to which respect for women’s property rights advances not only 
the economic health of nations but the capacity of women for self-
realization provide examples of the latter.446 The CEDAW commit-
tee’s ongoing interpretations of what it means for women to enjoy 
“equal” rights to marital property, often derived from ideas that 
women need to be able to have normative agency—to be able to 
maintain a home, to secure equal pay in their jobs, to inherit marital 
property, or to establish a business—provide evidence of the for-
mer.447 While, as Waldron indicates, the idea that normative agency 
is important to human dignity and that it is really at stake in partic-
ular factual contexts are contested notions, these are the “moral in-
tuitions” that, as Henkin would predict, appear to make a difference 
to those engaged in human rights advocacy and interpretation.448 
Moreover, adjudicators or U.N. human rights bureaucrats who 
rely on dignitarian ideas to justify conclusions about whether the 
right of property can be invoked in particular contexts are in good 
company. They may be presuming, along with Amartya Sen, that 
the right to property allows people to lead the kind of lives people 
                                                                                                             
 445 See, e.g., Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Cmty. v. Nicaragua, Merits, Rep-
arations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79, ¶ 149 (Aug. 31, 
2001); Yakye Axa Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations and Costs, 
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 125, ¶¶ 147–49 (June 17, 2005). 
 446 See generally WORLD BANK, supra note 373. 
 447 See General Recommendation on Article 16, supra note 336, art. 16 ¶¶ 30–
39. 
 448 Waldron, supra note 423, at 17–18; Henkin, supra note 324, at 10, 15. 
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value.449 They may be following Hegel in the belief that personal 
property enables the exercise of dignity in the form of individual 
autonomy; they may be assuming that property enables persons to 
express their personality, achieve their independence, and master a 
degree of self-government.450 They may be suggesting, as did Aris-
totle, that without nondiscriminatory access to basic core rights to 
property, including security to their homes, people are slaves.451 
More controversially, some applications of the human right of 
property seem premised on intuitive connections between the dig-
nity of labor and the dignity of self. This connection is suggested by 
some IACtHR rulings in Part III,452 national laws (as in Germany)453 
which draw a close connection between the right to labor and the 
right to property, and some of the other international instruments in 
the Appendix (including non-human rights instruments that protect 
industrial property, investors, the wages of workers, or the right to 
farm or use personal or communal lands).454 A number of the prop-
erty rights instruments in the Appendix appear to presume a connec-
tion between the right to work and the right to benefit from that 
work. 
The presumptive labor/property tie, most closely associated with 
Locke,455 has been the subject of considerable scorn, particularly by 
legal philosophers. Prominent legal philosophers argue that, as a 
                                                                                                             
 449 See Monteagudo, supra note 58, at 8 (connecting the right to property to 
Amartya Sen’s views). 
 450 See id. (connecting the right to property to Hegel); WALDRON, supra note 
58, at 343–89 (discussing Hegel’s justifications for private property). 
 451 See generally Koskenniemi, supra note 132, at 18. 
 452 See Abrill Alosilla v. Peru, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, In-
ter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 223, ¶ 83 (Mar. 4, 2011). 
 453 HENKIN ET AL., supra note 364, at 1538. 
 454 See infra Appendix. 
 455 As famously recognized in Locke’s words from his First Treatise on Gov-
ernment: 
[E]very Man has a Property in his own Person . . . . The Labour of his Body, and 
the Work of his Hands, we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever then he removes 
out of the State that Nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his Labour 
with, and joyned [sic] to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his 
Property. It being by him removed from the common state Nature placed it in, it 
hath by this labour something annexed to it, that excludes the common right of 
other Men. 
LOCKE, supra note 69, at 305–06. 
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matter of strict logic, Locke’s idea that one can “mix” one’s labor 
with an object and therefore acquire a right to the object makes no 
sense.456 Locke’s defense of personal property has also been dis-
credited to the extent that he used it to justify European rights to take 
property from the American Indians as far as the latter had not, in 
his view, “improved” the land;457 and Locke’s views have been re-
sisted by many others, including, of course, by Karl Marx.458 None-
theless, the texts of a number of property rights international instru-
ments as well as national laws suggest that the labor/property con-
nection may be another one of those “moral intuitions” which the 
drafters of these laws could not resist—and which those interpreting 
them ignore at their peril. International law, including treaties rati-
fied by nearly all states in the Appendix, presumes that the right to 
one’s labor presupposes the right to own the product of that labor. 
As a chief critic of Locke, Jeremy Waldron, points out, drawing a 
connection between acts of appropriation and the right to property 
need not be grounded in Locke’s proposition that property entitle-
ments emerge when objects are “mixed with one’s labor”; such 
property entitlements might be, more plausibly, argued on the prem-
ise that persons should be entitled to property that they have “im-
proved” as an additional way to evince respect for Hegelian ideas of 
individual autonomy and responsibility.459 It would therefore be 
wrong to presume that some, or all of property rights instruments in 
the Appendix, subscribe to Locke’s vision of property, as opposed 
to, for example, Rousseau’s or Hegel’s.460 And, these instruments 
                                                                                                             
 456 See, e.g., Liam B. Murphy, Professor of Law, N.Y.U., Private Law and 
Public Illusion, CLUSTER OF EXCELLENCE: “THE FORMATION OF NORMATIVE 
ORDERS” (May 2–3, 2016), http://www.normativeorders.net/en/events/frankfurt-
lectures/48-veranstaltungen/frankfurt-lectures/4662-private-law-and-public-illu-
sion-eng; WALDRON, supra note 58, at 184–91. 
 457 See e.g., Blake A. Watson, John Marshall and Indian Land Rights: A His-
torical Rejoinder to the Claim of “Universal Recognition” of the Doctrine of Dis-
covery, 36 SETON HALL L. REV. 481, 531–32 (2006). 
 458 See Richard Teichgraeber III, Rousseau’s Argument for Property, 2 HIST. 
EUR. IDEAS 115, 127–28 (1981). 
 459 WALDRON, supra note 58, at 310–13 (connecting this approach to Hegel’s 
account of the ethical importance of property). 
 460 Locke’s most prominent antagonist with respect to property, Rousseau, ar-
gued for Republican controls over the excesses wrought by acquisition of property 
and the desire for profit, not for the elimination of private property. Teichgraeber, 
supra note 458, at 121–124. Indeed, as Teichgraeber points out, Rousseau teaches 
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certainly do not follow Locke insofar as he refused to extend the 
benefits of either labor or property rights to indigenous peoples.461 
For much the same reasons, ideas of dignity seem to be used in 
the fourth sense defined by Waldron: to throw “indispensable light” 
on what a human right means or to help in the interpretation of it.462 
They appear to underlie decisions issued by the IACtHR (such as 
those directed at the forfeiting of property to the state in criminal 
cases noted at Section III(B)(2)(b)), and are inescapable in the juris-
prudence of the ECtHR.463 They may also help to explain the IAC-
tHR’s greater solicitude to some victims of property deprivations 
who happen to be poor.464 
CONCLUSION 
This Article is modeled in many respects on those included in 
Henkin’s Age of Rights. It canvasses weighty arguments directed 
against the idea of the human right to property that emulate Henkin’s 
“bill of particulars” against the idea of human rights generally.465 It 
                                                                                                             
the child Emile to cultivate beans in order to show the child, by example, that 
what one cultivates, that is, “given his time, his labour, and his trouble, [and] his 
very self to” provides a claim “against all the world[.]” Id. at 126 (quoting JEAN 
JACQUES ROUSSEAU, ÉMILE 62 (Barbara Foxley trans., J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd. 
1911) (1762)); see also David S. Siroky & Hans-Jörg Sigwart, Principle and Pru-
dence: Rousseau on Private Property and Inequality, 46 POLITY 381, 381 (2014). 
 461 See e.g., Lindsey L. Wiersma, Indigenous Lands as Cultural Property: A 
New Approach to Indigenous Land Claims, 54 DUKE L.J. 1061, 1065 (2005) 
(“John Locke articulated the quintessential European position on the rights of in-
digenous peoples: that they had no rights to lands they did not cultivate.”) (foot-
note omitted). 
 462 Waldron, supra note 423, at 12. 
 463 See, e.g., McCrudden, supra note 417, at 683; see also Paolo G. Carozza, 
Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights: A Reply, 19 EUR. J. 
INT’L L. 931, 934–39 (2008) (agreeing with McCrudden insofar as concluding 
that the ECtHR relies on three core dignitarian ideas: (1) an ontological claim 
about the intrinsic worth of the human person; (2) a relational claim about how 
others should treat human persons in view of their inherent value; and (3) a claim 
regarding the proper role of the state vis-á-vis the individual (i.e., that the state 
exists for the good of persons and not vice-versa)). 
 464 See, e.g., Massacres of El Mozote and Nearby Places v. El Salvador, Mer-
its, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 252, ¶ 164 
(Oct. 25, 2012). 
 465 Indeed, Henkin’s general “bill of particulars” strikingly echoes contempo-
rary objections to the specific right to property protection: 
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then attempts to do for the human right of property what Henkin did 
for human rights as whole: canvass how the right is compatible with 
U.S. values, identify what it means in particular cases (as in the IAC-
tHR), and advance normative justifications for its existence. 
This Article does not address one question with which contem-
porary scholars of international property rights like Sprankling are 
much concerned. It does not consider whether, apart from the instru-
ments enumerated in the Appendix, a universally applicable human 
right to property protection exists as a matter of customary interna-
tional law or general principles of law. This question, which lurks 
even in the context of some of the U.S. expropriation rulings dis-
cussed above,466 has been the subject of considerable attention. 
Scholars dealing with the rules applicable to the protection of alien 
investors have repeatedly revisited this question, at least since Elihu 
Root affirmed, before the American Society of International Law in 
1910, that an “international minimum standard of treatment” exists 
to protect the property of U.S. investors abroad or later, in the wake 
of Cordell Hull’s statements to Mexican officials in 1938 that cus-
tomary international law requires “prompt, adequate and effective 
                                                                                                             
[T]he rights idea is selfish and promotes egoism. It is atomistic, disharmonious, 
confrontational, often litigious . . . . It is antisocial, permitting and encouraging 
the individual to set up selfish interests as he or she sees them against the common 
interest commonly determined. The idea of rights challenges democracy, negating 
popular sovereignty and frustrating the will of the majority. In principle as well 
as in detail, it may exalt individual autonomy over communality, egoism over 
gemeinschaft, freedom over order, adversariness over harmony . . . . It imposes an 
artificial and narrow view of the public good . . . and takes critical decisions from 
those chosen to govern and the only ones capable of governing. In many societies 
and circumstances, the idea of rights helps immunize egotistic property interests 
and extravagant claims to autonomy and liberty, thereby entrenching reaction and 
preventing revolutionary social change. 
HENKIN, supra note 57, at 182. 
 466 Thus, in its 2012 Abelesz decision, the Seventh Circuit stated that there is 
no need to search for a self-executing treaty so long as the underlying rules were 
part of customary international law. It therefore turned to customary international 
law to find the “genocidal taking” exception to the domestic takings rule. “Con-
ventions that not all nations ratify can still be evidence of customary international 
law. As we explained above, the expropriations alleged by plaintiffs were an in-
tegral part of the planned genocide of the Hungarian Holocaust. And genocide has 
been recognized as a violation of customary international law.” Abelesz v. Mag-
yar Nemzeti Bank, 692 F.3d 661, 685–86 (7th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted), aff’d 
sub nom. Fischer v. Magyar Allamvasutak Zrt., 777 F.3d 847 (7th Cir. 2015). 
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compensation” when expropriating the assets of foreigners.467 Those 
who initiated the U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) Program 
have since indicated that reaffirming these rules was a key reason 
for pursuing BITs.468 The extent to which customary law protects 
the rights of foreign investors, ably scrutinized by scholars, interna-
tional and national judges, investor-state arbitrators, and many oth-
ers, requires no revisiting here.469 
In Mezerhane, discussed at the beginning of this essay, the U.S. 
district court had on hand (but ignored) expert witness Joseph 
Weiler’s opinion that the uncompensated expropriation of property 
violates two distinct branches of customary international law, 
namely the rules governing state responsibility for the protection of 
aliens and its rules against violating fundamental human rights.470 
Weiler argued that universally applicable property protections also 
exist under general principles of law recognized by the national laws 
of nations.471 Others, including John Sprankling, have advanced 
comparable claims, albeit with more nuance.472 
The case for a universal right to property protection as a matter 
of customary international law is largely based on the fact that, as 
noted, more than two-thirds of nations are now parties to a regional 
human rights treaty—namely the American Convention, the ECHR, 
the African Charter, or the Arab Charter—that include the right to 
property and a court with the power to issue legally binding judg-
ments to enforce it. It would also draw support from the fact that 
only two states in the world, Palau and South Sudan, are not parties 
                                                                                                             
 467 See Elihu Root, The Basis of Protection to Citizens Residing Abroad, 4 
AM. J. INT’L L. 517, 521–23 (1910); The Hull Formula (Exchanges between Cor-
dell Hull and the Mexican Government (1938), in AMERICAN CLASSICS IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW, supra note 24, at 235. 
 468 See e.g., Alvarez, supra note 342, at 20. 
 469 For a survey of views and precedents, see generally Alvarez, International 
Investment Law, supra note 24, at 1–81. 
 470 Weiler Report, supra note 299. 
 471 Id. at 8. But cf. Mezerhane v. República Bolivariana de Venezuela, 785 
F.3d 545, 552 (11th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 800 (2016). The Me-
zerhane Court, which ultimately dismissed Mezerhane’s claim on the basis of 
sovereign immunity, focused on whether the American Convention of Human 
Rights was self-executing and did not address the broader questions of customary 
international law or general principles. Id. at 548–49. 
 472 Sprankling, supra note 13, at 464–66. 
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to at least one treaty in the Appendix, such as those barring discrim-
inatory treatment with respect to property rights against vulnerable 
groups, such as CEDAW (189 parties), CERD (179), the Migrant 
Workers convention (51), and the Disabilities convention (175).473 
But, while it is not unusual today to use widespread treaty ratifica-
tions as proof that a rule of universal custom exists, as Sprankling 
acknowledges those who would insist on separate indications of 
opinio juris to make a definite finding that custom exists would not 
find evidence that states have entered into treaties necessarily suffi-
cient.474 The contention that a human right to property protection 
exists as a general principle of law would draw some support from 
the fact that today, when some ninety-five percent of the world’s 
nearly two hundred states guarantee the right to property under their 
national laws (most commonly in their national constitutions), there 
is no longer an East-West divide with respect to national laws that 
troubled Henkin when he was the chief rapporteur for the 1986 U.S. 
Restatement of Foreign Relations.475 
But neither conclusion, even if correct, would support anything 
other than a primitive or rudimentary conception of what the osten-
sible universal right of property would entail. A universal right 
grounded in either custom or general principles presumably would 
not go further than the wording in the original Universal Declaration 
                                                                                                             
 473 See infra, Appendix. Sprankling also canvasses other evidence for this con-
clusion, including G.A. Resolutions and a 1993 U.N. report authored by Vene-
zuelan scholar Luis Valencia Rodriguez that cast doubt on the conclusion that the 
right to property was truly universal. Sprankling, supra note 13 at 472–73. 
 474 Id. at 495–97. But short-circuiting the need to search for sufficient state 
practice and opinio juris by relying on widespread treaty ratification for findings 
of custom is, at least in the practice of national and international courts, quite 
common. See Stephen J. Choi & Mitu Gulati, Customary International Law: How 
Do Courts Do It?, in CUSTOM’S FUTURE: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A CHANGING 
WORLD 117, 132–34 (Curtis A. Bradley ed., 2016) (citing an empirical survey of 
how national and international courts find contemporary rules of custom for the 
conclusion that resort to widespread treaty ratifications is the leading source of 
evidence for adjudicative findings of custom). 
 475 See Sprankling, supra note 13, at 485, 492–93. But arguments premised on 
alleged general principles of law often paint with a broad brush and may ignore 
very real differences in how national laws and constitutions define and protect 
property rights. See generally Neha Jain, Judicial Lawmaking and General Prin-
ciples of Law in International Criminal Law, 57 HARV. INT’L L.J. 111, 111–13 
(2016) (critiquing how international criminal courts have deployed alleged gen-
eral principles of law). 
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of Human Rights, which leaves the parameters of such a property 
right, along with the definition of property owed protection, unde-
fined and presumptively subject to considerable state discretion.476 
Even if a universally applicable human right to property exists, that 
right would need to be capacious enough to embrace a wide range 
of state laws and economic systems with widely different emphases 
on reliance on the market—and more importantly, differing concep-
tions of how property rights relate to equality and human dignity. It 
would also need to be malleable enough to survive the fact that de-
spite widespread treaty reservations, some states remain outside 
many of the property protecting instruments in the Appendix, while 
a few have taken reservations expressly with respect to their prop-
erty provisions.477 
What can be said with more certainty is this: human rights of 
property exist even if they are grounded in treaties and not universal 
custom or general principles. International law has therefore recog-
nized such a right, including, but not limited to, the right to compen-
sation for government takings, and appears to base the right of prop-
erty on universal values like human dignity, even if the international 
community of states has not yet extended it to all humans as a matter 
of universal customary law. The vast majority of states that are par-
ties to treaties like the regional human rights treaties or U.N. “human 
rights” conventions in the Appendix have elevated property rights 
                                                                                                             
 476 “Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association 
with others. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.” G.A. Res. 217 
(III) A, supra note 17, art. 17. For one attempt to give content to such a minimalist 
conception, see Henry G. Schermers, The International Protection of the Right of 
Property, in PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS: THE EUROPEAN DIMENSION 565, 565 
(Franz Matscher & Herbert Petzold eds., 1990). 
 477 Thus, the United States does not consider itself to be a party to any regional 
human rights system for human rights, notwithstanding its ratification of the OAS 
Charter, which has been interpreted as incorporating the American Declaration of 
the Rights and Duties of Man. On the evolution of the American Declaration 
within the OAS, see THOMAS BUERGENTHAL, DINAH SHELTON & DAVID P. 
STEWART, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN A NUTSHELL, 226–33 (3rd ed. 
2002). Switzerland decided not to ratify Protocol 1 of the European Convention 
of Human Rights, in part because it includes Article 1’s property right. See Bun-
desgericht [BGer] [Federal Supreme Court] May 1, 2013, INTERPELLATION ZUR 
RATIFIZIERUNG DES 1. ZUSATZPROTOKOLLS DER EMRK (Switz.). 
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to a fundamental right, even while not defining what protected prop-
erty is.478 These states have answered Lauterpacht’s original suspi-
cions about the wisdom of recognizing such a right at the interna-
tional level in the way states like the United States have done so 
under national law for two centuries: by recognizing that property 
rights can be “fundamental” even if they can still be trumped by 
other social values, including the right of others and the right/duties 
of states to regulate for the public good.479 In regional human rights 
regimes and under IIAs, states have delegated to adjudicators the 
power to define the property rights requiring protections as well as 
the corresponding duties and rights of states with respect to them. 
On occasion, these adjudicators have not been satisfied with ensur-
ing that governments accord the mere opportunity to enjoy property 
but have insisted that people actually have them.480 In human rights 
treaties they have extended property protections to an individual or 
a group—and treated them as “human rights”—even though to 
greater extent than other rights, rights to property (particularly but 
not only rights to private property) curtail the freedoms of others (as 
through the right to exclude). 
When and how international law recognizes the human right of 
property (including determinations about what it applies to or its rel-
ative status as compared to other human rights), on how states can 
regulate the right, and the nature of the “bundle of rights” conveyed, 
are complex matters that, at present, are left to bilateral, regional, 
and some multilateral treaty regimes to determine, with no assurance 
that the determinations made or interpretations advanced under one 
treaty regime will be the same as in another. Efforts to provide a 
uniform set of responses to these matters through a global interna-
tional law of property are likely to fail and are probably counterpro-
ductive. Only the fragmented, evolving, and possibly contradictory 
                                                                                                             
 478 See Sprankling, supra note 13, at 481. 
 479 See LAUTERPACHT, supra note 17, at 3–4. See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New 
London, 545 U.S. 469, 489 (2005) (confirming the power under eminent domain 
for a local government to take property from one private owner and transfer it to 
another for purposes of economic development). 
 480 See generally WALDRON, supra note 58, at 390 (arguing that the normative 
reasons for property rights are not satisfied with a state’s providing the mere op-
portunity to satisfy them). 
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treaties that we have hold the prospect of answering the grave con-
cerns the international right of property elicits, including percep-
tions that they threaten sovereignty. 
The least controversial normative justification for the interna-
tional right of property (including the right to private property) may 
well be that it is essential to the advancement of human dignity, that 
is, the full development of “freedom, autonomy and the develop-
ment of independence and responsibility” of individuals.481 And the 
best response to the problem that the international right of property 
promotes (or may even be responsible for) global poverty and ine-
quality may be the answer that Waldron provides in justification of 
general rights-based arguments in favor of national protections of 
private property: when persons defend property rights on the basis 
that they advance everyone’s dignitary needs, they are also recog-
nizing that no one should be denied “the amount of property and 
economic security” they need to satisfy at least their basic needs if 
not more.482 Paradoxically, the national and international property 
rights that some see as gravely complicit in massive inequalities 
both within societies and among states may be vital to future efforts 


















                                                                                                             
 481 Id. at 416. 
 482 Id. at 414. 
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APPENDIX 




*: The United States is a party to this treaty. 
**: The United States voted in favor of this declaration. 
***: This declaration is now incorporated into the OAS Charter and 
according to the OAS, the United States is therefore a party to it (and 
subject to the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Commission (but not 
Court) of Human Rights). 
****: The United States signed this treaty but has not ratified it. 
 
Note: These instruments and others not listed may also include pro-
tections for interests that many see as equivalent to “property” such 
as rights to food or housing in the ICESCR (Art. 11(1)) or the “moral 
and material interests” arising from “scientific, literary or artistic pro-
duction” protected under the ICESCR (Art. 15(1)(c)) or the Universal 




Instrument Defined Right 
Beneficiaries 
Year Name State Parties  
1 1883483 
Paris Convention for the 
Protection of Industrial 
Property (revised in 1900, 
1911, 1925, 1934, 1958, 




 Right to industrial property.486 
 Nationals of member 
states and nationals of ot-
hers domiciled or esta-
blished in the member 
states (art. 3).487 
                                                                                                             
 483 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, 
revised July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1538, 828 U.N.T.S. 305. 
 484 Id. art. 1. 
 485 WIPO-Administered Treaties: Paris Convention (Total Contracting Par-
ties: 177), WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/Show-
Results.jsp?lang=en&treaty_id=2 (last visited Feb. 28, 2018). 
 486 Paris Convention, supra note 483, art. 1. 
 487 Id. art. 3. 
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2 1886488 
Berne Convention for the 
Protection of Literary and 
Artistic Works* (revised in 
1896, 1908, 1914, 1928, 




 Protection of literary and artistic 
works, e.g., exclusive right to trans-
late, make reproductions, to broad-
cast, to perform in public dramatic and 
musical works, to make motion pictu-
res, adaptations and arrangements of 
the work.491 







cerning the International 
Registration of Marks 
(revised in 1900, 1911, 
1925, 1934, 1957, 1967, & 







 Right to protection for marks.496 
 Nationals of member 
states and nationals of ot-
hers domiciled or establis-
hed in the member sta-
tes.497 
                                                                                                             
 488 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 
9, 1886, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 99-27, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 (as revised at Paris on July 
24, 1971 and amended in 1979). 
 489 Id. 
 490 WIPO-Administered Treaties: Berne Convention (Total Contracting Par-
ties: 175), WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/Show-
Results.jsp?lang=en&treaty_id=15 (last visited on Feb. 28, 2018). 
 491 Berne Convention, supra note 488, arts. 8–12. 
 492 Id. art. 2. 
 493 Madrid Arrangement Concerning the International Registration of Marks, 
Apr. 14, 1891, 828 U.N.T.S. 389. 
 494 Id. art. 1(2). 
 495 WIPO-Administered Treaties: Madrid Agreement (Marks) (Total Con-
tracting Parties: 55), WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/treaties/
en/ShowResults.jsp?lang=en&treaty_id=21 (last visited on Feb. 28, 2018). 
 496 Madrid Agreement, supra note 493, art. 1. 
 497 Id. 
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4 1907498 
Hague Convention (IV) 
Respecting the Laws and 
Customs of War on 
Land499 
38500 
 Right of prisoners of war to pro-
perty over personal belongings.501 
 Prohibition to destroy or seize 
enemy property.502 
 Prohibition of confiscation of 
enemy property during capitula-
tions.503 
 Right to private property of muni-
cipalities, and institutions dedicated 
to religion, charity and education, the 
arts and sciences.504 
 Prisoners of war.505 
 Parties in hostili-
ties.506 
 Capitulating parties to 
hostilities.507 
 Municipalities, and 
institutions dedicated to 
religion, charity and edu-
cation, the arts and scien-
ces.508 
5 1948509 
Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, article 
17.510 
**511 
 Right to own property.512 
 Right not to be deprived of pro-
perty arbitrarily.513 
 Individuals.514 
 Groups (“in associa-
tion with others”).515 
                                                                                                             
 498 Fourth Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on 
Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277. 
 499 Id. 
 500 Treaties, States Parties and Commentaries: Convention (IV) Respecting 
the Laws and Customs of War on Land, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, 
https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/States.xsp?xp_viewStates=
XPages_NORMStatesParties&xp_treatySelected=195 (last visited Feb. 28, 
2018). 
 501 Hague Convention, supra note 498, annex, art. 4. 
 502 Id. arts. 22–23, 
 503 Id. 
 504 Id. art. 56. 
 505 Id. art. 4. 
 506 Id. art. 23. 
 507 Id. art. 35. 
 508 Id. art. 56. 
 509 G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 
1948). 
 510 Id. art. 17. 
 511 Adopted by the United Nations General Assembly. See generally id. 
 512 G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, supra note 509, art. 17. 
 513 Id. 
 514 Id. 
 515 Id. 
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6 1948516 
American Declaration of 
the Rights and Duties of 
Man, article XXIII.517 
35***518 
(Parties to the 
OAS Charter) 
 Right to own property.519  Every person.520 
7 1949521 
Convention (IV) Relative 
to the Protection of Civi-
lian Persons in Time of 
War (Fourth Geneva Con-
vention)522 
196*523 




 Right to possession of articles of 
personal use and of those who have a 
personal or sentimental value.525 
 Right to remuneration.526 
 Right to retain a certain amount of 
money, to be able to make purchases.527 
 
 Individuals and 
groups during armed con-
flict or military occupa-
tions.528 
 Internees.529 
                                                                                                             
 516 Organization of American States, American Declaration of the Rights and 
Duties of Man, May 2, 1948, OAS Doc. OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.L./V.II.23, doc. 21, 
rev. 6, reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-
American System, OEA/Ser.L./V.II.23, doc. 6, rev. 1, at 17 (1992). 
 517 Id. 
 518 Member States, OAS, http://www.oas.org/en/member_states/default.asp 
(last visited Feb. 28, 2018). 
 519 American Declaration, supra note 516, art. XXIII. 
 520 Id. 
 521 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time 
of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. 
 522 Id. 
 523 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time 
of War, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/
pages/showdetails.aspx?objid=0800000280158b1a (last visited on Oct. 27, 
2017). 
 524 See Geneva Convention, supra note 521, art. 53. 
 525 Id. art. 97. 
 526 Id. art. 98. 
 527 Id. art. 98. 
 528 Id. art. 53. 
 529 Id. art. 98. 
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8 1949530 
ILO Convention (No. 95) 
Concerning the Protection 
of Wages (No. 95)531 
98532 
 Right to receive wages directly, re-
gularly, in legal tender, and without de-
ductions.533 
 Right to dispose freely of wages.534 
 “[A]ll persons to 
whom wages are paid or 
payable.”535 
9 1951536 
Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees537 
 
145538 
 Right to treatment which is (i) as 
favorable as possible, and (ii) not less 
favorable as other aliens in the acquisi-
tion of property and other rights per-
taining thereto.539 
 Right to movable and immovable 
property (industrial property also pro-
tected by art. 14).540 
 Refugees.541 
10 1952542 
Protocol to the European 
Convention for the Protec-




 Right to the peaceful enjoyment of 
possessions.545 
 Right not to be deprived of posses-
sions (with exceptions).546 
 Every natural or legal 
person.547 
                                                                                                             
 530 Convention (No. 95) Concerning the Protection of Wages, July 1, 1949, 
138 U.N.T.S. 226 (entered into force Sept. 24, 1952). 
 531 Id. 
 532 Ratifications of C095 – Protection of Wages Convention, 1949 (No. 95), 
INT’L LABOUR ORG., http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:11300:0::
NO:11300:P11300_INSTRUMENT_ID:312240 (last visited Feb. 28, 2018). 
 533 See Convention Concerning the Protection of Wages, supra note 530, arts. 
3.1, 5, 9. 
 534 Id. art. 6. 
 535 Id. art. 2.1. 
 536 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature July 
28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 189 U.N.T.S. 150. 
 537 Id. 
 538 The 1951 Refugee Convention, UN REFUGEE AGENCY, http://www.un-
hcr.org/en-us/1951-refugee-convention.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2018). 
 539 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 536, art. 13. 
 540 Id. arts. 13, 14. 
 541 Id. art. 3. 
 542 Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms, Mar. 20, 1952, 213 U.N.T.S. 262. 
 543 Id. art. 1. 
 544 Chart of Signatures and Ratifications of Treaty 187, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, 
https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/187/signa-
tures?p_auth=cPfiRlgV (last visited Feb. 28, 2018). 
 545 Protocol to the Convention, supra note 542, art 1. 
 546 Id. 
 547 Id. 
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11 1954548 
Convention Relating to the 





 Right to treatment which is (i) as 
favorable as possible, and (ii) not less 
favorable as other aliens in the acquisi-
tion of property and other rights pertai-
ning thereto.551 
 Right to movable and immovable 
property (industrial property also pro-
tected by art. 14).552 
 
 




Hague Convention for the 
Protection of Cultural Pro-
perty in the Event of Ar-
med Conflict with Regula-






 Obligation to protect cultural pro-
perty.557 
 States.558 
                                                                                                             
 548 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, opened for signa-
ture Sept. 28, 1954, 360 U.N.T.S. 117 (entered into force June 6, 1960). 
 549 Id. art. 13. 
 550 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, UNITED NATIONS 
TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetailsII.aspx?src=
TREATY&mtdsg_no=V-3&chapter=5&Temp=mtdsg2&clang=_en (last visited 
Feb. 28, 2018). 
 551 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, supra note 548, art. 
13. 
 552 Id. arts. 13, 14. 
 553 Id. art. 13. 
 554 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of 
Armed Conflict, May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 215. 
 555 Id. 
 556 State Parties to the Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in 
the Event of Armed Conflict, UNESCO, http://www.unesco.org/eri/la/conven-
tion.asp?KO=13637&language=E&order=alpha (last visited Feb. 28, 2018). 
 557 Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property, supra note 554, art. 2. 
 558 Id. art. 3. 









U.N. GA in 
2015)559 
Standard Minimum Rules 
for the Treatment of Priso-
ners.560 
- 
 Right to a safe custody of money, 
valuables, clothing and other effects.561 
 Prisoners.562 
14 1957563 
ILO Convention (No. 107) 
Concerning the Protection 
and Integration of Indi-
genous and Other Tribal 
and Semi-Tribal Popula-
tions in Independent Coun-
tries.564 
27565 
 Right of ownership of lands tradi-
tionally occupied.566 
 Respect to traditional mechanisms 
of transmission of rights.567 
 Indigenous peoples: 






European Social Charter.570 47571 
 Right to fair remuneration for 
work.572 
 Workers.573 
                                                                                                             
 559 G.A. Res. 70/175, United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treat-
ment of Prisoners (Nelson Mandela Rules) (Dec. 17, 2015). 
 560 Id. 
 561 Id. r. 67. 
 562 Id. 
 563 Convention (No. 107) Concerning the Protection and Integration of Indig-
enous and Other Tribal and Semi-Tribal Populations in Independent Countries, 
June 26, 1957, 328 U.N.T.S. 247. 
 564 Id. 
 565 Ratification of C107 – Indigenous and Tribal Populations Convention, 
1957 (No. 107), INT’L LABOUR ORG., http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/
f?p=1000:11300:0::NO:11300:P11300_INSTRUMENT_ID:312252 (last visited 
Mar. 1, 2018). 
 566 ILO Convention No. 107, supra note 563, art. 11. 
 567 Id. art. 13. 
 568 Id. art. 11. 
 569 European Social Charter, Oct. 18, 1961, 529 U.N.T.S. 89. 
 570 Id. 
 571 European Social Charter Signatures & Ratifications, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, 
https://www.coe.int/en/web/turin-european-social-charter/signatures-ratifica-
tions (last updated Mar. 21, 2016). 
 572 European Social Charter, supra note 569, pt. I, princ. 4. 
 573 Id. pt. I. 
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16 1961574 
Rome Convention for the 
Protection of Performers, 
Producers of Phonograms 
and Broadcasting Organi-
zations, article 7(1).575 
93576 
 Right to the protection of perfor-
mances.577 
 Performers, producers 
of phonograms and broad-
casting organizations.578 
17 1961579 
Vienna Convention on Di-
plomatic Relations.580 
191*581 
 Right to inviolability of property, 
residence, papers and correspon-
dence.582 
 Right to be exempt from taxa-
tion.583 
 Diplomatic agents.584 
18 1962585 
ILO Convention (No. 117) 
Concerning Basic Aims 
and Standards of Social 
Policy, article 4.586 
33587 
 Right to ownership and use of land, 




                                                                                                             
 574 International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of 
Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations, Oct. 26, 1961, 496 U.N.T.S. 43. 
 575 Id. 
 576 WIPO-Administered Treatises: Rome Convention (Total Contracting Par-
ties: 93), WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/Show-
Results.jsp?lang=en&treaty_id=17 (last visited Mar. 1, 2018). 
 577 Convention for the Protections of Performers, supra note 574, art. 7. 
 578 Id. art. 2. 
 579 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 
3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95. 
 580 Id. 
 581 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, UN TREATY COLLECTION, 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=III-
3&chapter=3&lang=en (last visited Mar. 1, 2018). 
 582 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra note 579, art. 30. 
 583 Id. art. 34. 
 584 See generally id. 
 585 Convention (No. 117) Concerning Basic Aims and Standards of Social Pol-
icy, June 22, 1962, 494 U.N.T.S. 249. 
 586 Id. 
 587 Ratification of C117 – Social Policy (Basic Aims and Standards) Conven-
tion, 1962 (No. 117), INT’L LABOUR ORG., http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/
en/f?p=1000:11300:0::NO:11300:P11300_INSTRUMENT_ID:312262 (last vis-
ited Mar. 1, 2018). 
 588 Convention (No. 117) Concerning Basic Aims and Standards of Social Pol-
icy, supra note 585, art. 4. 
 589 Id. 




on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimi-
nation, article 5.591 
179*592 
 Right to own property without ra-
cial discrimination.593 
 Right to inherit without racial dis-
crimination.594 
 Individuals.595 
 Groups (“in associa-




American Convention on 






 Right to the use and enjoyment of 
property.600 
 Right not to be deprived of pro-
perty unless under certain condi-
tions.601 
 Everyone.602 
                                                                                                             
 590 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Dis-
crimination, opened for signature Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into 
force Jan. 4, 1969). 
 591 Id. art. 5. 
 592 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Dis-
crimination, UN TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.
aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV-2&chapter=4&clang=_en#1 (last visited Mar. 1, 
2018). 
 593 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Dis-
crimination, supra note 590, art. 5(d)(v). 
 594 Id. art. 5(d)(vi). 
 595 Id. art. 5(d)(v). 
 596 Id. 
 597 Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights 
art. 21, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 (entered into force 
July 18, 1978). 
 598 Id. art. 21. 
 599 American Convention on Human Rights, UN TREATY COLLECTION, 
https://treaties.un.org/pages/showdetails.aspx?objid=08000002800f10e1 (last 
visited Mar. 1, 2018). 
 600 American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 597, art. 21. 
 601 Id. 
 602 Id. 





Convention on the Means 
of Prohibiting and Preven-
ting the Illicit Import, Ex-
port and Transfer of Ow-








Geneva Convention for the 
Protection of Producers 
of Phonograms Against 
Unauthorized Duplication 
of Their Phonograms, arti-
cle 2.609 
79*610 
 Protection against the duplication 
and distribution of phonograms.611 
 Producers of phono-
grams.612 
                                                                                                             
 603 Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, 
Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, Nov. 14, 1970, 96 Stat. 
2350, 823 U.N.T.S. 231. 
 604 Id. 
 605 Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, 
Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, UNESCO, 
http://www.unesco.org/eri/la/convention.asp?KO=13039&language=E&order=
alpha (last visited Mar. 1, 2018). 
 606 Convention on Preventing Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, su-
pra note 603. 
 607 Id. 
 608 Convention for the Protection of Producers of Phonograms Against Unau-
thorized Duplication of Their Phonograms, Oct. 29, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 309, 866 
U.N.T.S. 67. 
 609 Id. art. 2. 
 610 CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF PRODUCERS OF PHONOGRAMS 
AGAINST UNAUTHORIZED DUPLICATION OF THEIR PHONOGRAMS, UN TREATY 
COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume%20II/
Chapter%20XIV/XIV-4.en.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2018). 
 611 Convention for the Protection of Producers of Phonograms, supra note 
608. 
 612 Id. 






Convention on the Elimina-
tion of All Forms of Dis-
crimination against Wo-





 Equal right to administer pro-
perty.616 
 Same rights as men in respect of 
the ownership, acquisition, manage-
ment, administration, enjoyment and 






African Charter on Human 






39621  Right to property.622  Human beings.623 
                                                                                                             
 613 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 20378 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1981). 
 614 Id. arts. 15, 16. 
 615 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women, UN TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.
aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV-8&chapter=4&lang=en (last visited Mar. 1, 2018). 
 616 Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, supra 
note 613, art. 15.2. 
 617 See id. at art. 16.1(h). 
 618 Id. arts. 15, 16. 
 619 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, June 27, 1981, 1520 
U.N.T.S. 245. 
 620 Id. art. 14. 
 621 See African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, UN TREATY 
COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/pages/showDetails.aspx?objid=
08000002800cb09f (last visited Mar. 1, 2018). 
 622 See African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, supra note 619, art. 
14. 
 623 See id. pmbl. 
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ILO Convention (No. 169) 
Concerning Indigenous 





 Right of ownership and possession 
over the lands traditionally occu-
pied.627 
 Right to safeguard the lands not 
occupied, but accessed for subsistence 
and traditional activities.628 
 Right to participate in the use, ma-
nagement and conservation of natural 
resources pertaining to their lands.629 
 
 
 Indigenous peoples.630 
26 1990631 
International Convention 
on the Protection of the 
Rights of All Migrant 
Workers and Members of 
Their Families, article 
15.632 
51633 
 Right not to be deprived of pro-
perty arbitrarily.634 
 Migrant workers and 
members of their fami-
lies.635 
                                                                                                             
 624 Convention (No. 169) Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Inde-
pendent Countries, June 7, 1989, 1650 U.N.T.S. 383, 28 I.L.M. 1382. 
 625 Id. 
 626 Ratification of C169 - Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989 
(No. 169), INT’L LABOUR ORG., http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/
f?p=1000:11300:0::NO:11300:P11300_INSTRUMENT_ID:312314 (last visited 
Mar. 1, 2018). 
 627 Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent 
Countries, supra note 624, art. 14. 
 628 Id. 
 629 Id. art. 15. 
 630 Id. art. 1. 
 631 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant 
Workers and Members of Their Families, Dec. 18, 1990, 2220 U.N.T.S. 3. 
 632 Id. art. 15. 
 633 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant 
Workers and Members of their Families, UN TREATY COLLECTION, https://trea-
ties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV-13&chapter=4&
lang=en (last visited Mar. 1, 2018). 
 634 Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and 
Members of Their Families, supra note 631. 
 635 Id. 
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 Right to compensation for govern-
mental expropriations and other pro-
tections for “investments” and “inves-
tors.”639 




ted Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights.642 
164*643 
 Right to the protection of intellec-
tual property.644 




UNIDROIT Convention on 
Stolen or Illegally Expor-
ted Cultural Objects.647 
 
42648 
 Right to compensation for retur-
ning a stolen or illegally exported cul-
tural object.649 
 Possessors of stolen or 
illegally exported cultural 
objects.650 
                                                                                                             
 636 North American Free Trade Agreement, Can.-Mex.-U.S., Dec. 17, 1992, 
32 I.L.M. 289 (1993). 
 637 Id. ch. 11. 
 638 North American Free Trade Agreement, AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L L., 
https://www.asil.org/eisil/north-american-free-trade-agreement (last visited Mar. 
1, 2018). 
 639 Id. art. 1102. 
 640 Id. art. 1101. 
 641 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 
15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197. 
 642 Id. 
 643 IP-Related Multilateral Treaties: Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement), WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., 
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/other_treaties/parties.jsp?treaty_id=231&
group_id=22 (last visited Mar. 1, 2018). 
 644 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, su-
pra note 641. 
 645 Id. art. 3(1). 
 646 International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT) 
Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects, June 24, 1995, 2421 
U.N.T.S. 457, 34 I.L.M. 1322. 
 647 Id. 
 648 UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects 
(Rome, 1995) – Status, INT’L INST. FOR THE UNIFICATION OF PRIVATE L. 
(UNIDROIT), http://www.unidroit.org/status-cp (last visited Mar. 1, 2018). 
 649 UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 646, art. 4(1). 
 650 Id. art. 3(1). 





Arab Charter on Human 
Rights, article 25 (1994 
version, which never en-
tered into force),652 article 
31 (2004 version, entered 
into force in 2008).653 






Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European 
Union.658 
28659 
 Right to own, use, dispose of and 
bequeath lawfully acquired posses-
sions.660 
 Right to intellectual property.661 
 “Everyone.”662 
32 2000663 




 Implies the existence of a right to 
acquisition, possession or use of pro-
perty.666 
 Everyone.667 
                                                                                                             
 651 League of Arab States, Arab Charter on Human Rights, Sept. 15, 1994, 
reprinted in 12 INT’L HUM. RTS. REP. 893 (1997) (never entered into force). 
 652 Id. art. 25. 
 653 League of Arab States, Arab Charter on Human Rights art. 31, May 24, 
2004, reprinted in 12 INT’L HUM. RTS. REP. 893 (2005) (entered into force Mar. 
15, 2008). 
 654 Arab Charter on Human Rights, UNHCR: REFWORLD, http://www.ref-
world.org/docid/3ae6b38540.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2018). 
 655 Arab Charter on Human Rights, supra note 653, art. 31. 
 656 Id. 
 657 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 
1. 
 658 Id. 
 659 Countries, EUROPEAN UNION, https://europa.eu/european-union/about-
eu/countries_en (last visited Dec. 31, 2017). 
 660 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, supra note 657, art. 
17(1). 
 661 Id. art. 17(2). 
 662 Id. art. 17(1). 
 663 G.A. Res. 55/25, United Nations Convention Against Transnational Orga-
nized Crime (Nov. 15, 2000). 
 664 Id. 
 665 United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, UN 
TREATY COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=
TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII-12&chapter=18&lang=en (last visited Mar. 1, 
2018). 
 666 G.A. Res. 55/25, supra note 663, art. 6(1)(b)(i). 
 667 Id. art. 6. 
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33 2003668 
Protocol to the African 
Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights on the 
Rights of Women in 
Africa.669 
36670 
 Right to acquire and administer 
property during marriage.671 
 Right to an equitable sharing of 
property deriving from marriage.672 
 Right to property over land.673 





Convention on the Rights 
of Persons with Disabili-





 Equal right to own or inherit pro-
perty.679 
 Equal right to control their own fi-
nancial affairs and have access to cre-
dit.680 
 Equal right not to be arbitrarily de-
prived of property.681 
 Persons with disabili-
ties.682 
                                                                                                             
 668 Org. of African Unity (OAU), Protocol to the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, July 11, 2003, OAU Doc. 
CAB/LEG/66.6 (entered into force Nov. 25, 2005). 
 669 Id. 
 670 Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the 
Rights of Women in Africa, AFRICAN COMM’N ON HUM. & PEOPLES’ RTS., 
http://www.achpr.org/instruments/women-protocol/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2018). 
 671 Id. art. 6(j). 
 672 Id. art. 7(d). 
 673 Id. art. 19(c). 
 674 Id. art. 21(1). 
 675 Id. 
 676 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, opened for signa-
ture Dec. 13, 2006, 2515 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force May 3, 2008). 
 677 Id. art. 12(5). 
 678 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), UN: DIV. 
FOR SOC. POL’Y & DEV. DISABILITY, https://www.un.org/development/desa/disa-
bilities/convention-on-the-rights-of-persons-with-disabilities.html (last visited 
Mar. 1, 2018). 
 679 Id. art. 12(5). 
 680 Id. 
 681 Id. 
 682 Id. 
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ASEAN Human Rights De-




 Right to own, use, dispose of and 
give lawfully acquired possessions.686 
 Right not to be arbitrarily deprived 
of property.687 
 “Every person.”688 
 
 
                                                                                                             
 683 Association of South East Asian States (ASEAN) Human Rights Declara-
tion art. 17, Nov. 18, 2012, available at http://www.asean.org/storage/im-
ages/ASEAN_RTK_2014/6_AHRD_Booklet.pdf. 
 684 Id. 
 685 Id. 
 686 Id. 
 687 Id. 
 688 Id. 
